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This dissertation examines the legal and national dimensions of citizenship, 
focusing on the nature of social justice, multiculturalism and state formation in light of an 
increasing “migrant” population in the United States. 
For many individuals, Hispanic people and undocumented immigrants are outside 
of stereotypic understandings of “American” and the legal structure of the United States. 
Seeking to question this belief and the subsequent political atmosphere it engenders, this 
work presents the challenges that Hispanic people and undocumented persons pose to the 
central tenants of liberal political theory and the politics of recognition. 
Liberal theories of justice that assume the nation-state as their starting point and 
ignore the international elements of 21st century societies need reconsideration. Although 
John Rawls’s work remains central to this tradition, by constricting his theory of justice 
to a closed, self-sustaining polity that assumes all persons behind the veil of ignorance to 
be citizens, the trajectory of liberal political thought after his work evades the question of 
citizenship and the possibility of social justice for undocumented people. Although 
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conversations about “multicultural citizenship” are abundant in North American political 
contexts, these discussions focus on the national representation of minority peoples and 
ignore the legal aspects of citizenship and the reality of undocumented immigration. 
Philosophers that do think about undocumented persons argue for international theories 
of justice, human rights or cosmopolitanism. These are positive steps in thinking about 
social justice for immigrants, but they only matter insofar as they do not impinge upon 
state sovereignty and render social justice for immigrants a secondary issue.  
While Latin American political thinkers such as Enrique Dussel ground the 
origins of political power in the citizenry of states, they nonetheless assume the category 
of “citizen” to be uncontested. Thus, even in settings where radical political change is 
underway, the basis of state membership remains to be defined and freed of racial (or 
even “post-racial”) expectations. I undertake this project in terms of Estadounidense or 
“Unitedstatesian” citizenship, a concept that combats ethnocentric beliefs about the 
meaning of “American” while also informing of more open understandings of legal 
citizenship and porous conceptions of the state. 
 
 vi 
 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
NAME OF AUTHOR:  Grant Joseph Silva 
 
 
   
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 
 University of Oregon, Eugene 
 Chapman University, Orange, CA 
 
 
DEGREES AWARDED: 
 
 Doctor of Philosophy, Philosophy, 2011, University of Oregon 
 Master of Arts, Philosophy, 2007, University of Oregon 
 Bachelor of Arts, Philosophy, 2004, Chapman University 
 
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
 
 Social and Political Philosophy 
 Latin American Philosophy 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
 
 Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy, Canisius College, August 
 2011-Present 
 
 Sawyier Pre-Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, Illinois Institute of Technology, 
 Department of Humanities, August 2010-August 2011 
 
 Graduate Teaching Fellowship, University of Oregon, Department of Philosophy, 
 September 2004-June 2010 
  
 Future for Minority Studies (FMS) Mellon Fellow, Cornell University, 2007-2008 
 
 
GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS: 
 
Graduate Research Award, Philosophy Department, University of Oregon, 2010  
 
 vii 
 
 
 Prize in Latin American Thought, “Towards a Latin American Political 
Philosophy of/for the United States,” American Philosophical Association 
Committee for Hispanics in Philosophy, 2009 
 
 Graduate Student Summer Research Grant, “Political Being and Authenticity,” 
The Center for Latino/a and Latin American Studies (CLLAS), University of 
Oregon, 2008 
 
 $20,000 Grant, “Latin American Philosophy Conference and Seminar,” The 
Associated Students of the University of Oregon Surplus Fund, 2007 
 
 Summer Grant, Center for Race, Ethnicity and Sexuality Studies (CRESS), 
University of Oregon, 2007 
 
 George Rebec Prize for Outstanding Graduate Essay, “The American Identity 
Crisis or ‘Two Dogmas’ of Racialization,” Department of Philosophy, 
University of Oregon 
 
 
PUBLICATIONS: 
 
Grant J. Silva. “The Axiological Turn in Early 20th Century American 
Philosophy: Alain Locke and Jose Vasconcelos on Epistemology, Value and the 
Emotions.” In Philosophical Values and World Citizenship: Locke to Obama and 
Beyond, edited by Leonard Harris and Jacoby Carter, 31-55. Lanham: Lexington 
Press, 2010. 
 
 
 
 viii 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I wish to express sincere appreciation to Professor Naomi Zack for her assistance 
in the preparation of this manuscript and for her time in conversation throughout my 
years at Oregon. I can only hope to become half the person and philosopher that she is. In 
addition, special thanks are due to Professors Cheyney Ryan, Scott Pratt and Michael 
Hames-Garcia for their support and time. This dissertation was supported in part by the 
following: a Sawyier Predoctoral Dissertation Fellowship from the Illinois Institute of 
Technology, Department of Humanities; a grant from the Center for Latino/a and Latin 
American Studies (CLASS) at the University of Oregon; a grant from the Center for 
Race, Ethnicity and Sexuality Studies at the University of Oregon; a grant from the 
Future for Minority Studies (FMS) Institute. I would also like to thank Eduardo 
Mendieta, Lind Martin Alcoff, Joseph Orosco, Enrique Dussel, and Jose Jorge Mendoza 
for their friendship and direction. 
 ix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedicated to any person I know with one of the following for a last name: Loera, Silva, 
Camacho, Hernandez, Heredia, Rodriguez, Duran, Fraijo or Melville. I especially 
dedicate this to my mother, Claudia, my first teacher and the best mom ever. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NATIONAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP ............................................................................................................. 1 
 1. National-Citizenship .......................................................................................... 3 
 2. Legal-Citizenship ............................................................................................... 14 
 
 3. How to Order National and Legal Citizenship or the Plan for this Work ......... 22 
 
 4. Notes .................................................................................................................. 29 
II. THE OUTSIDE OF NATIONALITY .................................................................... 36 
 1. The Political Nature of Hispanic People ........................................................... 39 
 2. The Transmodern, Trans-National State ........................................................... 43 
 3. Critical Analysis: The Missing Thesis on State Membership ........................... 58 
 4. Notes .................................................................................................................. 63 
III. THE LAW OF ILLEGAL PEOPLES: POLITICAL LIBERALISM, STATE 
BOUNDARIES, AND JUSTICE FOR UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS .......... 71 
 1. The Citizen Behind the Veil .............................................................................. 76 
 2. The Right of Self-Determination and the Moral Significance of Borders ........ 81 
      3. The Distribution of Legal Personhood .............................................................. 88 
      4. Notes .................................................................................................................. 97 
IV. THE ETHICS OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND THE LIMITS OF 
POLITICAL RECOGNITION .................................................................................... 103 
 1. The Ethics of Political Representation .............................................................. 105 
 2. Multiculturalism and Latin American Indigenous Politics ................................ 118 
 xi 
 
 
Chapter Page 
 
 
 3. Notes .................................................................................................................. 128 
V. THE RE-RACIALIZATION OF UNITED STATES NATIONAL IDENTITY ... 134 
 1. Racial Dynamism and Social Ontology ............................................................. 138 
 2. Two Dogmas of Racialization ........................................................................... 141 
 3. Latino/as and the Mechanics of Post-Racial Ideology ...................................... 151 
  4. Notes .................................................................................................................. 165 
VI. FROM IMMIGRANT ENCOUNTERS OF ESTADOUNIDENSE ...................... 173 
 1. Core Political Axioms: Settlerism vs. Discovery .............................................. 175 
      2. Rethinking the Meaning of ‘American’: Estadounidense ................................. 183 
      3. Notes .................................................................................................................. 188 
REFERENCES CITED ............................................................................................... 190 
  
  
 
1 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE NATIONAL AND THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP 
[W]e are standing at the border today because we…recognize that being a nation of laws 
goes hand in hand with being a nation of immigrants. This, too, is our heritage. This, too, 
is important. And the truth is we’ve often wrestled with the politics of who is and who 
isn’t allowed to enter this country. At times, there has been fear and resentment directed 
toward newcomers, particularly in periods of economic hardship. And because these 
issues touch on deeply held convictions – about who we are as a people, about what it 
means to be an American – these debates often elicit strong emotions. 
 
President Barack H. Obama  
El Paso, May 10th 2011 
 
It has always been easier, it always will be easier, to think of someone as a noncitizen 
than to decide that he is a nonperson. 
Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 
 
What the young Chicano understands and no one else, I don’t think, is that the Mexican-
American in this country has been sold a bill of goods for so long that it has weakened 
him to the point of impotence. From the beginning he was sold the idea that he was 
white, in other words, one of the boys. Well hell, he’s not one of the boys. In my 
estimation he is not even white. The Chicano is finally realizing that there is nothing 
exceptionally great about being white or certainly nothing wrong about being white, that 
this illusion in the country that white is best must go. 
Ruben Salazar 
Los Angeles Times Journalist   
 
The distribution of membership is not pervasively subject to the constraints of justice. 
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice 
 
 
In 1971, Roger Nett called the freedom of human movement across the globe “the 
civil right we are not ready for.”1 Over three decades later, in the spring of 2006, large 
immigrant rights protests took place in cities across the United States. Using Spanish- and 
English-language radio, cell-phones, the Internet, and word of mouth, thousands of high 
school and college students, service workers, professionals, the unemployed, and full-
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time parents interrupted their daily lives, marched into the streets of cities like downtown 
Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas and New York, and signaled another round of civil rights 
protests.2 The sheer magnitude of these events, in conjunction with the media coverage 
and grassroots mobilization, made visible the debates surrounding national identity, legal-
citizenship, and undocumented immigrant rights like nothing before.3 For many, these 
events signaled their unique political existence, the birth of a new “citizen,” so to speak. 
It is this understanding of “citizenship”—and the problems that it posses to liberal 
policies of exclusion, the politics of recognition, and static or fixed conceptions of the 
state—that this dissertation explores. 
Within the history of Western political philosophy there are two main 
understandings of citizenship, national-citizenship and legal-citizenship. National-
citizenship is a positive, activity-based understanding of state membership with roots in 
ancient Athens and classical republicanism. Legal-citizenship originates in the legal 
status and civil protections of citizens in Imperial Rome, but its contemporary 
significance owes much to the modern, liberal embracement of negative rights and 
individual freedom. In what follows, I will briefly explain these understandings of state 
membership and describe their complementary nature. While some political philosophers, 
legal scholars, and social theorists offer more than two dimensions of “citizenship,” most 
by adding a third identity-based perspective that I fold into the national,4 I will argue that 
the dichotomy I offer constitutes the full range of state membership: legal-citizenship is 
the means towards being able to impact the political atmosphere in ways that reflect the 
activity of national-citizenship. 
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My goal in this dissertation is to demonstrate how the problem of undocumented 
immigration and the political nature of Hispanic people challenge both the legal and 
national dimensions of state membership on different levels and at different times. 
Describing the differences between legal-citizenship and national-citizenship is crucial in 
this respect, because it allows for the precise determination of how novel justice claims, 
made on behalf of immigrants and undocumented residents alike, relate to traditional 
views of state membership—something that has yet to be done in mainstream political 
philosophy. In other words, some of the claims made by immigrant rights activists pertain 
to the national dimensions of citizenship, others to the legal. Nothing more than 
confusion and hostility will arise from within the immigration debate unless this 
specificity is brought into light. 
1. National-Citizenship 
Although the term ‘national’ bears contemporary significance associated with the 
nation-state, national-citizenship arises in ancient Greece and is the understanding of state 
membership at work in classical republicanism, contemporary communitarianism, and 
multicultural or “recognition-based” views of citizenship. Will Kymlicka and Wayne 
Norman call this understanding of state membership, “citizenship-as-desirable-activity.”5 
Rather than a passive legal status lacking consent or justification, national-citizenship 
amounts to a “thick” conception of state membership that harbors an assortment of duties 
and responsibilities on the part of the individual. Citizenship-as-desirable-activity is the 
idea at work when members of a political community are upheld as “outstanding 
citizens” and it is also the understanding of state membership that unites the traditions 
mentioned above (amidst their disagreements).6 Within this framework, citizens are 
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expected to value and appreciate “civic” or public life, a disposition ingrained through 
either community activity or education. Debate ensues when the possibility of practicing 
one’s citizenship duties as a woman, racial or ethnic minority, or with minimal state 
coercion, conflicts with the necessity of a shared value system or culturally homogenous 
core constituency. While advocates of multinationalism and multiculturalism argue 
against cultural, gender-based, racial, and sexual homogeneity, they nonetheless view 
citizenship as something an individual (or “differentiated” group7) does, that is to say, 
citizens have an active role in political life. 
National-citizenship is often associated with “the freedom of the ancients,” also 
known as positive rights, e.g. the right to vote, the right to run for office, the right to 
propose and amend law—the expression “freedom to…” best summarizes what is at stake 
in national-citizenship. Isaiah Berlin explains positive rights as those rights associated 
with the idea of self-mastery, “the wish on part of the individual to be his own master.” 
He continues,  
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of 
whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other’s men’s, acts 
of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious 
purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from 
outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer—deciding, not being deicide 
for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I 
were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of 
conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them.8 
 
Positive rights lend themselves to the activity of citizenship through the idea of political 
autonomy as opposed to heteronomy. Autonomous individuals are self-legislating; they 
“give themselves the law.” Heteronomous individuals abide by laws created by someone 
or something else, e.g. a religious authority, monarchy, a military general, etc. 
Autonomous citizens must define for themselves, amongst a community of peers, what 
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they wish to do or not do, which, in this context, implies the actual construction of 
positive law and government. In the appropriately titled, The Good Citizen, David 
Batstone and Eduardo Mendieta write, “As an ideal, citizenship stands for the autonomy, 
self-legislation, and sense of civic solidarity that members of a group extend to one 
another. Through citizenship we affirm our autonomy on the one hand, while on the other 
dictating the obligations that constrain our expression of that autonomy. Through 
citizenship we are both subjects and objects of the law.”9  
The history of citizenship in ancient Athens best captures the idea of an active, 
autonomous citizenry. Being a “citizen” (polites) in Ancient Athens implied the ability to 
partake in the public construction of “the good,” the supreme ideal that every political 
community aspires towards. Aristotle tells us, “Every state is a community of some kind, 
and every community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in 
order to obtain that which they think is good.”10 Although every community aims at some 
good or desirable end, the state or political community embraces all lesser goods, and in 
so doing aims at the highest degree of good possible, this being “justice.”11 In Athenian 
society, citizenship duties entailed the proposal of laws, assisting in the decision-making 
processes of the community, and participating in the self-rule of the polis. Citizens 
created justice, or as Aristotle put it, “a citizen was one who both rules and is ruled.” The 
Athenian understanding of citizenship was more than just freedom from tyranny or 
oppression. As J. G. A. Pocock reminds, “[Athenian] citizenship is not just a means to 
being free; it was the only way of being free.”12 Thus, the Athenian practice of 
citizenship was an activity where one’s participation in the public construction of the 
good occurred alongside of other citizens, equal to equal.13 As I will show below, this 
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idea of a common good remains imbedded in civic republican and communitarian 
conceptions of national-citizenship.  
Historically, the creation of ancient Greek citizenship goes hand and hand with 
the solidification of the polis, the Greek city-state.14 The Athenian lawgiver Solon is 
often credited with articulating the first citizenship laws in the early sixth century 
B.C.E.15 The dual creation of the polis and polites marks the substitution of archaic tribal 
relations based on kinship and personal demands for vengeance, with a politically 
organized life where justice reigns supreme.16 As early as the ancient Greeks, citizenship 
was constructed within a bordered city-state, which was a self-enclosed political unit. In 
451-0 B.C.E, the politician and general, Pericles, issued a reform that limited the status of 
“citizen” to those born with two citizen parents. Pericles was reacting to a rapid increase 
in the number of citizens.17 This, together with the fact that Athens was a bordered 
political entity, is why I consider this Greek model nationalistic, a claim I will defend 
shortly. Without explicitly naming the reform, Aristotle’s views on citizenship challenge 
Pericles’ conditions.18  
Although himself nothing more than a resident alien (a metic), Aristotle provides 
the most complete picture of citizenship in the polis: “citizenship” is not determined by 
residence, legal-status, or even by having the right to sue in court, but it is a political 
category that applies to those who share in the administration of justice, take part in 
political assembly, and hold office.19 “The definition is essentially functional,” writes 
Cynthia Patterson, “a citizen is defined not by birth or by membership in any human 
association, but by what he does.”20 Not even labor within the walls of polis was a proper 
criterion for citizenship. Aristotle tells us, “The truth is that we cannot include as citizens 
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all who are necessary to the existence of the state.”21 His reason, as Michael Walzer 
reminds us, was that “Citizenship required a certain ‘excellence’ that was not available to 
everyone.” Walzer continues,  
Someone had to do the hard work of the city, and it was best if the workers were 
clearly marked out and taught their place from birth. Labor itself, the everyday 
necessity of economic life, put the excellence of citizenship beyond their reach. 
Ideally, the band of citizens was an aristocracy of the leisured…and its members 
were aristocrats because they were leisured, not because of birth and blood or any 
inner gift. Politics took most of their time, though Aristotle would not have said 
that they rule over slaves and aliens. Rather, they took turns ruling one another. 
The others were simply their passive subjects, the “material conditions” of their 
excellence, with whom they had no political relations at all.22  
 
For Aristotle, the virtue or “excellence” of citizenship required a level of leisure beyond 
the realm of necessary, mundane toil. Citizens live in the realm of “choice” or “freedom,” 
where collective decision-making determines their fate. Conversely, the conditions of 
economic life and material need determine the realm of necessary labor. Slaves, women 
(relegated to the domestic sphere), general laborers and even “mechanics” could not be 
citizens, because they were not “free.” Rather these individuals provided the material 
conditions for others to practice citizenship and thereby exercise their freedom. In sum, 
for Aristotle, the positive rights of citizenship, as connected to the autonomy of the 
political community, are incompatible if not impossible for those who spend their days 
working to make ends meet. Citizenship is a political exercise requiring one’s complete 
attention and focus.23  
 Here is an initial objection to Aristotle’s views, given that the practice of 
citizenship does require a type of status: a “citizen” must be outside the realm of material 
need, which is a socioeconomic, class status; it is also a gendered position, as Patterson 
suggests (see below). In short, Aristotle maintains heavy normative expectations 
pertaining to the type of person capable of being a citizen.  
  
 
8 
An Aristotelian response might remind us that while legal status is disregarded as 
a basis for citizenship, the focus is on moral excellence, which requires a certain amount 
of effort (and “luck” or “good fortune”). To put it differently, there are obvious moral 
dimensions associated with Aristotle’s understanding of citizenship. Aristotelian 
citizenship is an exercise in self-mastery requiring virtuous individuals willing to actively 
perform their duties in a community of others doing the same. Remember, for Aristotle, 
the highest good possible is a community of individuals who are all striving to be 
virtuous, i.e., they demonstrate excellence of character through their repeated moral 
actions.24 The practice of citizenship offers the opportunity to realize this atmosphere, 
since living well and embracing the good requires some kind of habituated activity, not 
just a passive state of being such as legal status. Although all individuals must aspire 
towards the virtuous life independently, regardless of whether or not they are born in a 
virtuous community, it does help if there are exemplars of virtue at the ready. Notice, 
however, that there is an element of contingency in this: one happens to be born in the 
right community, a point that Aristotle acknowledges when he explains that being 
virtuous requires a virtuous community. Thus, even from the onset, the idea of citizenship 
has an arbitrary foundation, a problem that is important in analyzing the work of John 
Rawls and, more generally, liberal political theory. 
The Aristotelian definition of citizenship requires an escape from any immediate 
involvement in the material conditions providing for the political life of a “statesman”—
from the instrumental material infrastructure to the ideal supra-structure (the end), to 
paraphrase Pocock.25 For Gershon Shafir, this amounts to a “participatory aristocracy,” 
because only a select few rule the polis.26 Walzer prefers the phrase “band of citizen 
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tyrants.”27 Challenging this view from an egalitarian perspective requires either the 
emancipation of women, slaves, and the rest of those confined to the realm of necessary 
labor or the construction of a new understanding of citizenship that obviates the divide 
between a public life of leisured service and the realm of toil. However, as Pocock notes, 
doing away with the split between a political life of leisure and the material realm of toil 
may throw out the idea of “citizenship” altogether: its historic meaning seemingly implies 
the gulf between public life and the private-domestic realm.28 This remains a contested 
issue in contemporary literature.  
Patterson’s analysis of gender dynamics revolving around the idea of citizenship 
in Athens demonstrates how women constantly contested the limits between the public 
and private.29 Susan Moller Okin and Carole Pateman argue against such a rigid divide 
between the public realm of freedom and the private-domestic realm of material need. 
Rather than conflate the public and private, Okin argues that they may be separate but 
“inextricably connected,” a move that assuages Pocock’s concern to some extent. 
Pateman argues that various issues relegated to the private-domestic realm are 
consequences of public decisions. In addition, many aspects of private life are routinely 
made political.30 Walzer notes that Aristotle’s division between the public and private is a 
false dichotomy and not as rigid as one may think, because  “citizens” did make decisions 
about material life.31 For Pocock, transcending the Aristotelian trap of associating the 
activity of citizenship with the public realm may demand a new understanding of the 
political altogether, one that is not agent-based.32 Below, I will present an alternative 
view of the political (and citizenship) constructed around the legal person and not the 
moral agent.  
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Given the emphasis placed upon citizenship as a practical, activity-based political 
category, one may object that my use of ‘national-citizenship’ is a misnomer, especially 
since the nation-state is a rather recent invention. If ‘national-citizenship’ focuses on the 
activity or practice of citizenship, which many theorists label “republican” or “civic” 
citizenship,33 why refer to it as “national”?  
Although this is a valid concern, throughout the history of citizenship-as-
desirable-activity the main practice has been nationalism. The laws created by citizens, 
values exhibited in the decision-making processes, and communal goals realized by the 
activities of citizens are all meant to support or reify the nation, i.e., the particular group 
of people residing in the location where citizens acquire their status as such. This is 
especially true when the practice of national-citizenship assumes the existence of borders 
and the idea of a territorial state. The “good” that Aristotle’s citizens try to realize is not 
that of the cosmos, but only the good of the political community, as it exists within the 
walls of the polis. Even Jean-Jacques Rousseau, enamored by the republican ideal of the 
political as primary consisting of an active close-knit citizenry ingrained with civic 
values, stands in favor of nationalism. A brief contrast between Rousseau and Thomas 
Hobbes on the source of political power and the difference between subject/citizen will 
make this point. 
For Hobbes, political power is concentrated into the hands of a sovereign, who 
stands above the community and makes all political decisions. When creating the 
Leviathan, individuals lay down their arms, divest themselves of their right to self-rule 
and give this right to the sovereign. As the supreme authority in a given domain, the 
sovereign has a monopoly on political power and the legitimate use of violence.34 The 
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question for Hobbes is primarily about the legitimacy of the sovereign, which he grounds 
in the irrevocable consent of individual persons forming the social compact (remember 
that in the state of nature there is no political community so “the people” are not the 
source of political power).35 With Hobbes, the difference between the ruler and ruled, 
sovereign and subject, is taken for granted: “every member of the body politic, is called a 
subject, to wit, to the sovereign.”36 There is no active citizenry but only a relation 
amongst subjects mediated by the authority figure articulating law.   
The difference between “citizen” and “subject” is crucial in this respect. The 
citizen, being autonomous, constructs and maintains law; the subject, being 
heteronomous, is legally accountable but does not have any say over law, because 
political power is consolidated into the hands of the sovereign, monarch, or political 
figure making the decisions. This is why in the civic republican tradition, and the more 
recent communitarian tradition for the same reason, the question of admission into a 
national polity is a weighty issue. One cannot be subject to law without having an actual 
say in its maintenance; once admitted, “immigrants” or those seeking inclusion must 
participate on equal footings. In short, in this tradition, citizens are not subjects, but 
autonomous members of the body politic. 
 Rousseau anticipates the communitarian view of citizenship when he writes, 
“Strictly speaking, laws are merely the conditions of civil association. The populace that 
is subjected to the laws ought to be their author. The regulating of the conditions of a 
society belongs to no one but those who are in association with one another.”37 Rousseau 
is an extremist here, because the responsibilities of state membership force a person to be 
free: “whoever refuses to obey the general will will be forced to do so by the entire body. 
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This means merely that he will be forced to be free. For this is the sort of condition that, 
by giving each citizen to his homeland, secures him against all personal dependence.”38 
Contrary to Hobbes, Rousseau believes that communal life exists prior to political 
institutions: “What people…is suited for legislation? One that, finding itself bound by 
some union of origin, interest or convention, has not yet felt the true yoke of laws.”39 For 
Rousseau, the pre-existing political community is not only the source of political power, 
but the people are the actual “sovereign” themselves. Even if they decide to give power to 
an individual, “a people is a people before it gives itself to a king. This gift itself is a civil 
act; it presupposes a public deliberation.”40 For Rousseau, a representative sovereign 
cannot rule over a “people” (i.e. nation) but only an “aggregation,” a group united by law 
and easily dissolvable with the collapse of the political order. Rousseau tells us, “There 
will always be a great difference between subduing a multitude and ruling a society. If 
scattered men, however many there may be, were successively enslaved by a single 
individual, I see nothing but master and slaves; I do not see a people and its leader. It is, 
if you will, an aggregation, but not an association.”41 “Associations” are communities 
formed through consent—yet another reason why admission policies are so important 
within the paradigm of national-citizenship.  
If the question worth asking Hobbes pertains to the legitimacy of the sovereign, 
the important question for Rousseau pertains to the unity and cohesion of the people. 
What generates and maintains the unity? While the opposition of private interests creates 
the need for order that comes with the creation of society, the fact that humans are willing 
to form social groups implies that they do have common interests. This is what forms the 
social bond. Therefore, it is only “on the basis of this common interest that society ought 
  
 
13 
to be governed,” or so argues Rousseau.42 The state or political institution, consisting of 
and working for the people, directs itself toward the common good, and in so doing 
strengthens the community. As a safeguard, Rousseau expects citizens to have a steadfast 
commitment to self-rule that is passed on through education and civic values.43 These 
values instill an appreciation for communal life and ensure that citizenry serve the 
common interest.  
It is not hard to see how the question of identity arises from this Rousseauian 
perspective. The cohesion of the political community thrives on the fact that citizens 
identify with their community in such a way that grants personal meaning. There is also a 
historical component. The good of the community is their good, and that of previous 
members unto posterity—this is why when immigrants want to practice citizenship in 
such a way that takes this historical trajectory into a “new” direction, conflict is bound to 
arise. 
It is through nationality that individuals are citizens; whenever the activity of 
citizenship occurs within the confines of a bordered polity, it assumes the wellbeing of 
nation to be its chief concern. This is most explicit in discussions of the “common good,” 
a major set back for immigrants, because the practice of citizenship-as-desirable-activity 
may be problematic from the perspective of a foreigner. To privilege an immigrant’s 
particular good (or even a minority’s wellbeing) above the general political community 
amounts to a betrayal of the category “citizen,” which again, acts with the highest good 
of the political community in mind. Along these lines, Rousseau writes,  
Finally, when the state, on the verge of ruin, subsists only in an illusory and vain 
form, when the social bond of unity is broken in all hearts, when the meanest 
interest brazenly appropriates the sacred name of the public good, then the general 
will becomes mute. Everyone, guided by secret motives, no more express their 
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opinions as citizens than if the state had never existed; and iniquitous decrees 
having as their sole purpose the private interest are falsely passed under the name 
of laws.44 
 
Immigrants and minorities may aspire to their own good by remitting money to their 
country of origin or arguing for specific minority rights, but not as “citizens” per se, at 
least on a generous interpretation. A more stringent perspective might argue that they 
cannot do these at all, either as citizen or noncitizen. Moreover, from that conservative 
perspective, maintaining one’s cultural tradition or a commitment to their home 
community is unpatriotic and a form of dissent. What I call “the ethics of political 
representation,” confronts this line of thought head on and seeks a middle ground 
between talk of rights and talk of the good, in the form of  “group rights.” The important 
point, here, even if one disagrees with my use of ‘national,’ is that there is a tradition of 
citizenship that focuses on the activity of being a citizen. It is performative, rests upon an 
appreciation for public life, and strives after an autonomous political citizenry. 
2. Legal-Citizenship 
Most theorists summarize “legal-citizenship” as formal membership in an 
organized political community.45 Interestingly enough, in today’s world of the state, all 
aspects of citizenship fall under the jurisdiction of some legal system, including national-
citizenship. To put it differently, “the law” protects both positive and negative 
constructions of citizenship.46 Thus, the term ‘legal-citizenship’ is somewhat of a 
pleonasm. However, as I will explain in this section, this is not what I mean by “legal-
citizenship.”  
Rather than the overt political activity described above, there exists an 
understanding of state membership connected to what are called “rights of 
noninterference,” those legal entitlements that protect an individual from the actions of 
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others. Legal-citizenship is an ascriptive status conferred upon individuals through the 
politics of birth or naturalization. 47 By “politics of birth” I have in mind the ways in 
which group membership is distributed according to the place of one’s birth (jus soli), 
one’s parents, lineage, or bloodline (jus sanguinis), or a combination of both. Legal-
citizenship is the actual having, or not, of official documentation or some form of state 
recognized identification that grants a person public legitimacy in a bordered political 
unit or pre-determined area. Compared to national-citizenship, legal-citizenship depends 
more explicitly on the existence of borders and well-defined polities. These designate the 
territorial range from where official membership is assigned. In this sense, legal-
citizenship is fundamentally connected to the sovereignty of states, especially a state’s 
right to create its own law.48 
Before providing the history of legal-citizenship, let me briefly state that this is 
the idea of state membership most people have in mind when considering the problem of 
undocumented, informal, or “illegal” immigration. Owing much to the liberal, social 
democratic nature of contemporary states, legal-citizenship is the main idea of citizenship 
within the folk ordinary understanding of state membership. As such, it lacks the positive 
import attached to national-citizenship. Like whiteness in terms of the experience of a 
racial identity, or the experience of gender in the context of male identities, legal-
citizenship is often taken for granted by a majority of the population of developed, first-
world countries like the United States (besides those times when citizens have to use their 
birth certificate, apply for a driver’s license, get married, etc.). Legal-citizenship is almost 
never in question for large segments of the population. Legal-citizenship is often the 
criterion for the practice of national-citizenship, a relationship I will say more about in 
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the next section. Nonetheless, in states where the legal-citizenship is the primary model 
of citizenship, national-citizenship is often considered some form of “patriotism” or 
national pride. 
Whereas national-citizenship expects citizens to perform an assortment of duties 
or tasks, legal-citizenship requires political institutions to be responsible for securing a 
certain standard of living and protecting basic civil entitlements. Negative rights, such as 
property rights, freedom of religion (or the separation between church and state), legal 
protections like habeas corpus and equal protection under law, in addition to civil rights 
ensuring equal opportunity, are crucial to legal-citizenship—“freedom from…” best 
expresses these rights. Berlin explains negative rights as those rights that provide “the 
area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. […] By being free in this sense I 
mean not being interfered with by others.”49 As Berlin notes, there is much debate in the 
history of modern liberal political thought regarding how wide of an area negative rights 
provide, in addition to how much the state or political institution needs to protect these 
economic and civil liberties.50 Within the social democratic tradition, legal-citizenship 
requires the existence of a large welfare state that guarantees civil protections and a 
common standard of living, what the British political theorist, T. H. Marshall, calls “civil 
rights” and “social rights” respectively.51 Given that they regulate individual liberty, not 
only are negative rights necessary for the existence of positive freedom, but they also 
entail certain basic entitlements that allow individuals to live productive lives that realize 
(to some extent) human potentiality. 
Legal-citizenship harks back to Roman imperial conceptions of a fully recognized 
person endowed with proprietary protections throughout the Empire.52 While the original 
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Roman republic had an understanding of citizenship closer to that found in ancient 
Athens, a more legalistic model replaced it with subsequent territorial expansion.53 The 
Roman imperial conception of legal-citizenship or civis Romanus (civitas—where the 
word ‘citizenship’ derives) secured legal protections against the claims of others and 
ultimately the right of “appeal to the Emperor.” According to Patterson, “citizen status 
was constructed as a juridical status providing access to the protection of Roman private 
law of person and property—and for men, access to political participation (and military 
service).”54  
Paul of Tarsus, or Saint Paul of the Roman Catholic Church, is the most obvious 
example of the significance of legal-citizenship in ancient Rome. A convert to 
Christianity, through his standing as “citizen,” Paul was able to travel throughout the 
Empire with impunity, taking full advantage of his civil protections and finding a unique 
opportunity to proselytize. Pocock writes, “Paul not only asserts that as a citizen he is 
immune from arbitrary punishment, he goes on to remind the officer threatening the 
punishment that he is a citizen by birth and the officer only by purchase and therefore of 
lower prestige and authority.” Pocock adds that citizenship in the Roman Empire was “a 
legal-status, carrying with it rights to certain things—perhaps possessions, perhaps 
immunities, perhaps expectations—available in many kinds and degrees, available or 
unavailable to many kinds of person for many kinds of reason. One can say in the world 
of Saint Paul that citizenship is a right to certain things.”55 
For Pocock, the relation to “things” (res) is the defining characteristic of Roman 
civitas. If you recall, Aristotle’s citizen was beyond of the world of material need, which 
includes “things” or objects. The relation between Athenian citizens was one of subject to 
  
 
18 
subject, not subject to object. This is not to say that Athenian citizens did not make 
practical decisions that affected the material world, they obviously did. However, as 
Pocock reminds, “[Athenian] citizens did not act upon each other through the medium of 
things, and did not in the first instance define one another as the possessors and 
administrators of things.”56 For Roman citizens, on the other hand, “citizenship” implied 
the ability to act upon the world and take possession of objects. Given that conflicts arose 
between individuals desiring the same material goods, some medium was required 
through which legitimate claims could be made.57 Jurisprudence or law served this role, 
thus regulating the interactions of citizens. In more modern settings this is the reason why 
law has to be objective and not at the service of any particular person; hence Hobbes’ 
Leviathan stands above the body politic, literally above the law.  
In short, Roman citizenship made one a proprietor capable of owning material 
possessions. The res publica was the political and legal realm (perhaps the “market 
place”) where citizens exercised their rights as individuals. Here, Roman imperial 
citizenship fully anticipated the possessive individualism of the modern liberal 
tradition.58 
Roman imperial citizenship reached its height in 212 C.E. when the Emperor 
Marcus Aurelius decreed that all free residents of the empire were citizens.59 This 
somewhat inclusive policy reflects the cosmopolitan nature of Roman imperialism, a trait 
that often benefitted the empire. For Patterson, civis Romanus was key to the longevity of 
the Empire: “its creative use of its own or others’ traditions and constructions of 
citizenship, allowing or at least tolerating diverse sorts of community and at time the 
crossing of borders.”60 While the purpose of an expansive citizenry was probably to 
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generate tax revenue, there is no doubt that the Roman Empire negotiated a certain level 
of complexity that recognized local and imperial law. This two-tiered system recognized 
local autonomy and citizenship law alongside the imperial model for citizenship.61 
With the fall of the Roman Empire, regional municipalities arose (what are called 
bourges in French or burgs in German). “Bourgeoisie citizenship,” as Pocock terms it, 
maintained legalistic understandings of group membership grounded in the particular 
laws of specific municipalities, a consequence of the Roman imperial tolerance of local 
autonomy. The legal-status of the Roman citizen became somewhat equivocal at this 
time, or at the very least just another jurisdiction that a person inhabited, even referred to 
as one’s “bourgeoisie Romaine.”62 Nonetheless, the bourgeoisie Romaine remained a 
universally recognized form of citizenship that was not localized to any particular 
community, but part of the entire empire. It is this understanding of citizenship, as a 
categorical law applicable to all persons regardless of their local affiliations, that remains 
important to contemporary understandings of legal-citizenship, especially in the context 
of a federated republic like the United States or a political entity like the European Union.  
The rise of the secular state in the 18th -19th centuries set legal-citizenship on the 
trajectory it maintains today.63 In the move to create political institutions that were not 
controlled by the Church or monarchy, citizenship law in the secular state became a 
means of distancing its subjects from these other institutions. Hence, being a citizen in a 
secular state implied that one was under the administration and control of that particular 
political institution, a sovereign entity. As Walter Mignolo puts it, “When the idea of 
[legal] ‘citizenship’ came into view—and was linked to the materialization and formation 
of the nation-state in secular north Europe—it enforced the formation of communities of 
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birth instead of communities of faith.”64 The basis of birth, rather than faith, rendered the 
idea of “citizenship” the physical, reproducible link between the nation and the state. In 
addition, since it was localized to a particular territory, citizenship also became an 
effective means of regulating the rise of unskilled labor during the industrial revolution, 
an instrumental use of citizenship that exists until today.65 
As Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith explain, “birthright citizenship originated as a 
distinctively feudal status intimately linked to medieval notions of sovereignty, legal 
personality, and allegiance.”66 For these political theorists, birthright citizenship arises at 
the onset of the modern state, especially in the legal works of Sir Edward Coke and Sir 
Robert Filmer, both of whom “wrote at a time when European monarchies generally, and 
the English Crown in particular, were still striving to unite fragmented territories and 
create centralized national government to replace a feudal order that divided power 
among diverse regional lords and religious authorities.”67 Coke found “the principle of 
ascription,” as Schuck and Smith call it, a means of ensuring group membership across 
national and ethnic boundaries (a view prompted by property disputes in light of the 
unification of the United Kingdom, i.e. Calvin’s Case). Coke viewed political identity as 
determined at birth and based on allegiance owed to the sovereign. In exchange for 
protection as an infant, subjects are indebted to their sovereign in ways similar to how a 
child owes their parents for care provided at birth (Hobbes’s “Lord Mothers” comes to 
mind). One can have more than one allegiance, but those debts acquired at birth reign 
supreme.68 In this sense, Schuck and Smith inadvertently explain why subsequent 
citizenship theorists find it necessary to say something about the family, when 
reformulating a theory of citizenship.69   
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There are two main problems with legal-citizenship. Given the fact that legal-
citizenship is assigned by an objective external entity (i.e. the state), in addition to the 
fact that it relies upon the politics of birth, many argue that it (1) lacks a consensual basis 
and (2) provides no motivation for political activity. For this reason, Schuck and Smith’s 
Citizenship Without Consent explains how birthright citizenship lacks credibility within 
the contractarian tradition.70 They write:  
At a conceptual level, [birthright citizenship] was fundamentally opposed to the 
consensual assumptions that guided the political handiwork of 1776 and 1787. In 
a polity whose chief organizing principle was and is the liberal, individualistic 
idea of consent, mere birth within a nation’s border seems to be an anomalous, 
inadequate measure or expression of an individual’s consent to its rule and a 
decidedly crude indicator of the nation’s consent to the individuals admission to 
political membership.71  
 
On this account, given the workings of actual citizenship law, only immigrants who 
chose to naturalize into a given polity are citizens. The ascriptive nature of legal-
citizenship is a fundamental problem for the liberal tradition that I will explore in more 
detail in chapter 4—especially since it suggest an arbitrary foundation for liberal thought. 
The second problem with legal-citizenship has to do with the fact that the expansion of 
welfare rights, “social rights,”72 and civil rights, all of which are associated with legal-
citizenship, tend to create a passive citizenry that does nothing overtly political or 
“public” in order to claim legal entitlements. As Kymlicka and Norman explain, Marshall 
believed that “the fullest expression of citizenship requires a liberal democratic state.” 
They continue, “By guaranteeing civil, political and social rights to all, the welfare state 
ensures that every member of society feels like a full member of society, able to 
participate in and enjoy the common life of society.”73 The conservative response to that, 
according to Kymlicka and Norman, “argues that the welfare state has promoted passivity 
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among the poor, without actually improving their life chances, and created a culture of 
dependency. Far from being the solution, the welfare state has itself perpetuated the 
problem by reducing citizens to passive dependents who are under bureaucratic 
tutelage.”74 The question then becomes how to activate such a citizenry in a way that 
does not require public life?75  
3. How to Order National and Legal Citizenship or The Plan for this Work 
For some, the shift from the activity of citizenship to legal status implies a change 
in the concept of the political altogether, one that creates a conception of political life and 
social interaction requiring an external intermediary; ultimately a “sovereign.”76 This 
renders citizenship something inward, personal, and subjective, rather than an outward 
relation exhibited amongst peers. Shafir notes that this anticipates the liberal-
communitarian divide on citizenship: political freedom to contribute in the political 
community versus legal protections that ensure freedom from other individuals.77 This 
division establishes two separate trajectories for subsequent political thought regarding 
state membership: for communitarians the question of equality is of the utmost 
importance (Walzer’s conception of “complex equality” is most representative of this 
train of thought), while for political liberalism the legitimacy of the sovereign or 
government and the idea of the institution as an unbiased intermediary are contentious 
issues (here John Rawls’ focus on fairness is paramount).78 That is to say, 
communitarians are most concerned with political relations amongst equals, whereas 
liberals are most concerned with the conditions for formal equality. 
Kymlicka and Norman differentiate legal-citizenship from national-citizenship as 
follows: “[T]here are two different concepts which are conflated in these discussions: 
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citizenship-as-legal-status, that is, as full membership in a particular political community; 
and citizenship-as-desirable-activity, where the extent and quality of one’s citizenship is a 
function of one’s participation in that community.”79 In Philosophies of Exclusion: 
Liberal Political Theory and Immigration, Phillip Cole points out that Kymlicka and 
Norman hold these understandings of state membership to be mutually exclusive, so that 
one can work on the question of what makes a person a “good citizen,” without ever 
really entertaining the question of legal-citizenship.80 They write, “we should expect a 
theory of the good citizen to be relatively independent of the legal question of what it 
takes to be a citizen, just as a theory of the good person is distinct from the metaphysical 
(or legal) question of what it is to be a person.”81 
According to Cole, the separation between good persons and legal persons is 
unsustainable and problematic. Political philosophers cannot construct theories of “good” 
citizenship without also addressing the legal dimensions of citizenship. Cole’s claim is 
more than just a suggestion. Yes, the question of legal-citizenship is a “metaphysical” or 
“ontological” question about a persons’ legitimate existence within a national boundary, 
while normative theories of citizenship inquire into the quality of citizenship practice. 
However, normative theories of citizenship cannot help but inform of the kinds of 
persons entitled to being a legal citizen. Thus, the “good” informs the “real,” so to speak. 
Cole writes, “the two questions are inseparable, and to construct a theory of internal 
membership without addressing the question of admittance is a fatally flawed project.”82  
Instead of viewing national-citizenship and legal-citizenship as two separate 
understandings of state membership, I think contemporary liberal polities inherit both 
formulations of citizenship, and consequentially both conceptions of the political. 
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National-citizenship and legal-citizenship are two different moments of the same 
understanding of state membership, both of which constitute the full meaning of 
citizenship in contemporary states. Walzer expresses a similar sentiment when he writes, 
“[t]he security provided by the authorities cannot just be enjoyed; it must itself be 
secured, and sometime against the authorities themselves. The passive enjoyment of 
citizenship requires, at least intermittently, the activist politics of citizens.”83 
Part of my objective in this dissertation is to explain the nature of the relationship 
between national-citizenship and legal-citizenship. 84 It is my hope that parsing out this 
division between the legal and national will aid the immigration debate as it exists in 
developed countries today. It will also help clarify what, exactly, those in favor of 
immigration reform and immigrant rights are asking for, and why mainstream political 
philosophers are unable (or unwilling) to respond to these individuals by formulating 
ethical and political theories that take into consideration their concerns. In light of the 
arbitrary nature of the politics of birth, as alluded to above (and explained in more detail 
in chapter 3), I provide an expansive notion of “legal-citizenship” that ameliorates the 
vulnerable social predicament occupied by informal residents in places like the United 
States. As various legal scholars have made apparent, the law is rather inclusive when it 
comes to the rights associated with legal-citizenship, at times even recognizing 
noncitizens and undocumented people as entitled to certain protections.85 Yet, the history 
of mainstream political philosophy does not reflect this expansive legal dimension of 
state membership. Political philosophers begin from conceptions of the state that are 
untenable, and in so doing they set the trajectory for subsequent thought on justice, rights, 
or equality in directions that will not help some of the most exploited and needed 
  
 
25 
individuals, e.g. undocumented immigrants. I argue that it is possible to start re-
formulating theories of justice and state that reflect the workings of actual political 
institutions in ways that do not necessarily impede on the positive rights of national-
citizenship. This, of course, requires that one grapples with the host of questions I pose in 
this work.  
Explaining the relationship between the legal and the national requires that I 
explore the question of state membership within mainstream political liberalism, the 
politics of recognition or multiculturalism, and contemporary conceptions of state. In 
order to surpass most of the theoretical limitations that pervade these traditions, I will use 
the question of undocumented immigration and the political nature of people of Hispanic 
descent as the springboard for this discussion, a perspective that I call “the outside of 
nationality.” Chapter 2 will explain my use of “the outside of nationality,” as well as 
focus on Enrique Dussel’s notion of the transmodern political institution (what I refer to 
as the “transnational-state”). Since Dussel views the construction of the state as an 
ongoing process that must take into consideration the marginalized and oppressed if it is 
to remain healthy, his “analectical politics” is crucial to rethinking immigration and 
citizenship today. However, amidst his transformative radical thought, Dussel does not 
make clear his stance on citizenship. I offer a critique of his views regarding state 
membership in light of his lack of a positive stance on the subject. Nonetheless, let me 
reiterate that Dussel’s thoughts provide the theoretical maneuver necessary to launch any 
meaningful and engaging criticism of the traditions I explore.  
As I will show, although there is a rich discussion of the importance of 
immigration and citizenship within contemporary political thought, little of this literature 
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has to do with the unique problem of undocumented immigration. The reality of 
undocumented immigration does not permit one to assume the existence of closed polities 
when constructing theories of justice. Discussions of formal or legal immigration do; 
formal immigration begins from a starting point viewing states as separate political units 
that can rightfully exclude or include whomever they desire. There are some pressing 
reasons why one must approach the question of state membership and theories of justice 
with the social and political positioning of “illegality” in mind. Illegality derives its 
meaning from legality. In using the real-life example of illegality, it is not only possible 
to address informal immigration from a political philosophical perspective, but the nature 
of “legality” itself requires reexamination. Thus, the fundamental question for a liberal 
polity is, as Cole phrased it, “how anybody, regardless of their circumstances, can 
legitimately be excluded from our political community?”86 
The answer to the question of exclusion must be compatible with the principle of 
equality that structures the internal membership policies of liberal states. Otherwise, one 
must supply a compelling argument for denying the equal moral worth of all persons (not 
just those within a national boundary).87 Cole writes,  
With its universalist commitment to the moral equality of humanity, liberal theory 
cannot coherently justify…practices of exclusion, which constitute ‘outsiders’ on 
grounds any recognisable [sic] liberal theory would condemn as arbitrary. And yet 
at the same time the liberal project depends upon those practices: the existence of 
a liberal polity made up of free and equal citizens rests upon the existence of 
outsiders who are refused a share of the goods of the liberal community. Liberal 
political philosophy maintains the appearance of coherence at the level of theory 
through the strategy of concealment.88  
 
When made apparent, the best a liberal state can do in justifying its “policy of exclusion” 
(i.e., the explicit reasoning that prioritizes the nation over the general human population) 
is to argue that the need for political order outweighs the equal moral worth of all human 
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beings. In addition, appeals to the right of self-determination are frequently employed for 
justifying national groupings, as they already exist. Using Rawls as a paradigmatic 
example, Chapter 3 will argue that utilitarian policies of exclusion and the appeal to self-
determination may justify the existence of borders in theory, but they do not abate the 
arbitrary nature of present-day state boundaries. I suggest that the best egalitarian effort 
that can be put forward is to formulate an idea of legal-personhood (not citizenship) that 
eventually leads to full membership in the nation, which is a move that happens to 
resemble the legal history of alienage law. 
In the chapter 4, I explain how the questions of national representation and 
multiculturalism have little to offer the legal-dimensions of citizenship, at least prima 
facie. In fact, the popularity and attention multicultural discourses of citizenship have 
received further alienates the exigencies of undocumented immigration. At the heart of 
multicultural discourse is a conception of legal-citizenship that remains unquestioned and 
connected to “the paradox of democratic legitimacy.” Aside from these issues, however, 
the politics of multiculturalism are central to establishing a political atmosphere 
conducive to immigrant rights. And so, through multiculturalism the division between 
national-citizenship and legal-citizenship can acquire new meaning that allows for both 
libratory discourses, the established work on national representation and novel work on 
illegality, to support one another. In addition, as an example of why multiculturalism 
must be accompanied by changes in political power, I present a historical example of the 
problems associated with multiculturalism in Bolivia. I recount how the transformation of 
indigenous peoples into national-citizens fostered a semblance of political equality, but 
allowed economic, social and class inequality to continue. These problems are 
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tantamount to the standard Marxist critique of formal citizenship: formal equality does 
nothing to assuage economic inequality or imbalances in power dynamics. My analysis of 
Marx’s essay, “On the Jewish Question,” serves as support.  
Yet, for other reasons I will explore in chapter 5, multiculturalism is not easy to 
achieve in the “post-racial” world we inhabit today, and the political nature of Hispanic 
people in the United States makes this point apparent. Any meaningful engagement with 
national-citizenship must contend with the question of race and racism. In this sense, 
chapter 5 pertains to the ways that United States national-citizenship remains racialized in 
ways that reveal novel forms of racism (amidst formal multicultural policies). It is my 
claim that one can only realize this re-racialization of U.S. national identity by 
familiarizing oneself with the history of race in Latin America. I also show how nativists 
concerns over the balkanization of the United States, resulting from increases in 
immigration and ethnic enclaves, depend upon racist sentiments that are seemingly 
inclusive and thus difficult to critique without an awareness of the dynamic nature of race 
and racism.  
This brings me to the conclusion, chapter 6, where I suggest some positive steps 
for rethinking justice, immigration, and citizenship in the 21st century. I explain how the 
political trajectory of the settler society makes it difficult to think about immigration 
reform or novel conceptions of state membership. Political philosophers tend to begin 
from a perspective that is ignorant of the historical relations between states. This has a 
determinant effect on the ways in which mainstream Anglo-American philosophy views 
naturalization law and immigration policy. In the haste to a certain level of abstraction, 
political philosophers have a tendency to forget that a history of colonialism or migratory 
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labor pervades the relationship between two countries. I argue for the importance of 
doing political philosophy with a historical orientation that is aware of the history of 
colonialism and oppression. I also offer a model of group interaction that is reciprocal 
and not founded on exclusive or one-way forms of assimilation. 
4. Notes 
                                                
1 Roger Nett, “The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The Right of Free Movement of 
People on the Face of the Earth,” Ethics 81 (1971): 212.   
2 Most but not all of these people were “Hispanic.” There was an interracial component to 
these marches that remains overlooked but is still visible in video footage from these 
events. 
3 These events took place between March and May of 2006. Estimates suggest that over 
one million people took to the streets across the United States on 1 May 2006, “May 
Day.” See Laura Pulido, “A Day Without Immigrants: The Racial and Class Politics of 
Immigrant Exclusion,” Antipode Vol. 39, No. 1 (2007): 1-7. 
 
4 For more than two dimensions to citizenship see: Linda Bosniak, “Citizenship,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies, eds. Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 185-186; Gershon Shafir, “Introduction,” in The Citizenship 
Debates: A Reader, ed. Gershon Shafir (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1998), p. 2 
(Shafir argues that the idea of citizenship amounts to an intellectual tradition housing “a 
string of citizenship discourses” with five main strands: the social democratic, 
communitarian, nationalist, feminist and multicultural, ibid.); Will Kymlicka and Wayne 
Norman, “Return of the Citizen: Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory,” Ethics, 
Vol. 104, No. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 353 (see in particular 
their inclusion of citizenship as an identity issue, p. 369). 
5 Kymlicka and Norman, p. 353.  
6 Bosniak explains how the idea of a “good citizen” now extends beyond the political realm 
(or, as she notes, this could be an expansion of the domain of the political). One can now 
practice citizenship in universities, in the economic realm, within the confines of everyday 
private life, inside of grassroots social justice movements, with church communities, and 
even the realm of culture. See Bosniak, 2003, pp. 187-189. 
7 See Iris Marion Young, “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of 
Universal Citizenship,” in The Citizenship Debates: A Reader, ed. Gershon Shafir 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1998), pp. 263-290. I return to the debate regarding 
multiculturalism and differentiated citizenship in chapter four. 
  
 
30 
                                                                                                                                            
8 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An 
Anthology (2nd Edition), ed. Robert G. Goodin and Philip Pettit (Malden: Blackwell, 
2006), p. 373. 
9 David Batstone and Eduardo Mendieta, “What Does it Mean to be an American,” in The 
Good Citizen, ed. David Batstone and Eduardo Mendieta (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 
3. 
10 Aristotle, The Politics and The Constitution of Athens, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1996), p. 11 (line 1252a). 
11 Plato makes the case for “the good” of the political community being synonymous with 
justice, a type of harmony amongst the community. See Plato, The Republic, trans. G. M. A 
Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), pp. 109-111 (line 434C).  
12 J. G. A Pocock, “The Ideal of Citizenship since Classical Times,” The Citizenship 
Debates: A Reader, Ed. Gershon Shafir (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1998), p. 
34 (emphasis added). 
13 Ibid., p. 36.  
14 Darren J. O’Byrne, The Dimensions of Global Citizenship: Political Identity Beyond the 
Nation-State (Portland: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 2003), p. 10. 
15 Cynthia Patterson, “Citizenship and Gender in the Ancient World,” Migrations and 
Mobilities: Citizenship, Borders, and Gender, Eds. Seyla Benhabib and Judith Resnick 
(New York: New York University Press, 2009), p. 53. See also O’Byrne, p. 11 and Pocock, 
p. 32.  
16 Pocock, p. 32. 
17 Patterson, pp. 49-50. 
18 For the time being, think about Pericles’ reform as limiting the activity of citizenship to 
those with two polites as parents—I will return to the question of citizenship based on birth 
versus citizenship as an activity below. 
19 Aristotle, pp. 61-62 (line 1275a-b). 
20 Patterson, p. 51. Assemblyman and juror were the two main public offices citizens could 
perform. These were positions held exclusively for adult men. Thus, Greek citizenship was 
mostly gendered. 
21 Aristotle, p. 68 (line: 1277b33). 
22 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 54. 
  
 
31 
                                                                                                                                            
23 This is not that far off from today: Most working-class individuals find it hard to vote. 
Although polling-places in the United States and other developed countries try to 
accommodate a busy schedule, being an informed voter who knows about policy and the 
potential decisions affecting their immediate lives takes time, which is a luxury one could 
barely afford when you have three kids, a low-income job, and bills. This problem is 
exacerbated by voter apathy, which tends to be a problem with the legal-construction of 
citizenship, as I will demonstrate below.  
24 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908). 
See Book II, Ch.1-2, Book V Ch.1 and Bk. IX Ch. 9.    
25 Pocock, p. 34. One may question the divide between necessity and leisure from a 
Marxist/Hegelian perspective using something like the master/slave dialectic: seeing how 
dependent the life of leisure is upon the material world of need, there is some sense in 
which citizens are not really autonomous since it requires the existence of individuals who 
labor.  
26 Shafir, p. 4.  
27 Walzer, p. 54. 
 
28 Pocock, pp. 34-35. 
29 See Patterson, 2009 (her essay explores the question of gender in addition to providing 
an overview of the ancient Greek and Roman understandings of citizenship). 
30Susan Moller Okin, “Women, Equality, and Citizenship,” Queen’s Quarterly Vol. 99, No. 
1: p. 69; Carole Pateman, The Disorder of Women. Democracy, Feminism and Political 
Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p. 131. 
31 Walzer, p. 54. 
32 Pocock, p. 37 
33 See Bosniak (2003) for example.  
34 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), p. 79-83. 
35 See Thomas Hobbes, “De Corpore Politico—Part the First: Laws of Nature,” in Body, 
Man, and Citizen, ed. Richard S. Peters (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 312-313. 
 
36 Ibid., p. 311. 
37 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, trans. Donald A. Cress, (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), p. 38. 
  
 
32 
                                                                                                                                            
38 Ibid., p. 26. In Spheres of Justice, Walzer reverberates Rousseau’s thought: “No 
democratic state can tolerate the establishment of a fixed status between citizens and 
foreigners (though there can be stages in the transition from one of these political 
identities to the other). Men and women are either subject to the state’s authority, or they 
are not; and if they are subject, they must be given a say, and ultimately an equal say, in 
what the authority does,” p. 61.  
 
39 Rousseau, p. 45 (Book II, Ch. 10) (emphasis added). 
40 Ibid., p. 23 (Book I, Ch. 5). 
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid., p. 29 (Book II, Ch. 1).  
43 This is why Rousseau’s Emile is read alongside of the Social Contract. 
44 Ibid., p. 80. 
45 Bosniak, p. 185; Kymlicka and Norman, p. 353. 
46 See Bosniak, p. 187. 
47 In the United States, there are several means through which legal-citizenship can be 
naturalized (usually after one acquires permanent resident status): general application; 
military service; familial/spousal relations; refugee or political exile status; plans for 
owning a business worth more than $500,000; and more (such as being an “alien with an 
extraordinary ability”). For naturalization policy in the United States see section 203(b)(5) 
of The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5).  
48 As I will show in the next chapter, as convincing as the theoretical argument for state 
boundaries may be, the borders that exist in the real world fail to satisfy the “principle of 
rationality,” i.e. the assumed non-arbitrary basis for political thought. For more on the 
principle of rationality see Phillip Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion (Edinburgh: University 
Press, 2000), p. 5 
49 Berlin, pp. 369-370. 
50 Ibid., p. 369. John Locke and Adam Smith would be minimalist in this sense. Locke 
believes in a rather optimistic view of human nature; Smith believes in free market egoism. 
Both endorse the idea that the state should only provide militaristic protection and civil 
courts for property disputes. Someone like Hobbes, with his pessimistic views on human 
nature, would require a more active state. 
51 See T .H. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class,” in The Citizenship Debates: A 
Reader, ed. Gershon Shafir (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1998). Marshall 
maintains one more category of rights, “political rights,” which serve the same purposes as 
  
 
33 
                                                                                                                                            
national-citizenship.  
52 O’Byrne, p. 11 
53 Patterson, p. 64. As Patterson notes, prior to the Empire, citizenship rights were 
multifaceted and dependent upon an individual’s wealth and age.  
54 Ibid. Its worth noting that slaves and foreigners could be granted citizenship-status, but 
only if they were adopted by slave owners or other citizens. 
55 Pocock, p. 37. Drawing form Pocock as well, Shafir summarizes the Roman 
understanding of citizenship in the following: “Instead of enabling one to freely 
participate in political decision making, citizenship became a legal status that provided 
protection from the emperor and his representatives’ arbitrary rule. In addition, Roman 
citizenship was defined, for example by the jurist Gaius, not by the freedom to deliberate 
with other people but the by the right to be a proprietor. Roman law became the 
regulation over freedom to take and dispose of possessions, including slaves,” p. 4. 
 
56 Pocock, p. 36. 
57 However, this did not imply that all citizens were equal; age and wealth were factors as 
well. Thus, citizenship was stratified and hierarchical. See Patterson, p. 64; O’Byrne, p. 11.  
58 Pocock, p. 36. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid., p. 69. 
61 Ibid., p. 66. 
62 Ibid., p. 38 
63 For an excellent account of the formation of France and German citizenship law in the 
18th-19th centuries see Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and 
Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1992). See also Andrean Fahrmeir, 
Citizenship: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Concept (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2007). 
 
64 Walter Mignolo, “Citizenship, Knowledge, and the Limits of Humanity,” American 
Literary History Vol. 18, Issue 2 (2006): p. 312. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Peter H. Schuck and Rogers M. Smith, Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the 
American Polity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 2. 
  
 
34 
                                                                                                                                            
67 Ibid., p 10. 
68 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
69 Here, I have in mind political and social theorists who explore the link between 
immigration reform and the existence of transnational families. See Rhacel Salazar 
Parreñas, Children of Global Migration: Transnational Families and Gendered Woes 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Patricia Landolt and Wei Wei Da, “The 
Spatially Ruptured Practices of Migrant Families: A Comparison of Immigrants from El 
Salvador and the People’s Republic of China,” Current Sociology Vol. 59, No.  (2011). 
See also American Families United (http://www.americanfamiliesunited.org/) an 
organization devoted to immigration reform on behalf of trans-national families.  
 
70 Schuck and Smith, p. 12. 
71 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
72 See Marshall, pp. 93-112.  
73 Kymlicka and Norman, p. 354. 
74 Ibid., pp. 355-356. 
75 See Ibid. for an overview of the various responses to this question. 
76 Pocock, p. 37. See also Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic 
Republicanism and the Modern World (London: Routledge, 1990). 
77 Shafir, pp. 4-5. 
78 In Spheres of Justice, Walzer writes, “no citizen’s standing in one sphere or with regard 
to one social good can be undercut by his standing in some other sphere, with regard to 
some other good,” p 19. Chapter 4 focuses explicitly on the question of citizenship in 
Rawls. 
79 Kymlicka and Norman, p. 353. 
80 Philip Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), p. 7.  
81 Kymlicka and Norman, p. 353; Cole, p. 7. 
82 Cole, p. 8. 
83 Michael Walzer, “Citizenship,” Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, ed. T. 
Ball, J. Farr and R. L. Hanson (Cambridge: University Press, 1989), p. 217. 
84 I am not interested in fussing over the meaning of ‘Hispanic’ or ‘Latino/a’ in this 
  
 
35 
                                                                                                                                            
dissertation. While debates over these terms are important in regards to self-determination 
and respect, I do not think that they are meaningless referents and thus I will use them 
interchangeably. For more on the importance of group names and an overview of the 
debates regarding the above terms see Jorge J. E. Gracia, Hispanic/Latino Identity: A 
Philosophical Perspective (Malden: Blackwell, 2000). I will use of national markers such 
as ‘Peruvian’ or ‘Honduran’ when possible.  
85 Hiroshi Motomura, “The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the 
Law,” Duke Law Review 59 (2010): pp. 1723-1786; Hiroshi Motomura, “Immigration 
Outside the Law,” Columbia Law Review 108 (2008): pp. 2037-2097; Alexander 
Aleinikoff, “Between National and Postnational: Membership in the United States,” in 
Towards Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States, ed. Christian 
Joppke and Ewa Morawska (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Linda S. Bosniak, 
“Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes,” New York University 
Law Review Vol. 69, No. 6 (1994): pp. 1047-1149.  
 
86 Cole, p. xii. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid., p. 2. 
  
 
36 
CHAPTER II 
 
THE OUTSIDE OF NATIONALITY 
 
Regardless of citizenship status, country of origin or duration of time within the 
United States, most Latino/as are in some way viewed as foreigners by a majority of the 
non-Hispanic United States citizenry.1 This foreign status is almost definitional; being 
“Latino/a,” “Hispanic” or even “Latin American” implies a type of internationality. As 
such, individuals of Latin American descent in the United States are said to be outside the 
workings of the national imaginary; they are not the people called to mind when one 
thinks about the typical “American.” For some this foreign status is an issue of legality, 
there is nothing imagined about it; for others it is a matter of national representation. As a 
result, both the legal and national dimensions of citizenship are important to the citizen 
status of Hispanic people as a whole.  
Philosophical reflection on the political nature of people of Latin American 
descent offers a unique opportunity to rethink the entire structure of state membership in 
the United States, not just one half (i.e., the legal or national). However, prior to 
exploring the inadequate ethical underpinnings of liberal policies of exclusion and the 
shortfalls of the politics of recognition, which pertain to legal-citizenship and national-
citizenship respectively, I will turn to the work of Enrique Dussel so as to provide the 
philosophical impetus for thinking about citizenship and social justice for immigrants 
from what I call “the outside of nationality.” While my initial goal in this chapter is to 
explain the unique social and political positioning of Hispanic people, Dussel’s view on 
the political provide an argument for why engaging those persons occupying positions of 
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marginality and social exclusion is crucial to the type of critique I will launch against 
North American political philosophers. 
I use the phrase “the outside of nationality” in a way similar to how Dussel and 
others speak of “the underside of modernity.” For Dussel, Leopoldo Zea, Walter 
Mignolo, and Arturo Escobar, one cannot understand European modernity in its fullest 
form without reference to colonialism, or the underside of modernity. According to these 
pensadores, the construction of “modern man” rests upon material and philosophical 
underpinnings stemming from the encounter with America. “Modernity” thus depends 
upon the non-modern, i.e. the “savage,” “uncivilized,” and “indigenous.” I provide a brief 
overview for the link between modernity and colonialism below. However, my point is to 
argue that one cannot understand the full scope of legal-citizenship and national-
citizenship without reference to those who exist outside of the formal boundaries of the 
country or nation. Nationality, and the physical borders between states, rests upon a 
distinction made between insiders and outsiders. This distinction becomes increasingly 
problematic when one stops to analyze the reasoning behind this division, as I will 
explain in chapter 3.  
The first section of this chapter presents an overview of the political nature of 
people of Hispanic descent in the United States. There is a great deal of literature on this 
subject from philosophical, social, and cultural studies.2 My summation of the issues 
surrounding Latino/a identity is simply meant to problematize the two views of 
citizenship offered thus far.  
In the second section of this chapter, I provide an overview of Dussel’s recent 
political work, drawing from both the Twenty Theses on Politics and the Politics of 
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Liberation: A Critical World History.3 I highlight the link between his early writings and 
the more recent political works. This link is found in Dussel’s idea of “transmodernity,” 
the foundation of his political philosophy of liberation. Transmodernity can best be 
described as an alternative global-social framework that is not predicated upon conquest, 
exploitation, and developmental theories of human culture, but rather an analectical4 
engagement with people of differing ways of life for the sake of mutual human 
flourishing (in light of ethical commitments such as mutual recognition, dignity, respect 
and the need for creativity or “alterity”). In the Philosophy of Liberation (i.e., Dussel’s 
more early writings) the transmodern starting point is the critical engagement with the 
“Other,” that is, “the peripheral colonial world, the sacrificed Indian, the enslaved black, 
the oppressed woman, the subjugated child, and the alienated popular culture.”5 In the 
Politics of Liberation (i.e., Dussel’s more recent work) the transmodern starting point is 
the critical engagement with the victims of both legitimate and fetishized forms of 
governance, the inherent suffers of political oppression. This tracing out of 
“transmodernity” helps to show both the difference and continuity of Dussel’s early and 
more recent thought, an implicit goal of this chapter. My claim is that whereas the 
philosophy of liberation begins from the underside of modernity (i.e. colonization), the 
politics of liberation begins from the outside of nationality, those situated beyond the 
scope and range of justice, such as undocumented immigrants and those associated with 
them based on common ancestry and ethnic/racial characteristics, i.e. Hispanics.6 
In the third and last section of this chapter, I question several aspects of Dussel’s 
political thought in the hopes of furthering key ideas and filling-in possible gaps. Of 
particular importance will be the status of state membership or the idea of “citizenship” 
  
 
39 
within Dussel’s work. If political institutions are the formal and explicit manifestation of 
the latent power of political communities, how can the limits of one community be 
distinguished from another, such that the actions of one group do not impinge upon the 
autonomy of another? Is there a missing thesis regarding state membership (something 
akin to “citizenship”) or the existence of political borders in Dussel’s theory of 
legitimacy? I think that there is, and in this sense Dussel suffers from a similar tendency 
amongst political philosophers in assuming the category “citizenship” to be uncontested. 
Nonetheless, Dussel’s reasoning for leaving out a positive definition for citizenship or 
state membership supports his idea of analectics. Thus, this is a shortcoming that must be 
explored for purposes at stake in this dissertation and in the context of libratory 
philosophy. 
1. The Political Nature of Hispanic People 
In the United States, most people of Latin American descent are directly or 
indirectly affected by the realities of modern day human migration and immigrant policy. 
Many can trace at least part of their family (if not their own self) to a country, countries, 
or region south of the continental United States. Others, although born or naturalized in 
the United States, cannot help but be associated with “foreigners” due to their skin color, 
surname, linguistic traits (such as an accent or bilingualism) and/or cultural traditions. 
Over a decade ago, the Latina feminist philosopher, Linda Martín Alcoff, put it the 
following way:  
The question of citizenship for U.S. Latinos is fraught with tensions that are in 
some respects different than for any other ethnic group. We are persistently seen 
by Anglo America as perennial foreigners: unassimilated, inassimilable, even 
uninterested in assimilation. Unlike other immigrant groups, our countries of 
origin are too close, our numbers too numerous and concentrated, to motivate the 
loss of Spanish language or cultural custom. Even though we may have lived in 
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North America for generations, even if as Chicanos our families have never lived 
anywhere else, we are perceived as a foreign people squatting within the United 
States.7  
 
It is important to remind that Alcoff’s words are prior to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th 2001. Since then, the constant threat of terrorism has engendered even 
more suspicion about the citizen status of Hispanic people, such that their patriotism and 
national pride (or lack thereof) is called into question, in addition to the need to 
strengthen (i.e., militarize) the Mexican border in light of these suspicions. 
Along these lines, Étienne Balibar credits the ascriptive foreign status of 
Hispanics to the creation of “hyper-borders,” that is, walled, militarized divides between 
countries. Drawing from Karl Schmidt, Balibar argues that hyper-borders create 
distinctions between friend (insider) and enemy (outsider). The increased militarization 
of the border and the nationalist culture that this spawns blurs the line between enemy 
and stranger: in a state threatened by “illegal aliens,” those who exhibit qualities that 
enemies have, such as speaking the same language or having similar physical traits, 
render them suspect or “strange.”8  
Considering that a third of the United States population is expected to be of 
Hispanic background by midway through the 21st century, roughly 132.8 million people,9  
one in three citizens will have a personal existence and/or close family ties that are in 
some way predicated upon “Hispanic foreignness,” be it real or imagined by others.10 
Unless the United States citizenry is willing to alienate such a large percentage of the 
population, novel understandings of national identity and state membership are needed. 
The historical concern, put forth by the recently deceased Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and 
Samuel P. Huntington, and now revived by others such as David Miller, Francis 
Fukuyama, and Robert D. Putnam, argues that the alienation of Hispanics (and others) in 
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the United States leads to the formation of separate cultural enclaves that run the risk of 
balkanizing the United States (and worse, result in potential terrorist activity, according 
to Fukuyama who worries about alienated Muslim immigrants in Europe).11  
The generally accepted number of unauthorized immigrants living in the United 
States ranges anywhere from 10 to 13 million, with most estimates holding at roughly 12 
million.12 An overwhelming majority of these individuals come from Latin America, 
particularly Mexico.13 The existence of undocumented persons and their demands for 
social justice (or those made on their behalf) articulate claims that are not supposed to 
exist inside of the political realities of liberal states. Undocumented immigrants reveal the 
workings and limitations of political ontology in its brightest light by existing where they 
are not supposed to be—a political manifestation of the problem of nonbeing. At first 
glance, the question of citizenship for these individuals has little to do with national 
membership or cultural recognition, as in being included in the idea of the “American 
people.” However, a state inclined towards a multicultural or culturally plural atmosphere 
can help to incorporate immigrants (documented or not) into mainstream society, without 
heavy assimilative demands. Nonetheless, for undocumented persons, the question of 
citizenship is primarily a legal issue.  
Liberal national polities such as the United States have never seen anything 
comparable to this situation. Never has there been such a large transnational14 ethnic 
minority inside of a modern state, so closely connected to undocumented immigrants. As 
the 2006 immigrant rights protests show, never have so many civilians and scholars 
questioned the morality of immigrant policy by considering the social/economic 
contributions of undocumented persons and challenging the main tenants of liberal 
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political theory, insofar as it attempts to justify immigration restrictions. When 
understood in these terms, non-Hispanics will also have to grapple with something of an 
“international identity” insofar as their daily interactions will force them outside of 
enclosed communities that consist of racially, ethnically, and even nationally 
homogenous majorities (this is, of course, unless Hispanics start belonging to the United 
States). Nonetheless, in the 21st century, because of the reality of human migration, 
recurrent political strife and the increasing scarcity of natural resources across the planet, 
in addition to global economic crises and climate change, all contemporary states stand in 
need of reflection on the link between state membership and national borders.15  
The issues raised should not be alarming. After all, the United States is a nation of 
immigrants. Nonetheless, these issues do create a host of questions for political thinkers: 
What will the liberal polities look like when the traditional view of nation-states as 
existing for citizens has to reckon with vast numbers of noncitizens within their territory? 
Do concepts like autonomy and sovereignty, nationality and community, in addition to 
the equality of rights or universal ability to partake in the good, become contradictory in a 
state fixated on legal status? Rather than argue for one-way assimilative paradigms that 
expect immigrants to conform to dominant society, political philosophers of 
multiculturalism and multinationalism16 ask the following type of questions: How do 
people of Latin American descent in the United States, given their international nature, fit 
into what is called “the politics of recognition”? Can we conceive of national-citizenship 
in a way that does not depend upon national identity?  
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2. The Transmodern, Trans-National State 
 
Drawing from Dussel’s recent political work this section offers a theoretical 
component to my use of “the outside of nationality.” I frame this discussion around the 
following claim: If the chief form of political organization throughout modern political 
thought is the state (and subsequently the nation-state),17 then the chief form of political 
organization derived from transmodern thought is what can be called the “trans-national 
state.”18 Here, the prefix ‘trans’ is of the utmost importance, it signifies the unfixed, 
ongoing process of an analectical politics of liberation—Dussel’s central concern in his 
recent political philosophy. The trans-national state is a political institution that 
continuously represents and obeys the will-to-life of the pueblo, the political community 
and source of political power. Although institutions must have well-reasoned bases in 
order to be considered legitimate, their practical application or feasibility will cause harm 
in some way or another. The job of the political liberationist is not to justify a particular 
institution in light of these failures, but instead to remind the political community of the 
dynamic complexities of the pueblo, complexities that continually exceed their 
crystallized forms of institutionalization. 
 Best known for the Philosophy of Liberation, Dussel is political exile to Mexico 
from Argentina where in 1970’s paramilitary forces bombed his home.19 A student of 
Emanuel Levinas and Paul Ricoeur, Dussel is part of a generation of South American 
philosophers who placed the subject of colonialism and the legacy of colonial oppression 
against women, children, African slaves and the indigenous at the forefront of 
philosophical analysis.20 Inspired by liberation theology, a branch of Roman Catholicism 
that maintains a tenuous relationship with the Church due to it political commitments and 
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social activism, the philosophy of liberation is one of the only segments of Latin 
American philosophy considered to be an autochthonous school of thought that attempts 
to think in and about the colonial experience (with much to say about the nature of 
philosophical discourse in Europe).21 
Dussel’s most current and important contribution to the field of political 
philosophy (not just Latin American philosophy) is a large three-volume work entitled 
The Politics of Liberation: Critical World History (Vol. 1), Architectonic (Vol. 2) and 
Critique (Vol. 3).22 Critical World History is a thorough description, reorientation and 
analysis of the theoretical landscape of the history of political philosophy, from ancient 
Babylon, Egypt and China to George Washington, Simón Bolívar and the Zapatistas, not 
to mention critical analyses of canonical political philosophers like Nicolai Machiavelli, 
Francisco de Vitoria, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Karl Marx, and more. The 
Architectonic and Critique supply a normative account of the purpose and overall 
structure of the concept of the political and the practice of politics. The second volume 
articulates the conditions for democratic legitimacy and political order, while the third 
deconstructs these categories so as to allow for the libratory moment. A more modest 
piece, Twenty Theses on Politics is a synopsis and heuristic for the above-mentioned 
magnum opus in which Dussel summarizes his massive project into twenty individual 
theses. I cannot overstate the importance of this text when interpreting the larger three-
volume work. The rest of this section is devoted to explaining the transmodern basis of 
this new political theory. 
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At the onset of the Twenty Theses, Dussel states that the recent political events 
and social movements taking place in Latin America (and now perhaps the Arab world) 
require a new theory to interpret and represent their trajectory. However, as he suggests, 
The new theory cannot answer to the assumptions of the capitalist and colonialist 
modernity of the past 500 years. It cannot begin from bourgeois postulates, nor 
can it engage those of “real” socialism (with its impossible ideal planning, its 
“square circle” [or paradox] of democratic centrism, with ecological 
irresponsibility, the bureaucratization of its sectors [cuadros], with the vanguard 
dogmatism of its theory and strategy, etc.). What is to come is a new transmodern 
civilization, inherently transcapitalist, beyond liberalism and “real” socialism, 
where power was a type of exercise of domination, and where the political was 
reduced to a bureaucratic administration.23 
 
Again, in the above passage (and those below), pay attention to Dussel’s use of ‘trans,’ 
‘beyond,’ ‘further than,’ ‘surpass,’ etc., because they reveal much about the process of 
liberation in both Dussel’s politics and philosophy.  
According to Dussel, there are three levels or stages required in describing the 
concept of the political, in addition to three corresponding principles that suggest 
normative ideals that bring these levels about. In its most basic formulation, the purpose 
of the political is the preservation, enhancement, and continuation of the life of the 
pueblo.24 At this first stage, Dussel’s understanding of the political implies a “material”25 
component aimed at ensuring the continuation of human life (which includes an account 
for why nonhuman life is equally important). The political is central or necessary to the 
material conditions that provide for the possibility of human existence, the content of 
political action. In its original form, political power consists of the will-to-life of the 
pueblo, the communal desire to stay alive. If it is to be effective in ensuring the survival 
of the community in ways that realize human potential, this will-to-life requires the 
institutionalization of power and the establishment of government. Dussel explains this as 
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the move from potentia (power as potential) to potestas (the actual institutionalization of 
power).26 Here, Dussel warns of the fetishization of power, the ultimate corruption of 
politics, where a governing-will or political ruler views their individual authority as the 
source of political power and separate from the will-to-life of the community.27 
Dussel recognizes a second level of the political while guaranteeing preventative 
measures against the corruption of politics, the legitimating sphere. This is where 
philosophers like John Rawls or Jürgen Habermas enter the discussion. Through such 
ideas as overlapping consensus, communicative action, or even in a broader sense the 
“social contract,” political philosophers of the second level ensure the legitimacy of 
political institutions. Dussel also calls this the formal or procedural-normative sphere.28 
Again, at this level, the purpose of political philosophy is to explain the legitimacy of 
particular forms of government, democracy being the most feasible:  
From among the diverse systems of government (monarchies and republics), 
democracy came to emerge as the only feasible form for the achievement of 
legitimacy. Today, the task is to assess and improve upon the various types of 
democracy: republican, liberal, social democratic, welfare State, post-colonial 
populist, etc. Existing empirical democratic systems are always concrete, 
inimitable in their entirety by other States, and always open for improvement. 
Democracy is a perpetually unfinished system.29  
 
Being “inimitable” and “unfinished,” the legitimacy of states or political institutions is 
inherently unique and ongoing. That is to say, legitimacy must continually be asserted 
and cannot be generalized—particular people from their specific institutions must play an 
active role in legitimating process.  
The third and final level of the political is the practical application or feasibility of 
political action. This is where political administrations arise and the actual practicing of 
politics takes place. The feasibility level pertains to what political institutions can 
actually do, i.e., the efficacy of legitimate forms of governance.30 It is at this last level 
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where certain limitations become obvious: being the work of finite human beings, all 
political institutions will cause victims; even the best or most just political institutions 
will be unfair or harm someone, somewhere (both within its boundaries and outside).31 
Political institutions are a moment in the attempt to formalize or capture potentia; 
institutions rely upon a “snapshot” of the dynamic needs of the will-to-life of the political 
community, they are bound to fail in some degree. In light of inevitable shortcomings, 
political power becomes fetishized when the institution attempts to justify its existence 
amidst suffering. When this occurs the will-to-life of the institution or political ruler 
becomes separated from the will-to-life of the community. Once placed above the needs 
of the community, the institution’s will-to-power—the desire to maintain its life at the 
expense of those suffering—is the corruption of politics. 
For Dussel, even though they may be imperfect, institutions are indispensible: 
“For a critical and realistic politics, institutions are necessary despite their imperfection; 
they are entropic and as such there always arises a moment in which they need to be 
transformed, changed, or destroyed.”32 The idea of “entropy” refers to institutions that do 
not have any novel productive growth stemming from the pain experienced by the 
oppressed members of society (e.g. exploited laborers, poor rural farmers or racial 
minorities inside the system) and those excluded from the political arena altogether (e.g. 
undocumented immigrants, third world laborers, women prior to having the right to vote 
in the United States).33 Instead, entropic institutions ignore the possibility for political 
transformation by interpreting novel justice claims as the latest form of a historical or 
existing criticism. Such claims as “universal health care is just another form of socialism” 
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or “pro-immigrant immigration reform is just about amnesty” serve as examples, because 
they deny the opportunity for novelty in today’s political climate. 
Dussel’s stance regarding the indispensability of institutions stands in stark 
contrast to political anarchists (in fact, Dussel has defended his views in front of 
anarchists like the Zapatistas on several occasions34). Peter Kropotkin defines anarchism 
as:  
[A] principle or theory of life and conduct under which society is conceived 
without government—harmony in such a society being obtained, not by 
submission to law, or by obedience to authority, but by free agreements concluded 
between the various groups, territorial and professional, freely constituted for the 
sake of production and consumption, as also for the satisfaction of the infinite 
variety of needs and aspirations of a civilized being.35   
 
Kropotkin continues by noting that “the state” is replaced by “interwoven networks” that 
provide an assortment of social functions. This idea of interwoven networks is almost 
identical to the social networks that operate in Zapatista communal arrangements (which 
inform Dussel of his views regarding political power). For the Zapatistas, what are called 
caracoles (“spiral shells”) are indigenous social arrangements that rely upon a revolving 
representational basis, with each official promising to rule through obedience. Each 
caracole maps onto to an indigenous community and designates a range of autonomous 
actions. All of this is not a form of Western “government,” argue the Zapatistas. 
“Government” implies that humans are inherently in need of the type of governing 
backed by coercive military force (as I will show in chapter 4, the governing view is also 
based on the supposed savagery of indigenous peoples, an idea the Zapatistas resent).36 
 Dussel’s argument for political institutions boils down to the following: human 
potentiality and wellbeing is, and historically has been, maximized by social 
arrangements that formalize the latent power of the community. This formalization 
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establishes the state, which serves as a form of mediation between political communities 
and their elected representatives. Dussel understands the practice of politics as a “noble 
vocation,” where political power is obediential service that not only upholds law but also 
has a “firmer obligation to obey the community.”37 Like republicans and contemporary 
communitarians (which share Dussel’s fondness for Aristotle’s political thought), Dussel 
assumes an active citizenry that maintains a civic minded populous that appreciates 
political life. The state or political institution is not some external entity, but comprised of 
the will-to-life and social interactions of the pueblo or “local, civil participants” (in light 
of his lack of a stance of citizenship, see below).  
Dussel’s disagreement with anarchist is somewhat semantic: he views caracoles 
as institutions, whereas Western political thinkers may see them as some form of 
indigenous tribal society. Dussel is on the same page with anarchists when it comes to 
“the dictatorship of the proletariat. ” Crispin Sartwell explains the dictatorship of the 
proletariat as “merely a dictatorship of the party of an individual, and that dictatorship 
was wrong.”38 Here, Sartwell is criticizing vanguard movements and revolutionary 
platforms that place a single individual at the forefront of social change in favor of 
socialism. Dussel’s anti-fetishized understanding of political power implies that the 
pueblo is the source for political power, not an individual ruler. Political representatives 
do not act in their own interest, so as to preserve or take power, but respond to the 
dynamic demands of the community.  
It is for this reason that Dussel favors political “transformations” over the 
“changing” or “destroying” of corrupt institutions.39 An initial explanation for this 
preference is the fact that transformations do not result in as much violence, bloodshed, 
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or political turmoil as revolutions. While Dussel does not rule out violence in the name of 
liberation,40 if one wishes to take on the political hegemony of a place like the United 
States there is little hope in military action from the vantage point of the people (given 
the current state of military power and the national war on terror, both foreign and 
domestic). The professional military may be more successful in a coup against the 
government, but this too is problematic and highly susceptible to fetishization: “Power is 
not taken but is instead exercised through delegation, and if one wants such delegation to 
form of obedience then it is necessary to transform many institutional moments (notably, 
partial or total transformations of the system, not reforms).”41 Political reform from 
within the prevailing system (either through changes in policy or law) is stifling and can 
result in entropy. Law serves to support the status quo in ways that can accommodate 
change, but this does not necessarily result in substantial shifts in power dynamics.42 The 
Bolivian “multicultural” reforms in the mid-1990s and the critical analysis of James 
Tully’s work (both in chapter 4), in addition to my analysis of the re-racialization of 
American national identity (chapter 5) all serve as examples. Political transformations are 
not just about inclusion of minorities or people of color into existing institutions, but the 
idea that the inclusion of marginalized peoples changes the composition of the whole. 
In place of reform and revolution, the transmodern state incorporates political 
practices that add new variables into mainstream discourses by allowing alienated and/or 
marginalized perspectives to serve as the source for transformation. The necessary 
starting point for analectic practice must be those whose ability to “live fully” is denied 
by the political institution itself, seeing how the political is meant to ensure the 
continuation and sustenance of life. Those persons either alienated from or oppressed by 
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“the ontological horizon of politics”43 have “the reason from beyond,” they are 
analectically situated. To put it differently, the oppressed and alienated have material 
needs that the institution (in its current manifestation) cannot respond to, either because 
of unwillingness or a lack of knowledge due to the novelty of the claims being made. 
When successful, analectic critique ruptures political hegemony and serves as the impetus 
for transformation in ways that do not result in reactionary politics or reaffirm 
mainstream political platforms. The oppressed and marginalized counter the decay and 
disorder that reform movements leave in place.  
Given that Dussel argues that entropy will always come about, analectical politics 
is an ongoing process, a nation in “transit” (recall the above quote: “democracy is a 
perpetually unfinished project”). Dussel continues this idea at the end of the Twenty 
Theses when he writes: 
It is true that the bourgeois Revolution spoke of liberty, but what is necessary now 
is to subsume that liberty and speak instead of liberation (as in North American 
pragmatism, one does not speak of truth but veri-fication). So now we do not refer 
to liberty but instead to liber-ation as a process, as the negation of a point of 
departure, and as a tension pressing towards a point of arrival.44  
 
In the second and third volumes of the Politics, Dussel performs the “negation of a point 
of departure” by first articulating the conditions for democratic legitimacy (Vol. 2), and 
then deconstructing the political categories used to arrive at legitimacy in the first place 
(Vol. 3). He does the same in the Twenty Theses; he first explicates a political philosophy 
of democratic legitimacy (Theses 2-10), and then deconstructs this theory with the 
victims of political institutions in mind (Theses 11-20). 
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Dussel’s willingness to consider political victims and the innate entropy of 
political institutions owe much to his earlier work on “transmodernity,” which served as a 
critique of modernity or modern thought in general. I will briefly elaborate this idea. 
Although it is possible to tell the story of modernity without reference to America 
or colonization, i.e. from strictly Eurocentric point of view, for Dussel, and other Latin 
American thinkers such as Zea, Mignolo and Arturo Escobar, “modernity” is a worldview 
that began with the encounter of America and the Iberian justification for conquest.45 
While most scholars in the West understand the work of Francis Bacon, Galileo Galilei 
and René Descartes to be the origins of “modernity,” Dussel argues that prior to these 
thinkers, Europe faced an epistemic crisis and obtained a position of global centrality 
resulting from the encounter with/of America.46 The encounter with a landmass not 
recorded in the Bible or other pre-modern foundational texts destabilized medieval 
epistemic footings and rendered obsolete epistemological justifications based on myth, 
dogma, Papal authority, religious knowledge, raw sense experience, and cultural 
tradition.47 This prompted a search for a “new” basis for knowledge, which came to be 
found in “reason.” 
Zea, for example, argues that the modern world is a product of a disappointment 
or letdown (decepción). The person who initiates the modern world is a disappointed 
person (decepcionado), “a man who has just encountered a world in which he does not 
fit.” He continues, “that which was familiar changed into something strange, the clear to 
the obscure, from light into dark. It is from here that this man takes it upon himself to 
make clarity where one can only find darkness, to look for ‘ideas clear and distinct.’ 
Clarity is order and distinction. To order and distinguish is the mission that the modern 
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man puts forward.”48 Obviously, Zea has in mind Descartes’ thoughts in the Discourse on 
the Method (the full title: Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, 
and Seeking Truth in the Sciences—this will be important below), especially with the use 
of “clarity” and “distinctiveness.” 
In terms of the justification of conquest, the various philosophical and legal 
arguments (posed by Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and others) for why Europeans who had 
dominion over the indigenous harbored a worldview predicated upon qualitative 
differences in human kind, e.g., “inferior,” “superior,” “barbarous,” “civil,” “holy,” 
“unholy,” and so forth. Initially these differences were based on religion and morality, 
especially in light of the Spanish reconquista (the expulsion of Moors and Jews from 
Iberia in early 1492). Later the differences between “superior” and “inferior” acquired 
novel significance and were understood to be the by-product of a groups’ historical 
development or lack thereof. One’s relation to Western history detailed a record of their 
progress. Those closer to the zenith of history were more or less “modern,” while those 
assumed to be lower down were historicized (pre-modern, savage). Through the process 
of colonization, modern man posited himself as the supreme form of humanity that all 
needed to strive for. 
Modernity sets itself as a fixed object that cannot be changed by anything external 
to it—it is the height of human ways of being. As the supposed culmination of humanity, 
“inferior” forms of knowledge that rest upon myth or tradition could not contribute 
anything positive to the modern worldview and thus to humanity as a whole. In fact, 
indigenous perspectives serve only as example of a past stage of human progress, a static 
point in human history. As Mario Saenz puts it in his review of Dussel’s thoughts on 
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modernity, “From the beginning [modernity] is an intersubjective phenomenon in which 
the [colonized] subject is either denied completely or at best belittled as the humanity of 
an immature child to be molded by a conquering and colonizing father.”49 
Modernity is a one-sided cultural interaction, a cultural imposition (recently, 
Dussel refers to this as the “philosophical anti-discourse of modernity”50). Through the 
threat of violence, European powers demanded indigenous conformity to modernity. This 
not only expanded European markets and subsumed native economies into the fledgling 
capitalist world-system, but it also established European ways of living as the standard 
for civilization. 51 This standard depended upon the proper use of “reason,” a measure that 
would not have been possible had it not been for the encounter with America in the first 
place. In Critical World History, Dussel elaborates this point: 
With an ironic and critical sense, Montaigne wrote about cannibals: ‘we may well 
call these people barbarians, in respect to the rules of reason’. ‘The rules of 
reason’ will always be the foundation of the justification, and for this reason the 
syllogism will be tautological or self-referential. The argument from Ginés to 
Locke or Hegel is expressed thus: (a) we have ‘rules of reason’, which are 
‘human’ rules in general (by being ‘ours’); (b) the Other is a barbarian because 
s/he does not fulfill these ‘rules of reason’, his/her ‘rules’ are not rational ‘rules’; 
because one does not have civilized rational ‘rules’, one is a barbarian; (c) being a 
barbarian (not fully human) one does not have rights; further, one is a danger to 
civilization, and (d) like all dangers, one has to eliminate it like a ‘rabid dog’ (an 
expression used later by Locke), to immobilize it or ‘heal it’ from its disease; and 
this is a good; one has to negate as irrational alternative rationality. That which is 
negated is not ‘other reason’ but ‘the reason of the Other’. So, for the so-called 
civilized, the war against savagery would always be a ‘just war’.52  
 
During the European conquest it was the “reason” of other cultures that modernity 
destroyed. This eliminated the continuity of non-Western cultural practices and systems 
of thought since it was assumed that these have nothing to offer the modern worldview, 
hence the “anti-discourse” of modernity.  
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Transmodernity attempts to overcome the ethnocentric and self-referential ideals 
of modernity by developing intercultural dialogues that are engendered from outside of 
the social totality established during the conquest and colonialism, based on the reason of 
an “Other” (analectics). Without expecting indigenous conformity to European ways of 
living and thinking, transmodernity attempts to create an analectical dialogue between 
cultures. This is not, however, an argument for why cultures need to remain disconnected 
or isolated. “An intercultural dialogue,” Dussel explains, “must be transversal, that is to 
say, it needs to set out from a place other than a mere dialogue between the learned 
experts of the academics or institutionally-dominant worlds. It must be a multicultural 
dialogue that does not presuppose the illusion of a non-existent symmetry between 
cultures.”53 Requiring a radical de-centering of the individual, transmodernity confronts 
human differences rather than demanding conformity to the “dominant” point of view. 
Again, the prefix ‘trans’ is important, it designates the unfixed (not unfinished) nature of 
an alternative view of cultural interaction.54 Dussel writes, 
To overcome modernity, one must deny its myth [the irrational appeal to violence 
and the belief in European superiority]. I seek to overcome modernity not through 
a postmodern attack on reason based on the irrational incommensurability of 
language-games. Rather, I propose transmodern opposition to modernity’s 
irrational violence based on the reason of the Other. I hope to go beyond 
modernity. I hope to transcend modern reason not by negating reason as such, but 
by negating violent, Eurocentric, developmentalist, hegemonic reason. In 
transmodernity, the alterity, coessential to modernity, now receives recognition as 
an equal. Modernity will come into its fullness not by passing from its potency to 
its act, but by surpassing itself through a corealization with its once negated 
alterity and through a process of mutual, creative fecundation. 55 
 
  Critical World History makes clear the link between Dussel’s earlier work on 
transmodernity and the recent political writings in the attempt to provide a transmodern 
basis for political institutions: 
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To speak of ‘trans’-Modernity will demand a new interpretation of the whole 
phenomenon of Modernity, to count on moments which were never incorporated 
into European Modernity, and which subsuming the better of European and north 
American Modernity, will affirm ‘from outside’ itself essential components of the 
excluded cultures, to develop a new political future, that of the twenty-first 
century. To accept that massive exteriority will allow one to understand that there 
are cultural moments situated ‘outside’ of Modernity. One will have to overcome 
an interpretation that still assumes a ‘second’ and very subtle Eurocentrism, and 
move to a non-Eurocentric interpretation of the history of the world-system (after 
the world-empire), controlled by Europe for only 200 years, not 500. So the fact 
that other cultures, scorned until now, are emerging far from the horizon of 
European Modernity is not a miracle arising from nothing, but the return to being 
actors as they had been in history in recent eras. Although Western culture 
globalizes itself, at a certain technical, economic, political, military level, it does 
not exhaust other moments of enormous creativity, which affirm from their 
‘exteriority’ other living, resisting and growing cultures.56  
 
Critical World History reminds one of the “exterior moments of creativity” by providing 
a positive account of the history of political thought writ large. As Dussel demonstrates 
through the first volume of his Politics, the transmodern basis for political philosophy 
begins with a reformulation of the history of political thought, one that surpasses 
Western, Hellenistic and “modern” conceptions of history (the same history that charted 
cultural development and justified conquest). This alternative history is crucial to the 
possibility of a new political future, one that is not determined by or limited to Western 
conceptions of the political. It also lends credence to current libratory movements that are 
seen as lacking historical continuity, as I will explain below.  
A great example of this historical reorientation is Dussel’s analysis of the Code of 
Hammurabi. With the Hellenistic creation of the polis, justice is something that takes 
place within the body politic, amongst citizens. Here, ‘justice’ is “[t]he central concept in 
Greek philosophy and politics of díke (justice)… [which] derives etymologically from the 
Sumerian diku-gal (supreme judge), from the Babylonian diqugallu, from the Akkadian 
duku.”57 Within the polis, the ability to participate in the public construction of the good, 
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one sense of “justice,” is limited almost exclusively to males of high social standing or 
“citizens.”58 Hammurabi, on the other hand, “does justice with the widow, with the 
orphan and with the poor, or with the foreigner.”59 Notice how “justice” can take place 
outside of the body politic, citizenship or official state-membership is not required (I 
leave you to imagine how this can translate into our time!). Neither is “justice” the 
explicit project of Western, Hellenistic thought but a continuation of pre-Hellenistic, 
Semitic ways of thinking, both etymologically and conceptually. Dussel does the same 
with the Greek terms for “demos,” “equality” and “destiny” (among others).60 
Critical World History is a macro-story of global political thought and it serves 
the function of a reference point for libratory claims to justice. Recent social movements 
like those present in indigenous politics in Latin America or amongst “radical” pro-
democratic Arabs in the Middle East and North Africa do not come from nowhere. 
Dussel historicizes these movements in a non-linear, non-developmental history of 
political philosophy. He writes, 
The critical discourse of liberation therefore has to abandon the fragmentation of 
its story and produce a critical macro-story with the claim of truth (that is to say, 
aware that it is inevitably fallible, but still advanced as a truth claim) in order for 
the imagination of the victims, those dominated, to have the capacity to protect 
itself in a historical place with meaning, with global meaning (which will have to 
be corrected; therefore the macro-story is inevitably fallible).61   
 
One may ask why global meaning is necessary. A possible answer is that this makes the 
project of liberation a world phenomenon and not a parochial concern of one class, one 
region or one people. The philosophy of liberation (and now politics of liberation) is 
more than just an autochthonous, de-colonial Latin American philosophy. Liberation is a 
distinctive human phenomenon. It maintains an innate global dimension that cannot be 
understated.62 The macro-story being inevitably fallible, no one person or culture will 
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monopolize the truth, but instead cultures must come to terms with one another in 
reciprocal ways.  
In order to fully understand the transmodern basis of Dussel’s new theory of the 
political, replace the idea of “competing historical truth claims taking place within a 
global-analectical discourse between cultures” with the idea of “analectical justice claims 
taking place within specific political communities.” The structure is essentially the same 
in that it is ultimately concerned with the limitations established by rigid social and 
political ontologies, rational accounts for what exists and what is possible in human 
social and political relations. That is to say, transmodernity is about freedom from 
oppression and the need for human creativity through alterity. It is about recognizing that 
there exist more than one way of being human, contrary to the myth of modernity, and 
also recognizing that the purpose of political institutions is to continually serve the 
complex and dynamic needs of the pueblo, the source of political power. Since the 
political is about the sustenance of human life, it too must not be a source for arresting 
the development of human potentiality, hence the practice of analectical politics. 
3. Critical Analysis: The Missing Thesis on State Membership 
 
There is much to admire within Dussel’s retelling of the history of political 
philosophy. The wealth of knowledge, critical analyses of canonical figures, and 
obtaining a glimpse of the general perspective of one of the most important Latin 
American philosophers alive today is enough to warrant a read of all three volumes of the 
Politics of Liberation and the Twenty Theses. Nevertheless, several questions arise related 
to Dussel’s views on state membership (or “citizenship”) and his thoughts on the 
relations between pueblos. Considering that I will hold North American political 
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philosophers accountable for assuming citizenship and nationality as the starting points 
for theories of justice, rights or state (see chapter 3), I also want to make apparent that 
Latin American philosophers are subject to the same criticism.  
Transmodern political thought is committed to the ideals of autonomy and 
equality, albeit with a certain nuance. The political community or pueblo is the 
“intersubjective referent” Dussel has in mind when explaining the purpose and structure 
of the political.63 ‘Intersubjective’ does the work of getting beyond the atomistic 
individualism of the modern solipsistic subject, which Charles Taylor has also rightly 
criticized.64 No human is completely autonomous and self-generating, but we are born 
into political communities that house power relations and social dynamics that we did not 
create. Our autonomy is situated, contextualized, and limited, but not gone. All 
participants of the political community are “free, autonomous, rational subjects with 
equal capacity for rhetorical intervention,” according to Dussel.65 The collective desire to 
stay alive is the will-to-life that leads to the creation of political institutions. These 
institutions require consensus, argues Dussel, a convergence of individual wills towards a 
common good.66 Unfetishized political power is the ability of the members of the pueblo 
to have symmetrical participation in the governing process, another way of saying “equal 
rule.” Dussel writes, “The more the individual members of the life-community participate 
and the more individual and common demands are satisfied, the more the power of the 
community—the power of the people—becomes through reasoned belief a protective 
wall [muralla] and a productive and innovative motor for that community.”67  
Dussel’s employment of the Spanish muralla, which George Ciccariello-Maher 
rightly translates as “wall” (one could also say “rampart”), inadvertently sets up the 
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question of state membership. The “wall” that protects and ensures the autonomy and 
symmetrical participation (equality) of the community from corruption and fetishization 
also protects the pueblo from the influence and coercion of other communities. But this 
begs the question as to what constitutes group membership inside the pueblo in the first 
place and how is legitimate membership determined? In short, Dussel’s political theory 
needs an explanation for what constitutes group membership within a pueblo in addition 
to an account for how one political community can exclude “foreigners” or members of a 
different pueblo from making legitimate justice claims. 
My concern is that Dussel assumes the category “citizen” to be uncontested (or 
that he expects it to be contested). Thus, even in settings where radical political change is 
underway, the basis of state membership remains to be defined and free of expectations 
that might involve appeals to nationhood, borders, or even ethnic/familial bases. While 
Dussel does not explicitly mention any of these as criteria for inclusion in a pueblo, 
without some positive stance on what justifies membership, readers might supply these 
more problematic justifications that can undermine Dussel’s project. 
For several reasons, Dussel’s lack of a stance on state membership is a difficult 
critique to launch. If there is in fact a missing thesis on citizenship it serves as another 
source for libratory politics. The initial construction of the political institution (which 
takes place in Volume 2 or Theses 2-10) is deconstructed during the critical analysis 
performed in Volume 3 (Theses 11-20). This means that a lack of a stance of citizenship 
ensures the future criticism of existing political institutions. Why construct an institution 
bound with such visible shortcomings in the first place? 
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Aside from the theoretical issues pertinent to Dusselian scholarship, the trans-
national state serves as an alternative to thinking about political units without reference to 
“closed” or “fixed” polities—in fact, Dussel tries to avoid the entropy that results from 
closed systems altogether. The analectical method is a great asset in articulating the 
failures of mainstream Anglo-American political philosophy from the perspective of 
undocumented immigrants. These people are obviously outside of the political ontology, 
at least formally or legally speaking, but nonetheless the national economy depends upon 
their labor and position of vulnerability. This speaks directly to the concerns I will raise 
in chapter 3 regarding the assumptions of liberal political theory, which John Rawls’ 
work serves as a classic example.  
Compared to closed polities, Dussel’s transmodern political institution is feasible 
and stable, but also subject to growth and change, both from within and outside. The state 
and subjects of justice (those to whom justice is due) remain a group continuously 
unfolding, hence my use of “trans-national.” I turn to the trans-national state to rethink 
the nature of political organization with robust and fluid conceptions of both the state and 
state membership in mind. I also admire the nature of analectical critique since it not only 
endows political subjects with freedom, but also “liberates” the state in ways that 
transform oppressive power dynamics rather than reify the status quo (which speaks 
towards the concerns I will raise in chapter 4 pertaining to indigenous politics in Latin 
America).  
Political stability will prove to be important in my critique of closed polities. 
There are good reasons for why states need some boundaries in place, and most of these 
reasons have to do with the distribution of rights/duties, the allocation of goods, and the 
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acknowledgement of autonomy. Dussel’s analectic politics is great in this respect because 
it allows for the type of criticism I offer, based on the perspective of the marginalized and 
oppressed, however, analectical politics are meant to produce political transformations 
that rupture the workings of mainstream political platforms but in ways that do not try to 
hinder the efficacy and continuity of political institutions. This is yet another reason why 
Dussel circumnavigates the debate regarding revolution and reform; revolution can result 
in much turmoil and violence, reforms from within the status quo do little to change 
power dynamics. Institutions are necessary for Dussel, as explained above, even while 
the process of transformation is taking place.  
Dussel’s work on the underside of modernity provides a framework that allows 
me to make one last point about “the outside of nationality.” Not only is the outside of 
nationality a location from where novel justice claims can be made, but the existence of 
an outside is also the basis for the “inside” itself (both philosophically and materially, i.e. 
in terms of exploitable cheap labor). As I will explain in chapters 3 and 4, legal and 
national constructions of citizenship depend upon outsiders; positive constructions of 
state membership are hard to come by, instead citizenship has historically been 
constructed through reference to those considered noncitizens, using what is called the 
via negativa.68 Jorge J. E. Gracia notes that nations are not the type of thing consisting of 
essential features, conditions or properties.69 Nations are clusters of individuals who 
share a range of things in common, such as culture, ideals, customs and perhaps even 
language, but no specific set or criteria is possible, since it is often the case that many 
who think of themselves as members will be excluded once necessary and sufficient 
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conditions are set. However, while nations appear to be positively inexplicable, using the 
via negativa, saying what a nation is not, can help this problem. 
This is a similar claim to one that Terrance MacMullan provides in Habits of 
Whiteness: A Pragmatist Reconstruction.70 MacMullan makes three points about 
whiteness: first, it is a social construct; second, although whiteness has meant different 
things at different times, it became a legal and social category in the 18th century (treated 
as a natural kind); third, “whiteness was established largely in a circular or negative 
fashion rather than through a clear articulation of who is white; its boundaries were 
defined primarily through the exclusion of those who were defined as non-white in their 
current age.”71 For MacMullan, “whiteness” gained its social significance in light of the 
denial of rights and privileges to nonwhites. “Definition through negation,” as he 
writes.72 Similarly, both positive and negative conceptions of citizenship depend upon a 
differentiation between citizens and noncitizens. One cannot successfully speak about a 
nation without first assuming the existence of those outside of nationality. And yet, to 
refer to an “outside” of nationality is to imply that a nation is a group with some sort of 
set limits, be they juridical or cartographic. What are those limits and how can they be 
justified if they are attached to differences in life expectancy and availability of 
resources? 
4. Notes 
                                                
1 This, of course, is not limited to non-Hispanics; even some Latino/as consider others, 
mostly recent immigrants, foreigners on account of their accent, immigration status, or 
some other factor. In addition, Hispanic citizens of the United States often encounter 
strange reactions to their citizen status abroad. 
 
2 See Ramon Grosfugel et al, Latin@s in the World System: Decolonization Struggles in 
the 21st Century U.S. Empire (Paradigm Publishers, 2005); Jorge J. E. Gracia and Pablo 
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De Grieff, ed., Hispanics/Latinos in the United States: Ethnicity, Race and Rights (New 
York: Routledge, 2000); Jorge. J. E. Gracia, Latinos in America: Philosophy and Social 
Identity (Malden: Blackwell, 2008) & Surviving Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality: A 
Challenge For the Twenty First Century (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) & 
Hispanic/Latino Identity: A Philosophical Perspective (Malden: Blackwell, 2000); Jorge 
J. E. Gracia, ed., Race or Ethnicity? On Black and Latino Identity (Ithaca: Cornell 
University, 2007) 
 
3 Enrique Dussel, Politics of Liberation: A Critical World History, trans. Thia Cooper 
(London: SCM Press: 2011 [2007]); Twenty Theses on Politics, trans. George 
Ciccariello-Maher (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008 [2006]). The Spanish versions 
are: Enrique Dussel, Política de la liberación. Historia mundial y crítica (Madrid: 
Editorial Trotta, 2007); 20 Tesis de Política (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 2006). See also 
Dussel, Materiales Para Una Política de La Liberación (Mexico City: Plaza y Valdes 
Editores, 2007); Filosofía de la Cultura y de la Liberación (Mexico City: UACM, 2006). 
 
4 “Analectic” is literally “the reason from an Other.” It is derived from the Ancient Greek 
particle ano (“beyond” or “from above”) and logos (“rational account of” or “science 
of”). For more on his use of the term see Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, (New York: 
Orbis Books, 1989), p. 158. This probably the most important idea in Dussel’s work, and 
yet it is routinely ignored by people working on his thought. Go figure. 
 
5 Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of “the Other” and the Myth of 
Modernity, trans. Michael D. Baber (New York: Continuum, 1995), p. 137 
 
6 I use the division between libratory philosophy and politics only for explanatory 
purposes, since it is often the case that those excluded from or oppressed within national 
polities are also the victims of colonization. Nonetheless, separating the political 
philosophy from the philosophy of liberation highlights some consistent theoretical 
maneuvers inside of Dussel’s work that have to do with general meaning of “liberation.” 
Also, Hispanics serve as one example of “the outside” of nationality; one can certainly 
make a similar argument from other the perspective of historically marginalized peoples. 
 
7 See Linda Martin Alcoff, “Latina/o Identity Politics,” in The Good Citizen, ed. Eduardo 
Mendieta and David Batstone (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 94-95.  
 
8 See Étienne Balibar, “Strangers as Enemies. Further Reflections on the Aporias of 
Transnational Citizenship” (presentation delivered at McMaster University, March 2006), 
Accessed 5-21-2007: 
http://www.globalautonomy.ca/global1/servlet/Xml2pdf?fnRA_Balibar_Strangers. 
 
9 United States Bureau of the Census 2008. Based on the 2010 Census Report, over 50 
million people identified as “Hispanic.”  
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10 This of course assumes that Hispanics do not assimilate into the mainstream white 
population as did previous immigrants groups such as the Irish, Italians and Eastern 
Europeans. Given the phenotypic differences of many Hispanic people (but not all), there 
is plausible reason to believe that this will not go as smoothly. In addition, the creation of 
“Hispanic ethnicity,” which is an aspect of a person’s identity aside from their race, 
serves as a mark of distinction between whites of non-Hispanic origins and those of 
Hispanic origin. As I will argue in chapter 5, there is strong reason to believe that 
Hispanics will not be incorporated into the dominant grouping based on the novel 
workings of racism in the United States. 
 
11 See Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Disuniting of America (New York: W.W. & Norton & 
Company Inc., 1991); Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to American 
National Identity (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2004); David Miller, Citizenship and 
National Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000) and “Nationality in divided societies,” 
Multinational Democracies, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001); Francis Fukuyama, “Identity, Immigration and 
Liberal Democracy,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 17, No. 2 (2006): p. 6; Robert D. 
Putnam, “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century” (The 
2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture), Scandinavian Political Studies Vol. 30, No.2 (2007): 
pp. 137-174. Fukuyama states, “Culturally diverse immigrants create problems for all 
countries, yet Europe has become and will continue to be a critical breeding ground and 
battle front in the struggle between radical Islamism and liberal democracy. This is 
because radical Islamism itself does not come out of traditional Muslim societies, but 
rather is a manifestation of modern identity politics, a byproduct of the modernization 
process itself. In this respect, it is unfortunately a familiar challenge, one that we have 
seen earlier in the extremist politics of the twentieth century,” p. 6.  
 
12 The USA Today/Gallup Pole, April 7-9 2005, states that there are roughly 11 million.  
Jeffrey S. Passel estimates 11.5 to 12 million. See Jeffrey S. Passel, “The Size and 
Characteristic of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S,” The Pew Hispanic 
Center (2006), last accessed on date, http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf.  
 
13 See the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), 
http://www.fairus.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=16859&security=1601&news_
iv_ctrl=1007  
 
14 Here, I am using ‘transnationalism’ in a way espoused by anthropologists, social 
theorists and migration scholars. See Roger Waldinger, “Immigrant Transnationalism,” 
Editorial Arrangement of sociopedia.isa (2011), accessed 8-23-2011, 
www.sociopedia.isa. This use of ‘transnationalism’ focuses on the flow of people and 
goods across borders. It also expresses the diasporic nature of the migratory experience. I 
will offer an alternative version of this term, “trans-national” in my analysis of Dussel’s 
work. 
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15 For more on climate change and migration see Richard Black, Dominic Kniveton, 
Ronald Skeldon, Daniel Coppard, Akira Murata, and Kerstein Schmidt-Verkerk, 
“Demographics and Climate Change: Future Trends And their Policy Implications for 
Migration,” http://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/working_papers/WP-T27.pdf; 
Addis Ababa and Lokichoggio, “Migration and Climate Change: A new (under) class of 
travelers,” The Economist, accessed June 25th 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13925906. For 
more on the relationship between globalization and migration see Stephen Castles, 
“Globalization and migration: some pressing contradictions,” International Social 
Science Journal Volume 50, Issue 156: pp.179-186.  
 
16 In particular I have in mind James Tully’s use of “Multinationalism,” in Multinational 
Democracies, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), pp. 2-4. 
 
17 Whether or not the “state” is the sole product of modern political thought remains an 
open question. While for some it is unique to modernity, others view the Greek polis, the 
medieval principality, and feudal estate-system as precursors. These two stances on the 
origins of the state are not mutually exclusive. For an insightful volume devoted to this 
question see Erika Cudworth, Tim Hall and John McGovern, eds., The Modern State: 
Theories and Ideologies (Edinburgh: University Press, 2008). It is also worth noting that 
one could very easily point towards “the colony” or the colonial system as the chief form 
of political organization during the modern era; in between the 16th to 19th centuries more 
than half the world was a colony of some European power.  
 
18 Again, I do not mean “transnational” in the sense of international corporate ventures 
like Coca-Cola or Ford, nor do I have in mind the association of this term with migration 
and the movement of people across borders.   
 
19 Enrique Dussel, The Philosophy of Liberation (New York: Orbis, 1989). For a great 
account of the major events in Dussel’s life and his intellectual lineage, see Linda Martín 
Alcoff and Eduardo Mendieta, “Introduction,” Thinking from the Underside of History: 
Enrique Dussel’s Philosophy of Liberation (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), pp. 
13-25. 
 
20 For more on this generation, with an insightful critical analysis of Dussel’s early work, 
see Ofelia Schutte, “Origins and Tendencies of the Philosophy of Liberation in Latin 
American Thought: A Critique of Dussel’s Ethics,” The Philosophical Forum Vol. XXII, 
No. 3 (1991): pp. #-#. 
 
21 For an overview of the philosophy of liberation see David Ignatius Gandolfo, 
“Liberation Philosophy,” A Companion to Latin American Philosophy, ed. Ofelia 
Schutte, Susana Nuccetelli and Otávio Bueno (Malden: Blackwell, 2009), pp. #-#; see 
also N.L. Solís Bello-Ortiz, J. Zúñiga, M.S. Galindo and M.A. González Melchor, “La 
filosofía de la liberación,” El pensamiento filosófico latinoamericano, del Caribe y 
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“latino”[1300-2000]: Historia, Corrientes, Temas, Filósofos, ed. Enrique Dussel, 
Eduardo Mendieta and Carmen Bohórquez (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno, 2009), p. 
399. 
 
22 Volumes 1 and 2 are available in Spanish (the first now in English—see note 2 above). 
Volume three is forthcoming in Spanish.   
 
23 Translation my own: “La nueva teoría no puede responder a los supuestos de la 
modernidad capitalista y colonialista de los 500 años. No puede partir de los postulados 
burgueses, pero tampoco de los del socialismo real (con su imposible planificación 
perfecta, con el círculo cuadrado del centralismo democrático, con la irresponsabilidad 
ecológia, con la burocratización de sus cuadros, con el dogma vanguardista de su teoría y 
estrategia, etc.) Lo que viene es una nueva civilización transmoderna, y por ello 
transcapitalista, más allá del liberalismo y del socialismo real, donde el poder era un 
tipo de ejercicio de la dominación, y donde la política se redujo a una administración 
burocrática,” Dussel, 20 Tesis de Política, pp. 7-8. I refer to the Spanish original because 
the English translation leaves out an important part of the last sentence referring to 
domination. 
 
24 Dussel, Twenty Theses, pp. 43-46 (Thesis 6). 
 
25 Dussel understands “‘[m]aterial’ in the sense of ethical-political ‘content,’ not merely 
physical,” see Politics of Liberation, p. 15. See also Enrique Dussel, “Six Theses toward 
a Critique of Political Reason: The Citizen as Political Agent,” Radical Philosophy 
Review Vol. 2, no. 2: pp. 79-95.   
 
26 Dussel, Twenty Theses, pp. 18-19 (Thesis 3). 
 
27 Ibid., pp. 30-35 (Thesis 5). 
 
28 Ibid., p. 50 (Thesis 8). 
 
29 Ibid., p. 51 (¶ 8.1.3). 
 
30 Ibid., p. 46. 
 
31 Ibid., p. 69. 
 
32 Ibid., p. 45. 
 
33 Ibid., p. 78 (¶ 12.1.2). Drawing from both Emmanuel Levinas and Karl Marx, Dussel 
differentiates between those persons outside the body politic and the oppressed people 
within a political system but on the bottom (the underside). Both of these grouping are 
heterogeneous and complex. With this move, Dussel provides a way of thinking about 
differential justice claims that are prima facie in conflict but nonetheless united by the 
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common goal of political transformation. See Twenty Theses, pp. 71-77 (Thesis 11). Both 
groups, those inside but on the bottom and those completely outside, can be part of the 
same analogical hegemonic bloc animated by what is called hyperpotentia, the political 
power of the people and plebs (different from the “political community”). See Twenty 
Theses, pp. 79-82. 
 
34 While at the University of Oregon (April 2008), Dussel explained that these exchanges 
took place in Chiapas, Mexico in 2007 and 2008.   
 
35 Peter Kropotkin, “Anarchism,” in The Encyclopaedia Britannica (1910 Edition): #-#. 
 
36 For an overview of Zapatista political arrangements see The Zapatistas: An Anarchist 
Analysis of Their Structure and Direction, accessed 5-11-2011, 
http://www.struggle.ws/pdfs/pamphlets/zapatista/ZapatistaUSlet.pdf. See also Neil 
Harvey, “Globalisation and resistance in post-cold war Mexico: difference, citizenship 
and biodiversity conflicts in Chiapas,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 22, No. 6 (2001), pp. 
1045-1061. 
 
37 Dussel, Twenty Theses, p. 51. Dussel’s idea of obediential service is connected to the 
ways in which “political power” manifest in the caracoles. 
 
38 Crispin Sartwell, Against the State: An Introduction to Anarchist Political Theory 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), p. 7. 
 
39 Dussel, Twenty Theses, p. 110 (¶ 17.2). Note: here Dussel is also involved in the 
Marxist/socialist debate between revolution and reform.  
 
40 Ibid., p. 106 (Thesis 16 or ¶16.2.4). 
 
41 Ibid., p. 108. 
 
42 Ibid., p. 111. (¶ 17.2.6). 
 
43 The ontological horizon of politics is the totality of the political system, an account for 
what is possible or what exists within a specific political institution (e.g. the range of 
persons allowed to vote or considered a citizen at any given time, the types of legal 
arguments that can be made in a court of law, the dispersal of rights to individuals rather 
than groups, etc.).  
 
44 Ibid., p. 137. 
 
45 Enrique Dussel, “Eurocentrism and Modernity (Introduction to the Frankfurt 
Lectures),” in The Postmodernism Debate in Latin America, Vol. 20-3, ed. John 
Beverley-José Oviedo (Durham: Duke University Press, Durham, 1995 [1993]), pp. 65-
76. 
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46 Enrique Dussel, “Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism,” Nepantla: Views from the 
South 1.3 (2000): pp. 468-471. Europe’s global centrality serves as the basis for 
subsequent colonialism such as the British in India, which is why these philosophers 
begin with the conquest of America. 
 
47 For an extensive analysis of how the medieval/scholastic worldview was challenged by 
the existence of “America” see Walter Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America (Malden: 
Blackwell, 2005). 
 
48 Leopoldo Zea, “Una aventura en la ‘Metahistoria,’” Cuardernos Americanos: Filosofía 
de lo Americano (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Nueva Imagen, 1984), p. 29.  
 
49 Mario Saenz, “Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of ‘the Other’ 
and the Myth of Modernity,” Continental Philosophy Review Volume 31, Number 1 
(1998), pp. 425-434. 
 
50 See Enrique Dussel, Anti-Cartersian Meditations: On the Origin of Philosophical Anti-
Discourse of Modernity, trans. George Ciccariello-Maher, accessed April 5, 2010, 
www.enriquedussel.org. 
 
51 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels make the same point in The Communist Manifesto 
(New York: International Publishers, 2008 [1948]): “The bourgeoisie, by the rapid 
improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of 
communication, draws all nations, even the most barbarian, into civilization. The cheap 
prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese 
walls, with which it forces the barbarians’ intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to 
capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of 
production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e. to 
become bourgeois themselves. In a word, it creates a world after its own image,” p. 13. 
  
52 Dussel, Critical World History, p. 193. 
 
53 Enrique Dussel, “Transmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the 
Perspective of Philosophy of Liberation,” accessed April 5, 2010, 
http://www.enriquedussel.org/txt/Transmodernity%20and%20Interculturality.pdf, p. 19 
 
54 In contrast to such thinkers as Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas, Dussel questions 
the idea that “modernity” is a concept that has yet to be completed, as argued by the latter 
in particular. See Dussel, The Invention of the Americas, p. 10. 
 
55 Ibid., pp. 137-138. 
 
56 Dussel, Critical World History, p. 131 (emphasis added). 
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57 Dussel, p. 12. 
 
58 See Cynthia Patterson, p. 47. 
 
59 Dussel, Política de la liberación, pp. 23-24. 
 
60 Dussel, Critical World History, pp. 15-16. 
 
61 Ibid., p. 2. 
 
62 This is another geo-spatial interpretation of “trans-national.”  
 
63 Dussel, Twenty Theses, p. 72. 
 
64 See Charles Taylor, “Atomism,” Social and Political Philosophy: Classic and 
Contemporary Readings, ed. Andrea Veltman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
pp. 431-444. 
 
65 Twenty Theses, p. 15. Given Dussel’s language in the last quote, Marta Nussbaum 
would argue that Dussel is subject to the criticism she launched against social contract 
theorists (see chapter 3). Namely, that there is a problem with conflating the subjects of 
justice (those to whom justice is due) with those who take part in the articulation of the 
compact. Again, those external to the state, like third world workers require some 
consideration, as do animals and individuals with developmental disabilities. See Martha 
Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 16.  
 
66 Dussel, Twenty Theses, p. 15. 
 
67 Ibid. 
 
68 In Apophatic theology, the via negativa signifies the fact that a finite, rational being 
cannot positively describe God’s infinite nature in its fullest and thus construct images of 
God based on what he is not, e.g. “God is not evil,” “God is not subject to temporality,” 
“God is not fallible.”   
 
69 Gracia, Surviving Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality, p. 134. 
 
70 Terrance MacMullan, Habits of Whiteness: A Pragmatist Reconstruction 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University press, 2009). 
 
71 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
 
72 Ibid., p. 30. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE LAW OF ILLEGAL PEOPLES: POLITICAL LIBERALISM, STATE 
BOUNDARIES, AND JUSTICE FOR UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 
From a political philosophical perspective, “undocumented,” “informal,” 
“clandestine,” or “illegal” immigrants provide a unique opportunity to rethink the legal 
dimensions of state membership in ways that reflect the actual workings of political 
institutions. For those individuals residing in the United States without the explicit1 
consent of the government, the legal dimensions of citizenship are more pressing than the 
politics of recognition or multiculturalism, areas of political philosophy where talk of 
“citizenship” abounds.2 This is not to say that questions of national representation or 
identity politics are insignificant in regards to the immigration debate, as I will show in 
greater detail in chapter 4. However, for those living precarious lives without many of the 
privileges, rights and duties that citizens have, legal status is the primary issue. In this 
sense, the point of departure for this chapter are the problems posed to political liberalism 
by the reality of undocumented immigration, the reality of individuals who informally 
exist inside the boundaries of a national polity. I will thus perform an “analectical” 
critique of mainstream theories of justice and state membership.  
Political activists render demands for social justice for undocumented people a 
question concerning the legitimacy of state membership. Pausing to examine the 
theoretical justifications for liberal policies of exclusion, in addition to evaluating the 
explanations for why mainstream theories of justice exclude undocumented immigrants 
from theoretical consideration, generates a host of questions about the nature of 
citizenship and social justice in the 21st century: How do we think about state 
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membership and social justice in a society with a population consisting of a “minority-
majority,” with dynamic and ongoing “post-racial” racial politics and an increasingly 
non-European migratory or international population? How does being within the scope of 
justice, which undocumented immigrants are, constitute a type of political subjectivity 
within the state? How can individuals contribute to the national economy and be subject 
to the law, but not have any say in its construction? Those who marched in the protest of 
2006, and every May Day since, ask these questions to all political philosophers, not just 
those of Latino/a backgrounds. Thus, at their core, arguments in favor of immigration 
reform are standard justice claims that pertain to such issues as exploited labor, racism, 
national prejudice or jingoism, political misrecognition and more. Being justice claims of 
this variety, all of which have been addressed at great lengths by feminists, philosophers 
of race, and social theorists, why are mainstream domestic theories of justice unable to 
respond to these specific justice claims? The answer to this question has to do with the 
“nationalistic” orientation of mainstream political and social philosophy.  
What follows are several reconsiderations of justice that provide for more robust 
and fair understandings of state membership.3 These reconsiderations focus on the central 
tenants of liberal political theory and the work of John Rawls, undoubtedly the most 
significant political philosopher of the 20th century.4 Of particular importance is the first 
limitation that Rawls places upon his theory of justice, namely, that it is a theory of 
justice for a closed society.5 My contention is that this constraint provides too much 
information regarding the persons behind the famed “veil of ignorance”; when 
formulating the basic principles upon which the structure of society will depend, we may 
not know if we are rich, poor, black, white, able-bodied or not, male or female, gay or 
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straight, but we do know that everyone behind the veil will be a citizen (because of the 
limitation mentioned above). Through this constriction Rawls limits justice to those who 
are formal members of the body politic. With this move, upwards of 12 million 
undocumented people are immediately alienated from Rawls’ basic conception of justice, 
individuals who clean our houses, take care of our children, pay taxes, serve us food, and 
rent the apartment down the hall. Although we did not formally invite them into this 
country (nor did they ask for permission), these are individuals that our national economy 
has historically turned to for cheap, reliable labor (hence another reason for why the 
“nation” depends upon those “outside”). Unless Rawls’ first limitation is justifiable, how 
can the range of justice, in its most basic form, be so narrow?  
In section 1, I argue that Rawls is paradigmatic of a general tendency in liberal 
political theory: he assumes the nation-state as his starting point. I attempt to hold Rawls 
accountable to standards that are his own: (1) justice should not rest upon arbitrary or 
contingent factors and (2) political philosophers must work with conceptions of people as 
the actually are, within the realm of what is actually possible.6 Similar to Rawls 
requirement that one’s family or class have nothing to do with one’s relation to justice, 
since those are determinations outside of your control, the place of one’s birth or the 
family one is born into should not have any effect on justice. It is increasingly difficult 
and indicative of a rift between theory and practice to think about justice in its idealized 
form when one assumes outdated if not impossible conceptions of society and the state as 
its starting point. In other words, I think it is impossible to think about justice today from 
the perspective of closed societies, instead I suggest the idea of more or less “stable” 
polities (amidst discussion of “ideal theory”).7 
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I believe that Rawls was aware of this line of critique. In The Law of Peoples he 
acknowledges the arbitrary nature of borders on several occasions.8 Nonetheless, his 
response to the nature of borders does not resolve the issue, and I will appeal to his 
difference principle to think through the problems posed above. I attempt to provide what 
amounts to Rawls’ way out of the above questions. In the Lectures on the History of 
Political Philosophy, while explaining his approach to teaching philosophers like Hume, 
Leibniz, and Kant, Rawls writes: “I always assumed…that the writers we were studying 
were always much smarter than I was. If they were not, why was I wasting my time and 
the student’s time by studying them? If I saw a mistake in their arguments, I supposed 
they [the philosophers] saw it too and must have dealt with it, but where? So I looked for 
their way out, not mine.”9 Thus, while attempting to rethink the scope and range of 
justice, so as to provide more adequate models of state membership in the 21st century, it 
should be possible to launch a Rawlsian critique of Rawls—what some thinkers might 
call an “imminent critique.” 
Section 2 explores the moral status of borders and the reasoning offered by 
political philosophers in favor of immigration restriction. I point out the historical 
contingency and arbitrary nature of state boundaries. I also provide what amounts to the 
best argument in favor of bounded political units. While borders are necessary, we need 
to think about them in ways that I will explain in section 3. 
Section 3 argues for a domestic understanding of justice that avoids the pitfalls of 
human rights discourse and cosmopolitanism, but also draws from Rawls’s difference 
principle. If the ascriptive foundations for legal-citizenship should not be factors in the 
construction of justice, such that Rawls’ initial constraint must be justified or modified, 
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then perhaps, using the difference principle, we can ask why some should be “citizens” 
and how others regarded as “noncitizens” benefit from this particular difference in social 
status. That is, we can thereby invoke Rawls’s “difference principle,” the idea that any 
differences in social or class status among the people in his proposed society should 
benefit the least advantaged, in a critical understanding of Rawls.10 Once the arbitrary 
bases for citizenship are included into the list of social and physical contingencies 
curtailed by the Rawlsian apparatus, then an undocumented immigrant or non-citizen 
resident become possible life options for persons behind the veil of ignorance.11 Being a 
non-citizen resident would thus join the list of things one doesn’t know if one has or is. 
This would mean that Rawls’ theory would have to account for “illegal aliens,” 
immigrants in general, and even people in developing nations, or else risk the arbitrary 
starting point of an enclosed polity.12 
In light of the arbitrary nature of borders, and the fact that historical contingency 
is the primary factor that determines state membership across the globe, I will attempt to 
provide an expansive notion of legal-personhood that reflects the workings of 
contemporary alienage law and the actual functioning of states. This idea of legal-
personhood assumes that immigrants, legal or not, are citizens in waiting (at least 
potentially). They must be treated in ways that reflect this status. Similarly, this view 
assumes that states exist only as processes of transition and mutual co-dependency, such 
that the juridical boundaries between states are constantly on the move. In this sense, I 
return to my use of “trans-nationalism” (which already harbors temporal connotations) by 
adding spatial dimensions that resonate with typical uses of this term: the construction of 
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national polities and national citizenries are processes that are continuously unfolding, 
expanding, and contracting. 
1. The Citizen Behind the Veil 
 
Within liberal political theory, the category “citizen” is often axiomatic. Theories 
of justice, the dispersal of political, economic and social rights, and even arguments for 
political institutions are justified in frameworks intended for “citizens” (this is also true 
even when discussions of “personhood” prevail). It is as citizens that individuals have 
their primary relation to the state—the “state,” subsequently the “nation-state,” being the 
chief form of political organization. Through an examination of Rawls’ work, from the 
perspective of undocumented immigration, it can be shown that liberal political theory 
often begins within the nation-state and assumes bordered polities as its starting point, 
typically through the language of closed political units. Not only is this assumption 
unjustifiable, but it also limits the type of philosophical questions one can ask when it 
comes to justice for immigrants.13  
If true to their beliefs, someone committed to the moral equality of all human 
beings cannot help but think about the lives of those outside of one’s national boundaries. 
In the mid-1980’s, James L. Hudson argued that any attempt to limit a moral framework 
in terms of nation-states runs the risk of arbitrarily handicapping its ethical commitments, 
adequate justification is required.14 Hudson writes,  
The philosophical discussion of immigration restriction has thus largely been a 
discussion of the merits of nationalism. The issue is not finally settled, but 
nothing has yet been done to rescue nationalism from the dubious company of 
racism and sexism. The thesis that we should give priority to fellow citizens, like 
the similar thesis with respect to members of our own racial or sexual group, 
requires some strong support if it is to be credible. It has not yet been given such 
support, and the prospects are bleak.15  
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Most liberal theorists hold that the question of national belonging and political 
membership rests upon answers that satisfy liberal principles, particularly the central 
tenants of autonomy and equality, in addition to satisfying the rationality principle—the 
idea that political philosophy should rest upon non-arbitrary, justifiable grounds. 
However, as Phillip Cole notes, when one stops to reflect on these answers they 
increasing seem to defy the equal worth of all human beings.16  
At the onset of A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that his main object of inquiry 
is justice, the basic structure of society. As such, Rawls seeks a simple conception of 
justice and limits his project in two crucial ways: First, after noting that he is “concerned 
with a special case of the problem of justice,” he writes “I shall be satisfied if it is 
possible to formulate a reasonable conception of justice for the basic structure of society 
conceived for the time being as a closed system isolated from other societies.”17 Rawls 
reemphasizes this limitation in later works but adds that “this position views society as 
closed: persons enter only by birth, and exit only by death.”18 Rawls’s second limitation 
is that he wishes to “examine the principles of justice that would regulate a well-ordered 
society.” He continues, “Everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in 
upholding just institutions.”19 This is called strict compliance theory, which has 
generated a comprehensive academic literature. However, most Rawlsian literature 
explores the question of whether or not a well-ordered society implies that people share 
common conceptions of the good, and whether or not people would behave justly if 
presented with the opportunity to do so. 
My concern here is with the first limitation (justice for a closed system). I take 
two issues: The first is that it renders the question of social justice for undocumented 
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people an afterthought; only after we settle the question of justice for citizens can we 
think about justice for immigrants, foreigners or those somewhere in between. This is 
analogous to saying that we need to figure interracial justice among whites first and 
interracial justice second.20 How can the basic conception of justice not immediately 
pertain to 12 million people in the United States? One may attempt to address this 
concern by appealing to the fact that Rawls is working with ideal theory, which supplies 
the most perfect form of justice possible and then uses this as the rubric by which to 
judge existing societies.21 My response to this view is found in Charles Mills’ work on 
racial justice and the pitfalls of ideal theory (I return to this below).  
My second issue with justice for a closed-society is that it reveals some 
knowledge about the individuals behind the veil of ignorance: although people behind the 
veil may not know if they are poor, rich, Black, White, Gay, able-bodied, etc., they do 
know that they will be citizens. This violates the main reasoning and motivation for the 
original position and veil of ignorance, which is to implement justice with a conception 
of it as fairness that allows for equality and liberty to be simultaneously possible.22 I will 
explore this second concern first. 
The closed-society limitation is warranted but unjustifiable. Closed political 
systems allow for the proper dispersal of burdens and benefits. They also ensure that 
individuals will exhibit prudence, since it is assumed that the citizenry cannot leave 
whenever they choose to do so. In The Law of Peoples Rawls holds that a government 
should be an effective means of making citizens respect their environment; they cannot 
trash the place and then just pick up and leave.23 From a theoretical point of view, 
arriving at a basic conception of justice for a closed society allows for the vantage point 
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necessary that can be used to think about theories of justice on a global scale. It makes 
sense that Rawls would recreate the theoretical scenario that provides for the foundations 
of justice inside of a closed polity on a more global perspective. However, Rawls did not 
do this, but instead appealed to the idea of the Society of Peoples (where there is a form 
of the original position but it is a bit more open). His reasoning is that one will have to 
consider the existence of illiberal governments, as well as reasonably just institutions that 
remain religiously structured or monarchical.24  
Rawls is clear that essential to the basic structure of a well-ordered society is 
fairness. Political institutions should be fair and the product of well-reasoned beliefs 
checked by moral intuitions, as well as methods of universalization. Reviving the social 
contract tradition, Rawls holds that consent is crucial to the formulation of systems of 
government. As a Kantain, Rawls thinks universality, in terms of the scope of justice for 
citizens, should also be present in a theory of justice as fairness. Using the famed “veil of 
ignorance,” Rawls asks the members of a hypothetical society to create the conditions for 
justice by formulating the overall structure and rules of society without knowledge of 
how they will be affected by the end result. That is accomplished by not knowing who 
they are at the outset. Assuming that humans are unwilling to gamble that they will 
become the richest, most privileged members of society, given the risk they may end up 
the poorest least privileged, Rawls thinks that reasonable persons would not favor gross 
disparities in wealth or standards of living. At the end of the experiment, any differences 
amongst the lives of citizens should benefit the most disadvantaged or worst-off groups. 
The end result of this thought experiment, and hence a theory of justice in an ideal 
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setting, would result in an overlapping consensus on the basic structure of society that 
leaves room for reasonable disagreement on moral, metaphysical and political ideas. 
According to Martha Nussbaum, Rawls differs from other social contract theorists 
by not assuming any type of natural rights in the original position, which Rawls intended 
to serves as his version of the state of nature.25 Whereas Hugo Grotius, Samuel von 
Pufendorf and Francisco Vitoria influence Thomas Hobbes and John Locke in terms of 
international law and natural rights, Rawls makes no concessions in this regard. In 
addition, Rawls maintains the possibility of certain moral intuitions, stemming from 
Kant, which inform or check the hypothetical procedure whereby the basic structure of 
society is determined. Both the procedural orientation and the appeal to moral intuitions 
ensure that human interests can best be served by a social contract that “divest human 
beings of the artificial advantages some of them hold in all actual societies—wealth, land, 
social class, education and so on,” as Nussbaum writes.26 In Rawls’ own words: 
[T]he reason why the original position must abstract from and not be affected by 
the contingencies of the social world is that the conditions for a fair agreement on 
the principles of political justice between free and equal persons must eliminate 
the bargaining advantages which inevitably arise within background institutions 
of any society as the result of cumulative social, historical, and natural tendencies. 
These contingent advantages and accidental influences from the past should not 
influence an agreement on the principles which are to regulate the institutions of 
the basic structure itself from the present into the future.27  
 
Rawls’s attempt to eliminate accidental or historical “bargaining advantages” when 
formulating the basic structure of society, i.e. justice, should again be emphasized.  
If Rawls is concerned with contingencies of birth like class, race and gender why 
does he not recognize that place of birth or the family to whom one is born are equally 
contingent? These politics of birth are matters of luck that violate the rationality 
principle, i.e. the idea that as rational beings, humans can solve political problems 
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without reference to arbitrary decisions. Joseph Carens noticed this problem as well: 
“Citizenship in Western liberal democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal 
privilege—an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances. Like feudal 
birthright privileges, restrictive citizenship is hard to justify when one thinks about it 
closely.”28 It is for this reason that Peter H. Schuck and Rogers M. Smith argue that jus 
soli and jus sanguinis are ascriptive elements of state membership lacking consent, the 
cornerstone of the social contract. Building from the Lockean principle that it is “consent 
which makes any one a member of any common-wealth,”29 Schuck and Smith argue that 
the politics of birth should be considered illegitimate within the contractarian tradition.30  
2. The Right of Self-Determination and the Moral Significance of Borders 
In more recent scholarship, the argument from consent rests upon the right of self-
determination with varying opinion on the question of birthright citizenship. Most notable 
in this respect are the works by Michael Walzer, Christopher Heath Wellman, and 
Jacqueline Stevens.31  
Walzer and Wellman concern themselves with the right of self-determination and 
for the most part drop the discussion of birthright citizenship. Both thinkers unfortunately 
assume a de-historicized political community in their arguments. Walzer and Wellman 
have convincing arguments for why admission policies should be based on a political 
community’s right of self-determination, a right that is simply postulated.32 They do not, 
however, explain how or why individuals who arbitrarily find themselves members of an 
existing polity can further their luck by then having a right to exclude or include others. 
Walzer and Wellman are missing a significant point about the formation of polity 
communities in the first place. Walzer writes,  
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The idea of distributive justice presupposes a bounded world within which 
distributions take place: a group of people committed to dividing, exchanging, 
and sharing social goods, first of all among themselves. That world, as I have 
already argued, is the political community, whose members distribute power to 
one another and avoid, if they possibly can, sharing it with anyone else. When we 
think about distributive justice, we think about independent cities or countries 
capable of arranging their own patters of division and exchange, justly or unjustly. 
We assume an established group and a fixed population, and so we miss that first 
and most important distributive question: How is that group constituted?  
I don’t mean, [h]ow was it constituted? I am concerned here not with the 
historical origins of the different groups, but with the decisions they make in the 
present about their present and future populations. 
 
Notice how Walzer assumes a bounded community. More on point, however, is the fact 
that he is not concerned with the historical origins of group formation. While the decision 
to admit or not may be clear-cut once the group is already in existence, its origins may be 
murky. This may have an effect on the relationship between two countries, and thus there 
might be some reason for maintaining certain immigration allowances that override the 
right of self-determination (I spell this out in the next paragraph).  
Wellman argues that individuals and states have a right to determine whom they 
with whom they do or do not associate, using as an example the immorality of an 
arranged marriage.33 However, not all human relationships are so decisive. For instance, I 
may select my spouse—assuming my partner selects me as well, and also assuming that 
humans make completely rational autonomous decisions when we are “in love”—but I do 
not get to select my in-laws, the family I am born into, neighbors, childhood friends (to 
some extent), and coworkers. My situation requires that I treat my in-laws, family, 
neighbors, friends, and coworkers fairly, and at time put up with certain obligations that I 
could abandon, but to tell my brother, mom or best friend that they do not have special 
significance in my life is to issue a lie, both to them and myself. Thus, the historical point 
I made against Walzer carries over into Wellman’s essay: the historical formation of a 
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political community may impose certain obligations that we cannot forsake or ignore 
(obligations that extend beyond our local community34). Mexican immigration should be 
curbed, but the United States has historically relied upon cheap, reliable labor from 
Mexico. In addition, the southwestern part of the United States is a product of colonial 
expansion backed by war. And Mexico’s drug problems are related to the United State’s 
drug consumption. Thus, for the United States to say that they have a “right to order their 
own affairs as they please” is to appeal to a sense of autonomy that depends upon a 
material reality, which is dependent upon international relations (I will return to in the 
next section).35 These are some problems with the starting point of an enclosed, self-
sustaining polity.   
Stevens’ account differs from Walzer and Wellman in her view that birthright 
citizenship is connected to the promulgation of the “nation” (from the Latin nasci, 
“birth”). National affiliations based on the politics of birth are organizations that strive to 
curtail individual human mortality, and in so doing lend themselves to war or other 
dangerous political actions. Stevens writes, “The creation and reliance on kinship rules to 
determine membership is a symptom of an unmet desire for certainty and immortality in 
the face of life’s actual conditions of chaos and death.”36  
The question of eliminating birthright citizenship is a contentious issue. Without 
an understanding of state membership based on the politics of birth, the entire liberal 
project cannot get off the ground. Nonetheless, the argument for birth-based state 
membership could work as follows:  
As social animals, human beings require formal institutions and political 
organizations in order to realize human capabilities and ensure the wellbeing of 
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individuals. These institutions and organizations require various levels of 
complexity and longevity, in addition to an effective means of regulating the 
distribution of political power, particularly with reference to such ideals as liberty, 
autonomy, equality, community and fairness. Part of the historical efficacy of 
political groupings is their less-than-global, that is parochial, nature. For this 
reason, we live in a world of political communities (plural). From this picture, 
some form of state membership is required to allow for the differentiation of one 
community from another. “Citizenship” provides an efficient means of 
designating the range and scope of a particular state’s authority and responsibility, 
in addition to the duties and benefits shared amongst its people.37 Thus, it is only 
through the idea of bounded political units that political communities are possible. 
The determination of membership status is of the utmost importance and 
outweighs the need for non-arbitrary, well-reasoned arguments.38 
A plausible argument for ignoring the fact that the politics of birth are historical 
contingencies rests upon utilitarian grounds: without the existence of political boundaries 
such ideas as autonomy and equality are impossible. As Carens notes, borders are needed 
to allow for the possibility of group autonomy and political stability. He refers to this as 
“the principle public order”: In a borderless world states would not exist and chaos would 
ensue. 
While it is one thing to argue that borders and political communities are 
necessary, this does not provide an account for why borders as they exist now are the 
products of fair or well-reasoned decisions. Because we need borders for political 
communities to be possible does not tell us why we should accept those currently in 
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existence, which are the product of historical contingency, including unjust or unjustified 
conquest through war. Given the arbitrary nature of current borders, a relaxed or more 
informed immigration policy could or should be considered.  
In the Law of Peoples, regarding the arbitrariness of borders, Rawls tells us:  
It does not follow from the fact that boundaries are historically arbitrary that their 
role in the Law of Peoples cannot be justified. On the contrary, to fix on their 
arbitrariness is to fix on the wrong thing. In the absence of a world-state, there 
must be boundaries of some kind, which when viewed in isolation will seem 
arbitrary, and depend to some degree on historical circumstances. In a reasonably 
just (or at least decent) Society of Peoples, the inequalities of power and wealth 
are to be decided by all peoples themselves.39 
 
Rawls continues by saying that in a global society of liberal and decent peoples the 
common sources for migration go away. He writes, “The problem of immigration is not, 
then simply left aside, but is eliminated as a serious problem in a realistic utopia.”40 All 
political philosophy is “realistically utopian when it extends what are ordinary thought of 
as the limits of practical political philosophy.”41 Rawls is not advocating for a world 
government or global-demos; he stands in agreement with Kant that such a place would 
not allow for effective forms of governance (think in terms of logistics) and result in 
frequent civil war. Rawls simply believes that under ideal circumstances the causes of 
immigration would cease, similar to how under ideal circumstances no one would be an 
undocumented immigrant inside of a domestic polity. 
Here is where the argument for ideal theory comes in to play, as does the work of 
Charles Mills. Mills’ project is to figure out Rawls’s position of racial justice. At best, 
Rawls never really thought much about race, and at worst he willfully ignored this 
subject.42 Mills argues for two forms of ideal theory, that which attempts to prevent such 
things as immigration or racial injustice, and that which tries to rectify past injustices or 
historical contingencies by creating ideal theories that consider non-ideal factors. Mills 
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thinks that the omission of racial justice affects the nature of justice in a variety of ways. 
Most important, it would require such things as an intergenerational concept of justice 
both for reparations and as means of curtailing racial tension for posterity.43  
Against Mills, Yolanda Wilson argues that omitting the question of racial justice 
is not a fault in Rawlsian theory. Rawls is dealing with ideal theory, non-ideal theory may 
require one to engage questions of racial justice, but we cannot hold Rawls accountable 
for such an omission.44 Similarly, in terms of my project, one may object that just 
because Rawls does not entertain the question of social justice for undocumented 
immigrants that this omission is not a flaw of Rawls’s ideal theory. However, Mills is 
quick to argue that even in ideal conditions, a theory of justice that takes into account 
racial justice, as a variable that may change the end result of such a hypothetical 
situation, will appear drastically different from an ideal theory that does not. The ideal 
scenario that includes racial justice does not amount to the same ideal conditions that 
leave this question aside. Furthermore, insofar as the purpose of ideal theory is to serve as 
a rubric for justice in the real world; what good is ideal theory, Mills asks, if it cannot at 
all respond to or measure up to the goal of racial injustice?  
Mills has a temporal point, namely that we cannot start over when thinking about 
justice, but instead must begin from where we are and then posit the ideal to be achieved. 
The past must be accounted for and not just pushed aside for the sake of contemplating 
perfection. Cole reminds us of this when he writes:  
The relation between states and the borders between them are the product of a 
history, and that history gives rise to ethical conclusions: for example there may 
have been a colonial relationship between the two states. Too often liberal 
political philosophy is written against the background of a fictional history in 
which colonial exploitation never occurred. But once we bring this historical 
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element into our considerations, it has a profound impact upon our ethical 
reasoning concerning migration.45 
 
This passage also applies to Walzer and Wellman’s dismissal of the historical 
significance of group formation, as mentioned above. 
In terms of space, the question of justice for undocumented persons does to 
Rawls’s project what Mills attempts in terms of time (remember the intergenerational 
point). It is no longer possible to understand social justice in its most basic form within 
closed frameworks. Migrations, the activities of transnational corporations, and the 
existence of multinational people challenge the possibility of formulating theories of 
justice that ignore the international elements of 21st century societies. In similar ways, 
given the legacies of social oppression visible within gender or racial differences, 
questions of reparations, affirmative actions policies, and other redistributive procedures, 
a trans-historical approach to justice is required in those cases, as well.46 As Nelson 
Maldonado-Torres, Ramon Grosfugel, and Jose Saldívar write, “The old way of thinking 
about migration is obsolete today given the compression of space and time.”47 One 
cannot think of national space as enclosed or isolated, nor can time be viewed outside of 
the causal relationships that generate each particular moment. In considering the nature of 
justice, these new ideas of time and space must therefore be acknowledged. 
There is another consideration that appeals to ideal theory must take into 
consideration when thinking about justice as only for citizens. T. Alexander Aleinikoff 
argues that most of the rights that non-nationals or undocumented immigrants have inside 
of first world countries like the United States are products of constitutions and not 
international human rights law.48 In an extensive legal study, Linda Bosniak provides a 
history of the ways in which various United States Supreme Court decisions have argued 
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in favor of noncitizens, including “illegal aliens,” based on the 14th Amendment49 and the 
language of “persons” not “citizens.” 50 This also proves equally problematic to 
cosmopolitans and post-citizenship thinkers who often assume a general human rights 
platform when thinking about social justice for all people in the world. If anything, as 
Kristen Hill Maher argues, human rights may have an influence on how a state will 
recognize the rights of its own citizens, but this does nothing for noncitizens. For Maher, 
“human rights norms have generally been enacted within the nation-state system and 
administered as the rights of citizens.”51  
Worse, cosmopolitanism and theories of global justice problematize the reality of 
undocumented immigration. While individuals like Thomas Pogge may think that legal 
cosmopolitanism is possible in theory—in a way modeled after the European Union—the 
fact that this would impinge on state sovereignty makes it difficult to imagine.52 In a 
world of global citizens, no person can be “illegal.” Thus, the question of undocumented 
citizenship, as it exists today, is a nonissue from the perspective of cosmopolitan theory 
just as it is for Rawls. Relevant here is Paul Rabinow’s idea of “coerced 
cosmopolitanism” that examines the ways in which transnational experience of the 
underprivileged in first-world countries consistently reminds migrants of their cultural 
particularity and alienation from capitalist, globalized culture.53 
3. The Distribution of Legal-Personhood 
Even though the category “citizen” is a dated concept reliant upon a Westphalian 
model of the state and national autonomy, citizenship is not going away. Although the 
world is increasing becoming globalized and interconnected—such that individuals like 
Seyla Benhabib, Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, and Peter Spiro view citizenship to be 
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outdated—it is unlikely that the significance of the concept will lessen given the 
existence of militaries and the state tendencies to avoid sacrificing national sovereignty.54 
Citizenship must be refigured in ways that are attentive to the contemporary concerns of 
21st century societies, but nonetheless informed by the workings of the real world, 
cautious of utopian or idealistic fetters.  
Rethinking the nature of justice from the perspective of “illegal” peoples 
necessitates new or reformulated models of political membership and state-boundaries 
that are more fluid and porous; again, the assumption is that rethinking the subject of 
justice, those to whom justice is due, will inform us of new types of political membership. 
I am hesitant to advocate for an open doors policy as a resolution to the undocumented 
immigration issue, since I think this would be impractical on several levels. The efficacy 
of political communities will be called into question and it also undermines the ability for 
other people to be autonomous. I do believe that we can do a better job with handling the 
reality of unauthorized immigration and constructing understandings of justice that are 
more friendly to immigrants in general. This would start by fostering domestic social 
atmospheres conducive to the rights of persons and not official members of the body 
politic, as well as making legal-citizenship an easy and open means towards achieving the 
ability to participate in the construction and reconstruction of the nation, national-
citizenship. 
If undocumented immigrants are to be included in the list of persons subject to the 
procedural construction of justice, and if we are really committed to the central tenants of 
liberal political theory (i.e., autonomy and equality), then they should also have a say in 
the construction of justice.55 Being within the scope of justice—not just a theoretical 
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claim but also historical fact based on the history of alienage law—provides a type of 
political subjectivity. What is this subjectivity? If it is not equivalent to legal-citizenship, 
then at the very least it is a form of legal-personhood endowed with an assortment of 
rights grounded in the Constitution (and not some cosmopolitan ethic or human rights 
platform). The burden thus falls upon Rawlsian theory to justify this difference in social 
status, meaning that Rawlsian theorists have to explain why political duties should 
maintain an exclusive connection to national-citizen while the rights associated with 
legal-citizenship can be expanded to noncitizens. 
We can broaden the rights associated with legal-citizenship while preserving the 
rights of nation-citizenship if there are rational arguments (non-arbitrary reasons) for why 
we need national-citizens in the first place.  This will fit the two main principles of 
justice, as articulated by Rawls: 
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of 
  equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of 
  liberties for all; and 
 
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to 
 be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
 opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
 advantaged members of society (the difference principle).56 
 
Of the above, “a” is constitutionally guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to all people who 
happen to be in the United States. I offer an argument for “b” below.   
A rational argument that preserves the distinction between citizen and noncitizen 
can be made insofar as the pathways to national-citizen are open, relatively easy, and 
subject to the interrelatedness of states (which would satisfy the first clause of this 
principle, i.e. “equal opportunity”). The Rawlsian caveat is that non-citizens must benefit 
from their specific status as such (the difference principle). In a large welfare state, this 
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criterion is somewhat easy to satisfy, assuming that there is a fair distribution of goods 
based on personhood. This is easier said that done, however, and the controversy ventures 
beyond definitions for what constitutes a “fair distribution of goods.” As Mills has 
recently pointed out, arguments in favor of personhood are as capricious as those for 
citizens since historically the category “person” did not apply to all humans, even though 
corporations and other nonhuman entities are afforded this status.57 
 Another way noncitizens can benefit from their status as such is if those with 
official status perform an assortment of positive rights, like voting, running for office, 
and taking part in the construction of law, that benefit the entire body politic. Citizenship, 
in this sense, is more of an official post or type of office, rather than a passive status 
lacking any significant performative component. The problem with this perspective is 
that is ends up being paternalistic and contrary to the central tenants of liberal political 
theory, at least initially. As Cole and Walzer observe, if one is subject to law they must 
have a say in its construction and maintenance.58 As I explored in chapter 2, a way of 
resolving this problem stems from Enrique Dussel’s account of analectics. While citizens 
are needed to perform an assortment of duties that noncitizens benefit from, these duties 
are ongoing and constantly in the process of becoming. From the perspective of the 
transnational state, the category of citizen is continuously unfolding. The autonomy of a 
state is never complete or fixed but continually in transit (this is the temporal component 
of “trans-nationalism”). The divide between autonomy and heteronomy is never as clear 
as one might like. Human beings are born into communities that we are not responsible 
for; our autonomy is situated and intersubjective and thus a process that is more or less 
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stable at different times. This is another lesson learned from philosophers of 
multiculturalism (the subject of chapter 4).  
Again, central to this argument is the idea that noncitizen aliens are really persons 
on their way toward becoming citizens. We can expect that immigrants are willing to 
perform the duties of being a citizen in return for the protections provided to citizens. 
Here, being an “immigrant” implies that one is actively pursuing naturalization into a 
state.59 Hiroshi Motomura’s essay, “Immigration Outside the Law,” become extremely 
relevant at this point.  
For Motomura any meaningful discussion immigration reform requires that one 
explore the tripartite structure of (1) the meaning of “unlawful presence” or “illegality,” 
(2) the role of states and cities in the immigration debate, and (3) the integration of 
immigrants. What “unlawful presence” means is not settled in the United States. The 
Supreme Court has been ambivalent about the nature of legal and illegal immigrant 
rights, at times making decisions in favor of immigrants other times allowing plenary 
powers to run their course. Nonetheless, the federal government has made clear that 
immigration is national matter not a local or state issue. However, cities and states play a 
major role in establishing political and social atmospheres that are conducive to 
immigrant rights. Thus, effectively striking accord between state and federal governments 
on the issue of immigrant rights is crucial. Instead of viewing the expansion of immigrant 
rights as counter to the stability of the state, Motomura argues that these rights are 
actually the means of fostering successful integration into mainstream society (this point 
is worth highlighting since I wish to remind that legal-citizenship is the means to 
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national-citizenship). In this sense, immigrants have to be willing to positively affect 
society, which really means acknowledging the positive impacts of immigrant labor.60     
Healthy integration requires an open and relatively easy naturalization process. 
We can preserve the positive rights associated with national-citizenship (e.g., voting) if 
naturalization law is transparent and easily accessible, in addition to the existence of a 
wider distribution of the rights associated with legal-citizenship (e.g. the right to health 
care, various civil protections like renters rights, union rights, public education, habeas 
corpus). This is a common sentiment among individuals working on the issue of 
immigration and justice.61 
Last, in order for our theories of justice and network of rights to become more 
inclusive towards noncitizen residents, we must rethink the nature of states and the 
borders the give them their shape. While states exert sovereignty over their domain, they 
exist in a world of other states, “a political community of states,” so to speak. States thus 
depend upon their “outside,” both materially and philosophically. As an analog take the 
atomistic subject. 
 While modern, enlightened thinkers like Kant viewed the self as a solipsistic 
subject, autonomous and independent, subsequent philosophers challenged this 
understanding of the self and demonstrated how this individual is only possible within a 
network of other subjects who together provide the material conditions for life. As 
feminists, phenomenologists, and post-colonial philosophers argue, the modern subject 
only exists in a world with slavery, the oppression of women and minorities, and 
colonization. Thus, the modern subject became inter-subjective. Along these lines, in his 
Cartesian Meditations, Edmund Husserl argues that thinking things (Descartes cogito) 
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only exist insofar as they are thinking about something; the objects of thought (even if 
they are an illusion) provide the conditions for the possibility for thought and self-
realization in the first place. Thus, human consciousness is consciousness-of-something. 
There is no “thought” by itself but only thinking-about-something.62 This does not mean 
that self or modern subject has no autonomy, but the split between autonomy and 
heteronomy is not black or white, gray areas are everywhere.  
The last two points about the intersubjective-self and Husserl’s explanation for 
how the modern subject depends upon the object of knowledge relate to my claim about 
the outside of nationality. Nation-states depend upon that which they are not, they are 
intersubjective and co-dependent, both constitutively (i.e., in their formation) and even 
after they are formed. Rousseau comes close when he writes:  
The state, in contrast, since it is an artificial body, has no fixed measure and is 
never sure of its proper size. It can always expand, and yet always feels weak as 
long as there are other states that are stronger than itself. Its security, its defense, 
demand that it try to appear more powerful than its neighbors; and it can only 
grow, feed itself and test its strength at their expense. Even if it does not actually 
need to seek its subsistence beyond its borders, it is ceaselessly on the lookout for 
new members who might give it a stable base. For the inequality of men has limits 
put in place by the hands of nature, but the inequalities of states can grow 
incessantly, until one absorbs all the others.  
 
Its powers being purely relative, the political body is forced ceaselessly to 
compare itself in order to know itself. It depends on its surroundings, and must 
take an interest in all that happens there. For in vain might it wish simply to keep 
to itself without risking gain or loss; whether a state becomes small or great, weak 
or strong, depends on whether its neighbor expands or pulls back, adds to its 
forces or reduces them.63 
 
 As an  “artificial body” the state is the work of human beings. Constructing the state is 
an art that remains ongoing (“it has no fixed measure…”). As national collectives, states 
are aware of others and gain their “sense of self” through comparison with others. The 
growth of one usually means the constriction of another. While Rousseau argues for this 
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to be a cause of war, I wish to interpret this in the following way: one can never know 
where national polities end. Borders are not helpful in this regard since national interest 
routinely surpasses them (e.g., the United States has some material investment in Mexico, 
Canada and at the time of this writing, now Libya!).  
Etienne Balibar’s recent comments on the nature of borders are helpful in this 
regard.64 Borders, for Balibar, are real, symbolic and imaginary. The reality of the border 
pertains to their increasing militarization and strengthening, but also the fact that the 
border enters everyday spaces, and thus becomes “more real” through their increasing 
presence. Borders are vacillating. They do not work in the same way for all people and 
the lines they form segmented pockets around the more affluent and dominant parts of a 
single state. In addition, borders stand as representations for what states want to be, they 
designate a range of what I call “legalistic aspiration.” States purport or aspire to be the 
supreme legal authority in a designated (bordered) area, but legal transgressions occur 
constantly within its domain. Nonetheless, legalistic aspirations are checked by the 
sovereignty of other states, although at times a states jurisdiction ventures into another 
states’ boundaries. As John Agnew excellently put it: 
What I have in mind…[is] reframing the border question in practical and ethical 
terms in such a way that moves beyond the simple either/or stipulation of the 
current debate. We need to change the way in which we think about borders to 
openly acknowledge their equivocal character. In other words, we need to see a 
border not as that which is either (a) fixed or (b) as such must be overcome, but as 
an evolving construction that has both merits and problems that must be 
constantly reweighed. My main normative commitment is to the idea that the 
answer to what borders do should always be related to the overriding ethical 
concern that they serve and not undermine human dignity and what Johnathan 
Seglow has called ‘the right to a decent life.’65 
 
The fact that borders provide a service is of the utmost importance in light of the 
argument for borders I provided in the last section. That is to say, they ensure human 
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autonomy and allocate rights, but as the product of past human interactions, which are not 
completely just and never complete or fixed (hence Agnew’s use of “evolving 
construction”).   
 Returning to my claim, the interdependence of national polities and the dynamic 
nature of borders necessitates novel constructions of state membership that reflect this co-
dependency and jurisdictional fluctuation. Our immigration policy and theories of 
domestic justice, while they should “open” a bit, could do more to reflect the actual 
workings of states as inter-connected entities.  
 A conclusion to be drawn at this point is that although theories of justice, like that 
provided by Rawls, are positive steps in thinking about the overall structure of society 
and the principles meant to regulate the fair terms of social cooperation, they must always 
be improved, in an analectical sense. We do not simply achieve something like social 
“equality” or “fairness”; these are ideals that we are constantly striving towards. I am not 
saying that Rawls is working with a fixed understanding of equality or justice. His views 
are dynamic as well. But, given the constraints placed upon his theory of justice, Rawls’s 
thought heads in a direction that I am not sure will help such individuals as 
undocumented immigrants—the fact that they are left aside speaks towards this. Part of 
the improving our theories of justice requires that our conceptions of the state and state 
membership become ongoing processes, not static or fixed. Rawls and mainstream 
liberals may have dynamic conceptions of justice in mind, but their trajectories are set in 
ways that further the arbitrary bases of state membership.  
Liberal political theory begins from conceptions of the state that are self-enclosed. 
This self-enclosed origin determines the trajectory for subsequent political thought 
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regarding the nature of political institutions, state membership, and group/individual 
rights in ways that locate these inside the boundaries a country. These boundaries are 
hard to justify, morally, and not so clear-cut or well defined, in actuality. State boundaries 
rest on shaky ground given that they are historically contingent and the products of 
imperial expansion through war. Examining the reality of borders reveals that they are 
shades of gray, not black or white, since national interest and the vacillation of borders 
defy the lines the sand that state boundaries depend upon. In addition, the historical 
relation between states, in terms of trade, economic co-dependency, and the flow of 
people and goods across borders, defies the self-enclosed nature purported by mainstream 
political theorists. All of this should be a factor in how state membership is determined. 
Yet it is not. This is my main argument in this chapter, and in my concluding chapter (6), 
I offer another way of explaining this argument relying upon two conceptual frameworks, 
i.e. “encounter” and “discovery.” 
4. Notes 
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4 By “liberal political theory” I mean that tradition of thought descending from political 
philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and John Stuart Mill to procedural-
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immigration and citizenship, such as Michael Walzer or David Miller, it is hard to tell 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE ETHICS OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND THE LIMITS OF 
POLITICAL RECOGNITION 
My goal in this chapter is to explain the ways in which questions of 
multiculturalism and the politics of recognition relate to undocumented immigration and 
Hispanic people as a whole. I will explain how this branch of political philosophy can 
help the immigration debate, and also report the shortfalls of this perspective when it 
comes to changing power dynamics associated with legal-citizenship and majority group 
rights. I emphasize majority because most theorists of multiculturalism are concerned 
with minority group rights. I intend on flipping the backdrop of the politics of recognition 
to show how they must be accompanied by real changes in the nature of political power. 
Not only do I have in mind the history of multiculturalism in Bolivia in the mid-1990s, 
but I am also anticipating the reality of a minority-majority and the future of group rights 
in the United States. 
Drawing from Charles Taylor, Iris Marion Young, James Tully and Will 
Kymlicka, section 1 of this chapter reviews the politics of multiculturalism. I call this 
range of questioning “the ethics of political representation.” After providing an overview 
of citizenship from within this perspective, I argue that this train of thought misses the 
question of legality and instead relies upon a civic-oriented communitarian idea of state 
membership, i.e. national-citizenship. Although many individuals think that this branch 
of political thought can be used to argue for undocumented immigrant rights, even when 
put into constitutional terms, the ethics of political representation does not combat the 
exclusive nature of political power, nor does it entertain the question of state-membership 
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for undocumented peoples. Instead, the paradox of democratic legitimacy necessitates the 
existence of borders and divisions between nation-states (no matter how multinational 
they are). Hence, at the base of the politics of recognition is a conception of legal-
citizenship that remains unquestioned. 
There exist major set backs associated with the idea of multiculturalism, 
especially in terms of its practical application. In section 2 of this chapter, I explore one 
historical manifestation of these problems involving the application of multicultural 
reforms in Bolivia in the mid-1990s. These reforms aimed at “liberating” or 
“politicizing” the indigenous majority. I will make some general comments regarding the 
nature of indigenous politics in Latin America. Namely, from one perspective, 
“indigenous politics”—i.e., the practice of Western politics from the perspective of 
indigenous worldviews—is questionable, because indigenous people are seen as the 
foundation for Western political thought. I will then explore the actual Bolivian reforms 
put in place in the mid-1990s. Overall, my main point is encapsulated in comments Linda 
Bosniak has made regarding the standard Marxists critique of citizenship:  
Indeed, citizenship has been famously criticized as a formalist construct that 
purports to extend formal equality in the public sphere but which simultaneously 
obscures relations of domination in the private economic realm. Marxist thought, 
in particular, is well-known for counterposing citizenship to economy by 
maintaining that the formal equality of citizenship status masks relations of 
drastic inequality prevailing in what Marx himself called the domain of ‘material 
life.’1 
 
In chapter 5, I will present one more problem associated with multiculturalism 
that has to do with the dynamic nature of race and the ways in which United States 
national identity remains racialized, amidst much progress in combating racism. 
However, these critiques in this chapter (4) and the next (5) are not meant to obviate any 
discussion of cultural pluralism. In fact, as I will argue below, most theorists believe that 
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plausible immigration reform cannot come about without multicultural understandings of 
the state. This is why I parsed out national-citizenship from legal-citizenship. The politics 
of multiculturalism attack culturally exclusive forms of nationalism that harbor anti-
immigrant sentiment. While it should be clear by now that I am interested in providing a 
conception of legal-personhood that improves the lived reality of undocumented peoples, 
I am also interested in supporting political atmospheres that are tolerant of “strangers” 
considering the view of trans-nationalism I offer (i.e. the state and the nation as a 
process).  
1. The Ethics of Political Representation  
 “Cultural diversity,” much like “multiculturalism,” implies that nation-states are 
composed of an assortment of social groups that maintain their own cultural or ethnic 
practices, mores, languages, and ways of being (among other things). Professional, civil 
or political institutions and social theorists that promote multiculturalism endorse the idea 
that not only should institutions reflect the range of perspectives that they serve or 
represent, but also that diversity itself is a desirable goal. While the fact of 
multiculturalism is simply the existence of various distinctive cultural/ethnic groups, the 
normative sense of “multiculturalism” finds value in such an atmosphere and subscribes 
to the belief that diversity should be fostered, supported and even implemented. Note, 
however, that it is a mistake to view diversity itself as the end. Political philosophers, 
who do not say enough about diversity as the means of bringing about a political or social 
atmosphere where people equally influence one another and interact, run the risk of 
allowing for tokenism and separatism. 
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The early 1990’s saw an explosion of debates revolving around the importance of 
cultural diversity in contemporary states and the national representation of ethnic, racial 
and gender minorities. The year 1992 in particular stands out insofar as libratory 
movements and the idea of cultural diversity are concerned. Originally published that 
year, Charles Taylor’s Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition” is probably the 
most widely known philosophical account of the role of cultural diversity in public 
institutions and the social and political life of the United States.2 As Kymlicka and 
Norman explain, the focus on group rights at this time stemmed from the previous two 
decades of political thought: the 1970s focus on justice and the structure of political 
institutions (i.e., Rawls’ work), and the 1980s focus on community (i.e., communitarian 
thought). In the 1990s, political philosophers combined the idea of justice and 
community, the end result being multiculturalism.3 All of this is aside from the fact that 
there were race riots taking place in Los Angeles due to the complexities of the O. J. 
Simpson trial, in addition to the 500-year anniversary of the encounter with America.4  
As is the case with Tully and Kymlicka, Taylor’s work arises out of the debates 
regarding cultural rights in Canada, in particular, the rights of Francophone peoples in 
Quebec and the protection of the rights and land of First-Nations peoples. In the United 
States, one possible source for the attention paid to multiculturalism and the national 
representation of minorities is Ronald Reagan’s call for the return to “traditional family 
values.” Seemingly harmless, Reagan understood the family to be the means by which 
national culture was maintained and strengthened. Like Aristotle, who argued that the 
heterosexual family is the source of the state, Reagan asserts in Proclamation of National 
Family Week:  
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The family is the basic unit of our society, the heart of our free democracy. It 
provides love, acceptance, guidance, support, and instruction to the individual. 
Community values and goals that give America strength also take root in the 
home. In times of change and challenge, families keep safe our cultural heritage 
and reinforce our spiritual foundation.  
  
[…] 
 
National Family Week is a time to be thankful for the family as a national 
heritage and resource. It is a time to recommit ourselves to the concept of the 
family—a concept that must withstand the trends of lifestyle and legislation. Let 
us pledge that our institutions and policies will be shaped to enhance an 
environment in which families can strengthen their ties and best exercise their 
beliefs, authority, and resourcefulness. And let us make our pledge mindful that 
we do so not only on behalf of individual family members, but for America.5  
 
Reagan’s statements on family force the question as to what changes in legislation or 
society occurred to warrant such a recommitment to the family? The Reagan 
Administration makes clear that the loss of traditional family values stemmed from the 
“value-relativism” of the ‘60s and ‘70s, a time when public institutions and ordinary 
citizens were discouraged from imposing any particular set of morals or cultural 
traditions upon others.6 At that time, toleration of value differences was viewed as a 
means of assuaging differences in culture and lifestyle. Hence, one way of reading 
Reagan’s thoughts are as code for the restoration of heterosexual middleclass, unbroken 
Christian families, especially after the social events of the ‘60s-‘70s. This adds some 
weight to Reagan’s comments above, regarding the ways in which the family keeps safe 
“our cultural heritage” and his hopes that the American family can withstand certain 
lifestyle and legislation trends.  
Yet the type of tolerance that the Reagan administration criticizes also challenges 
the idea of the family being at the center of United States national identity. When nations 
are based on families and familial relations that harbor specific cultural and religious 
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affiliations, kinship and even ethnic commonalities serve as the core for such nations or 
peoples. This led Carter A. Wilson, among others, to argue that Reagan’s use of the 
family also implied a racial component.7  This was a plausible interpretation of the 
Reagan Administration’s beliefs, because the value relativism that Reagan criticized 
coincided with the civil rights movement of the later half of the 20th century. In a political 
atmosphere where familial relations are the primary source for identification, familial 
bonds and extended clan relations serve as the basis for national membership and can 
begin to resemble genealogical practices of race, i.e., the idea that one’s racial heritage 
has to do with blood ties and familial kinship. Any national culture or nationalism 
founded upon familial relations creates political communities of kinship that alienate vast 
segments of the United States by failing to present a culturally diverse United States of 
America. Viewed in this light, Reagan’s return to the family contributed to an image of 
the United States as white, male-dominated, middleclass, and heterosexual. This is an 
image of the core “America” that many minority groups feel alienated from, because it 
does not reflect or recognize the many cultural realities of United States society. This is 
not to say that certain minority groups are not heterosexist and “traditional” than the 
mainstream, as well as more family oriented. I use ‘minority’ in the sociological meaning 
of less powerful, which would include women, gay, elderly, disabled, etc. 
The ethics of political representation originate in the sentiments of minority 
groups alienated by hegemonic national imaginings that imply racial, cultural or ethnic 
homogeneity. This becomes ethical, according to Taylor, when misrecognition or non-
recognition can damage a person’s sense of self and also lead to scenarios where political 
institutions fail to recognize their responsibilities in helping to alleviate such things as 
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poverty or disease in areas housing minority groups. 8 The view of citizenship that arises 
out of Taylor’s “Politics of Recognition” originates within this need for recognition. It 
tends to be the case that nation-states with population imbalances lead to national 
identities that represent only the dominant group, so that alienated minorities are denied 
the full process of identity formation as it manifests inside of public institutions. Taylor’s 
conception of citizenship is thus wedded to cultural representation and the universal 
ability to contribute to the sustenance of the national image.9  
Because we are social animals, Taylor argues that humans share a fundamental 
need for recognition. This need drives the demand for political recognition on the part of 
racial, gendered, and ethnic minorities.10 The link between minority groups and 
recognition is human identity. Human identity is constituted by our interactions with 
others and must necessarily reflect the ways in which self-conscious beings think about 
themselves. For Taylor, humans are not the atomistic or individual units that many 
modern philosophers thought. We are born into established communities and political 
institutions; we find ourselves constantly trying to make sense of our lives using ideas 
that we did not create, languages we are not the founders of, and cultures we are not 
initially responsible for. Human subjectivity or agency thus depends upon our 
interactions with others—it is “intersubjective.” Taylor writes, “my discovering my own 
identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it through 
dialogue, partly overt, partly internally, with others.” He continues, “My own identity 
crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others.”11  
The origins of Taylor’s conception of the interpersonal or intersubjective-self can 
be found within G.W.F. Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit. Most social theorists and 
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philosophers look to the master-slave dialectic as the source for the intersubjective self, 
given that this section of Hegel’s text coincides with the shift from a general sense of 
consciousness to self-consciousness (and it also includes much of the language pertaining 
to recognition). However, Hegel’s thoughts on “culture” (Bildung) also provide an 
alternative way of viewing Taylor’s intersubjective. The world of “culture,” for Hegel, is 
responsible for one phase of self-consciousness’s development, that is, the dynamic 
interaction between an individual and a pre-established social group or collective. Hegel 
holds that the existence and actuality of self-consciousness arises from a process by 
which an individual “divests itself of its personality, thereby creating its world.” Hegel 
continues, “It is therefore through culture that the individual acquires standing and 
actuality.”12 Bildung is the act or process of cultivation, the refinement and acquisition of 
communal or social qualities and traits. The process of becoming “cultured,” in Hegel’s 
sense, places one in unison with the shared meanings and interpretive practices of their 
social, intellectual, aesthetical and moral surroundings. To become cultured means to 
learn, develop or become educated in the ways of being that are apparent in one’s 
community. One does this by bracketing or taking stock of any commonalities that exist 
amongst a group, and then discovering what remains. The residual aspects of ourselves 
that is not found in the commonalities “creates” or “realizes” the self, while the 
commonalities “create” or “realize” the culture (understood as a social group).13 Being 
able to find one’s self through this process, in both the realization of the group and in the 
solidification of individuality, is an act of recognition. While one’s outer self can be 
similar to others, one’s inner self is made apparent by differentiating between those 
similarities and differences.    
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The same process of intersubjectivity is required in Taylor’s conception of nation-
states. The only difference is that cultural groups replace individual persons as the main 
subjects. Like his view of persons, nations require a plurality of human experiences in 
order to arrive at commonalities and uniqueness. Since encountering and referencing a 
host of temperaments and personalities helps to foster a sense of self for individuals, 
nation-states likewise require people of diverse ways of life in order to properly develop a 
national identity. Hence, the citizenry of a political community should reflect the cultural 
variety of the people it harbors. This is an idea that necessitates the protection of minority 
groups through the establishment of what Iris Marion Young calls “differentiated 
citizenship.”14  
For Young, ensuring the plurality of voices inside of nation-states necessitates the 
creation of public protections and political mechanisms that permit the self-organization, 
self-representation, and veto rights for minority groups, in regards to specifically harmful 
or detrimental (in the case of reproductive rights for women or land claims for Native 
Americans) policies This leads to a differentiated or variegated sense of citizenship, 
because not all members of the body politic will have these protections; only the 
underrepresented members of society require these acts.15 Kymlicka argues that a 
“comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state will include both universal 
rights, assigned to individuals regardless of group membership and certain group-
differentiated rights or ‘special status’ for minority cultures.”16 The challenge for liberal 
democracies posed by the reality of multiculturalism is to accommodate differentiated 
rights in a morally defensible way, argues Kymlicka. Along these lines, Young does not 
see the policies and procedures that allow for differential treatment as instrumental, 
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utilitarian suspensions of formal equality on behalf of minority people. Instead, she 
argues that group differences and social oppression will always be a possibility inside of 
modern social groups: “Thus a society should always be committed to representation for 
oppressed or disadvantaged groups and ready to implement such representation when it 
appears.”17  
Citizenship, in this context, is not so much a legal category for state membership 
but the proper basis for the ethical formation of a national identity. Individual cultures, 
inside of national structures, must learn to interact on reciprocal terms. When disparities 
in income or group numbers obscure the process of identity for members of a group, then 
national identity itself becomes problematic. Put differently, with one cultural group 
starts to impose itself upon others, via “monological” (as opposed to dialogical or 
intersubjective) methods of assimilation, nations cannot foster the sense of community 
needed for group development, to use Taylor’s terms.18 “Cultural diversity,” in this sense, 
is both a process of self-development (and thus social-development), and the institutional, 
legal means by which these acts of cultivation come about. This sense of “culture” is 
rather introspective and representative of classical traditions. Anthropological and 
sociological conceptions of ‘culture’ may emphasize the process of becoming “cultured,” 
but there the word is primarily used to describe the customs and traditions of a people. 
Taylor’s communitarian leanings thus become obvious when one notices that his 
conception of culture lends itself to a theory of citizenship that emphasizes the equal 
ability to participate in the pursuit of the good, a process that requires personal reflection 
on the part of the members of a political group—the good being the formation of national 
identity.  
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Critics of multiculturalism argue that “identity politics” is the end result of the 
ideas that thinkers like Taylor put forward. In its negative connotations, identity politics 
is seen as an attack on individualism (especially since it favors ethnic, cultural, racial, and 
gender-based groups) and as a limited form of political liberation.19 Francis Fukuyama 
argues that identity politics springs forth from “a hole in liberal theory,” namely the 
limited significance and extent of group rights.20 In more recent years, the politics of 
recognition has come under attack from reactions to the idea of a multicultural nation-
state, on account of its supposed contradictory nature and likelihood to balkanize or 
fragment a country into ethnic divides. The fear is that without a unifying culture, ethnic 
divides will tear a country apart.21 
The more serious criticism of the politics of recognition lies with the nature of 
political power and autonomy. Recognizing cultural groups and ethnic/national minorities 
in nation-states does little to change the workings of a political system with power 
imbalances, for instance, where all resources are controlled by a select few or where 
minority figures become tokenized political vessels for more conservative ideology. The 
act of recognition highlights the political power that certain individuals have, because 
those doing the recognizing remain in charge.22 By placing this conversation between 
Taylor and his critics into constitutional terms, Tully attempts to resuscitate multicultural 
politics in terms of power. However, his project seeks out accommodations for minorities 
inside of existing political systems, which does not challenge the legitimacy of the entire 
framework itself (see the next section for a historical example). 23  
Nevertheless, when related to the idea of intersubjectivity, “citizenship” is a 
category open to all members of a body politic and is not limited to the perspective of 
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dominant groups. Rogers Brubaker elaborates on this understanding of citizenship as 
connected to the national imaginary when he writes,  
Debates about citizenship, in the age of the nation-state, are debates about 
nationhood—about what it means, and what it ought to mean, to belong to a 
nation-state. As an institutional and social-psychological reality, the nation-state 
is a distinctive way of organizing and experiencing political and social 
membership. But the nation-state is also an idea—and an ideal: it is a distinctive 
way of characterizing and evaluating political and social membership.24 
 
For Brubaker, debates about citizenship are normative discussions about the significance 
of “citizenship” that take place in the minds of the people these institutions are meant to 
serve, hence the significance of the “social-psychological” and the point about idealism. 
“Citizenship debates,” in this sense, are self-conscious acts of figuring national identity 
from the perspective of those capable of contributing to such discussions, namely the 
entire citizenry. Cultural uniqueness and originality are central to this act of self-
constitution, because people must authentically represent their own inner selves. The 
assumption is that distinct ethic groups harbor different ways of living and different ways 
of appreciating life. Nevertheless, this intersubjective basis for nation-states creates a 
moral framework that guarantees cultural diversity.  
An initial criticism of the idea of citizenship in the ethics of political recognition 
is that recognition is strictly concerned with representation and national identity, and thus 
lacks any legal component whatsoever. In addition, even when political thinkers from this 
school of thought attempt to introduce constitutional reform on behalf of minority 
peoples, they mostly seek out protections for group rights in light of the individualism 
that pervades most contemporary constitutions. This is not to say that the ethics of 
political recognition are unimportant for the unauthorized immigration debate nor is to 
say that the great fault of this line of thought is the omission of specified legal issues 
  115 
about state-membership. Nonetheless, the ways in which Taylor and others think about 
democratic legitimacy, in omitting the question of legality, limit the applicability of their 
paradigm to undocumented persons.  
In a recent essay, Taylor argues that a demos or “nation” must openly negotiate “a 
commonly acceptable political identity between the different personal or group identities 
that want to or have to live in the polity.” 25 Taylor presents a version of the democratic 
legitimacy paradox when he writes, “Democratic States need something like common 
identity.”26 The paradox arises when one realizes that democracies stand in need of a 
demos or “people” as its base; the act of choosing or identifying such a people is a project 
that verges upon being anti-democratic, since it necessarily excludes others, namely 
“noncitizens.” The question thus arises, how are noncitizens differentiated from those 
capable of contributing to “citizenship debates”? This is related to chapter 2 regarding 
Dussel and his work on the underside of modernity. What I argued there is that one 
cannot have nationalism without those outside the nation. The process of nationalism 
works in a negative sense that builds itself up by excluding others. 
As Taylor notes, the citizen debates boil down to an issue of sovereignty, “For a 
people to be sovereign, it needs to form an entity and have a personality.”27 That 
“personality” may be variegated, multicultural, and inclusive (in fact the intersubjective 
aspects of this necessitate inclusivity), yet the basis for this personality is the existence 
and exclusion of other individuals who are not members of a particular body politic. 
Taylor’s comments quickly take on legal connotations, because it builds upon rights of 
birth or naturalization, both of which assume the existence of borders or national divides 
to provide the initial justification for excluding some and including others. However, 
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appeal to borders is rather arbitrary; national borders are products of human artifice that 
are often immoral since almost every existing national border is a product of war or 
conquest, as indicated in chapter 4.28  
Along these same lines, Hans Lindahl argues that the attempt to justify a demos 
from within the perspective of a bordered polity is an act that presumes the existence and 
history of a people without an actual, material or “real” referent.29 Taylor is talking about 
a group that does not exist (nor has it ever) in empirical space and time but only in the 
minds of those positing it. Hence, what we should focus on is the workings of the 
national imaginary, from which, in the United States, Hispanic people are historically 
alienated.  
Given that the real object of inquiry is the question of national identity and 
national-citizenship, on one level it may be fine to ignore the fact that the politics of 
recognition avoids the question of legal citizenship. This no longer is possible, however, 
given that unjustified and unquestioned means of legal inclusion and exclusion are the 
basis for multicultural citizenship in the first place. Although many individuals believe 
that the multicultural branch of political thought can be used to argue for undocumented 
immigrant rights, this tradition concerns itself with representation, and its immediate 
import in terms of legality is none. However, multicultural political thought remains very 
important to the undocumented immigration debate. As noted by Kymlicka and Nick 
Stevenson, a multicultural political environment is imperative to establishing a policy of 
legal-citizenship, or sense of legal-personhood, that is fair and conducive to immigrant 
rights.   
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Revealing how his thought on the relation between the national and legal have 
changed, Kymlicka, in “Immigration, Citizenship and Multiculturalism: Exploring the 
Links,” while comparing the immigration law of the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Canada, argues that legal-citizenship is the means to national-citizenship.30 He argues 
that any discussion of citizenship policies towards non-citizens requires a reformulation 
and explicit engagement with immigration policy and multiculturalism.31 Clarity on how 
many immigrants will be granted naturalization rights and fairness regarding who will be 
admitted, in addition to an open stance on how immigrant assimilation will take place in 
light of cultural rights and minority protections, helps to define the goals of a nation-state 
in terms of how it sees “citizenship.” Kymlicka writes: 
The success of efforts to revalue citizenship in an age of migration will depend 
not just on the nuts and bolts of citizenship policy, but also on broader attitudes 
towards immigration and multiculturalism. The likelihood of gaining a strong 
public consensus on citizenship policy may depend on developing a stronger 
consensus on immigration and multiculturalism (and vice versa).32  
 
According to Kymlicka, we can preserve national-citizenship if we are clear that this is 
not a culturally homogenous core, but instead a community of beings acting in a way that 
expresses the interests of all people. Immigration policy, a commitment to 
multiculturalism or multi-nationalism, and citizenship policy are a “three legged stool” 
that must be properly balanced.33 Few will consider immigration policy or restrictions 
unfair, if the state (1) has an open and positive attitude towards the rights of immigrants 
(formal or not) and (2) strives to achieve a culturally plural atmosphere. While the state 
may impose immigration restrictions, this should not lessen the quality of life for 
noncitizens. 
Stevenson presents a similar idea: any plausible conceptualization of legal-
citizenship requires a clear stance from the country proposing it regarding their efforts to 
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increase, maintain and “recognize” a culturally diverse national populous.34 In addition, 
immigration policies and immigrant rights must be transparent and not arbitrary. Put 
differently, this time drawing from Jean Hampton, “a state’s policy on immigration is 
connected to its sense of itself and its own identity.”35 If a state’s “sense of self” is plural 
in terms of culture and nationhood, the legal rights that immigrants have will promote a 
healthy integration that takes place on equal terms, which should lesson fears of nation-
balkanization or heavy handed assimilation.  
Kymlicka and Stevenson help to clarify the ways in which a country’s xenophobic 
attitude towards non-citizens and immigrant groups can be a product of dated 
immigration policies and exhausted or confused debates regarding multiculturalism. In 
chapter 5, I suggest that this is the case in the United States: the cultural-racialization of 
United States national identity reveals a set back in multicultural discourse since it 
furthers an assimilative ideal that takes pride in a multi-colored America, which is a 
specious idea given that there is more to race than just skin color. In the next section, 
however, I present a historical case for why changes to national-citizenship have to attack 
structural power dynamics and economic inequalities.  
2. Multiculturalism and Latin American Indigenous Politics 
 
This section examines contemporary indigenous politics in Latin America with an 
emphasis on discourses of multicultural national-citizenship.36 My goal is to explain the 
ways in which the practical application of multicultural policies has taken shape in Latin 
America, often to the detriment of indigenous peoples. I explore some recent issues in 
indigenous politics in Latin America, focusing on Bolivia. Building from Karl Marx, my 
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comments are meant to push for a rethinking of the state and the origins of political 
power, as influenced by Dussel’s work explored in chapter 2.  
My examination of indigenous politics draws from the recent development of 
what has been termed “critical liberalism,” the indigenous embracement of the supposed 
cornerstones of liberal theory: autonomy and equality.37 Interesting enough, analogous to 
this “indigenous liberal turn” is the recent scholarship by philosophers of race in the 
United States who are also attempting to reclaim liberal notions of autonomy and 
equality.38 Both of these perspectives demonstrate the need for the protection of equal 
rights for minority peoples or indigenous majorities and group autonomy. However, as 
Marx points out in his exploration of “the Jewish Question,” granting political freedom to 
ethnic groups does not signal the liberation of the citizen nor the state.39 As a result, 
individual or collective autonomy (the first being for citizens, the second for cultural 
groups) in light of state sovereignty becomes the central issue that any project on 
citizenship must contend with. 
By “indigenous people of Latin America” I do not have in mind such images as 
the “Aztec,” “Maya” or “Inca.” While descendants of these pre-Columbian civilizations 
exist, they do not represent pristine worldviews untarnished by Western culture.40 
Moreover, the awareness of these larger cultural groups, amidst the variety of people who 
lived prior to conquest, obscures classifications of indigenous people until today. While 
in some parts of the Amazon and other hard to reach places there may still be untouched 
cultures and traditions, most indigenous people in Latin America are cultural mestizo/as. 
They may have elements of native worldviews and knowledge, the extent of which may 
vary, but almost all are influenced in some fashion by Western culture and most are 
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bilingual. All this is to say that indigeneity in Latin America is a complex issue given the 
history of colonization, the recent effects of globalization, and the conscientious shift 
from a peasant-based political platform to an active politicized indigeneity.41 Any 
adequate examination of indigenous politics necessitates an analysis of the relationship 
between the history of modern forms of governance and coloniality, that is, the peculiar 
power dynamic that functions within colonial atmospheres and often outlasts nation-
building processes (I will return to this is chapter 6).42  
The social conditions of many countries throughout the world are providing the 
necessary atmosphere for radical political change. This is especially true in Latin 
America. Novel questions, new potential political agents, and interesting forms of social 
organization are developing out of this insightful historical moment. Many non-dominant, 
sub-national and indigenous communities are quickly gaining political clout in countries 
like Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, just to name a few. Paralleling arguments and 
criticism of the politics of recognition in North America, indigenous politics in places 
like Bolivia and other parts of Latin America question the importance of a “multicultural” 
political atmosphere. These communities not only seek political recognition and equal 
treatment under the law, but they also wish to assert themselves as authentic agents of 
social change within the boundaries of their countries. Put differently, indigenous peoples 
are articulating political demands that exceed the nature and workings of “traditional” 
political institutions. 
 In addition, recent Latin American political thought questions the nature and 
workings of nation-states as historically linked to the legacy of European forms of civil 
governance. Modern nation-states descend from theories of government that hinge upon 
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the developmentalist perspective. Two famous lines from the work of early social 
contract theorist immediately come to mind: Thomas Hobbes famously wrote, “The 
savage people in many places of America…have no government at all, and live at this 
day in that brutish manner as I said before.”43 The brutish manner that Hobbes has in 
mind is the pre-political, and thus pre-historical, state of nature. This sentiment is echoed 
by John Locke’s claim, “In the beginning all the world was America.”44 In this light, the 
basis for contemporary states can be viewed as a product of modern political theory that 
relied upon the idea of America (and the indigenous people on this continent) as 
immature, savage and in need of cultivation.  
Erika Cudworth and John McGovern write, “the ‘state’ is the key formation of 
modern politics.” They continue by noting that recent scholarship on the state varies: 
When or where the idea of the “state” began or whether or not the state is a product of 
modern political thought remains a question.45 McGovern holds that the formation of the 
state, as connected to the idea of sovereignty, began in feudal Europe prior to the 
encounter with America.46 While one can accept this point as fact, seeing how the various 
principalities and city-states that emerge from medieval Europe lend support to it, there is 
no doubt that with the advent of the European colonization of America the foundations 
and grounding for the state took new direction. This shift stemmed from the newfound 
interaction and subsequent domination of people and land unknown.  
Gustavo Esteva, the Mexican political thinker, highlights this tendency when he 
argues that “Both the nation state and formal democracy are established on the premise 
that we are competitive and violent individuals who can coexist only if we are controlled 
by the state, which grants itself the sole monopoly on legitimate violence.”47 The idea of 
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a violent and competitive nature has a determinant affect on any political philosophy 
since it assumes that the need for governance is “an intrinsic quality of the human 
condition.”48 The state, in this instance, becomes “a specific kind of government 
associated with European modernity” considering that it rests upon modern postulates 
about human nature.49   
Reviewing Hobbes on human nature supports this point. For Hobbes, pre-political 
human life was “poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”50 This is the infamous “state of nature,” 
where war is a perpetual condition for human existence. Endowed with natural rights, the 
fundamental right of nature being self-preservation, one is at liberty to do whatever one 
must to preserve their life. Here, liberty is freedom from constraints, “the absence of 
external impediments.”51 Because of this fundamental right all humans have equal access 
to anything that can be to their advantage, i.e., in the state of nature all humans are ruled 
by their individual reason, for they have not submitted to the ultimate reason of a 
sovereign.52 “Reason,” here, is something humans use to navigate the world and also the 
means through which humans arrive at government. Aníbal Quijano summarizes this use 
of reason as an “organic social totality”—a social theory where the reason-based parts of 
society serves as the “head” of the “body politic” (a model which was also used to justify 
colonialism).53 In this sense, modern humanisms arise out of a hierarchical ordering of 
human life that posits a particular individual as the height of civilization: modern rational 
man. This individual gains this status through a mythic ideal that began with the 
discovery of America.54 
Contemporary states grow out of modern political contexts that understand the 
people of America early as alien cultures, glimpses into the past of human history. This 
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poses several major challenges to indigenous politics in places like Bolivia. “Anchors to 
the whole edifice of Western social thought,” as Vince Deloria Jr. writes, tribal peoples 
are either forced into political positions that render their demands illegitimate (since they 
may advocate for group rights in light of neoliberal individualism) or the 
accommodations that are made to incorporate them into the political arena demand 
conformity to Western political practices and do nothing to change the dynamics of 
political power.55  
In Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia, Nancy 
Grey Postero argues that the subject of her book is the emergence of a “post-
multicultural” citizenship. This understanding of citizenship does not simply recognize 
ethnic minorities and indigenous communities while maintaining the status quo of 
modern nations, but forces new political agents into the realm of neoliberal politics, thus 
signaling “a new stage in the study of neoliberalism.”56 This suggest that indigenous 
politics are the continuance of liberal ideology, but only in a very peculiar sense given 
that indigenous politics in Latin America are not what one might expect from a United 
States perspective. As Courtney Jung explains, indigenous politics are more akin to class-
based political movements, like unionization, rather than a form of identity politics 
grounded in specific cultural identities.57 I think this provides the basis for an alternative 
critique of the politics of multiculturalism that reveals what is sometimes lacking in 
discourses of recognition.  
The contexts of Postero’s book are the mid-1990 political reforms in Bolivia, 
especially the Law of Popular Participation (LPP). This law changed the Bolivian 
constitution to recognize the state as a multiethnic and “pluricultural” state. Providing 
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protective measures for indigenous territorial land rights and promoting the teaching of 
indigenous languages and cultures in school, the LPP decentralized politics in Bolivia 
and “named indigenous people as actors in municipal development of decisions.”58 As 
Postero notes, this policy was a step in the right direction, insofar as it ameliorated the 
tension between non-indigenous and indigenous people in Bolivia. The LPP was also a 
step forward since “indigenous actors embraced the democratic potential of the 
reforms.”59  
The Law of Popular Participation in many ways reflects the “inclusive” ideals of 
nationality and national identity that was representative of many Latin American nations 
after the colonial struggles for independence. Simón Bolívar, the liberator of several 
Latin American nations, writes,  
[W]e are not Europeans, we are not Indians, but rather a race midway between the 
aborigines and the Spanish. Americans by birth and Europeans by rights, we find 
ourselves in the dilemma of disputing rights of possession with the natives and of 
sustaining ourselves in the country of our birth against the opposition of the 
invaders; thus our case is most extraordinary and complex.60  
 
This mix between indigenous and Iberian (not to exclude the African component) is the 
idea of mestizaje, the fusion of race and culture in the hopes of fostering peace between 
once warring groups. With the advent of such laws as the LPP, this ideal seemingly 
became a political reality, not just national rhetoric. 
However, the freedom to participate in the political arena did not come without 
constraints. Implicit in such reforms as the LPP was the expectation that ethnic-minorities 
and indigenous politicians would conform to the proprieties and political practices that 
pervade modern nation-states. While multicultural and “plurinational” in name, the LPP 
was assimilative, it expected a one-way or exclusive cultural influence rather than a true 
reciprocal exchange of ways of life. In short, indigenous conformity was expected. An 
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example of this is the ways in which indigenous politicians were expected to thrive in a 
time where many peasants and native communities were suffering from the effects of 
neoliberal economic privatization (such as water and gas). This did nothing but 
consolidate the power and wealth of the elite classes amidst much multicultural chatter.61 
The only way that indigenous politician would thrive in this atmosphere was to accept 
such things as exclusive water rights and then try to make the best of this situation, which 
in many ways was impossible.  
The anthropologist, Charles Hale, asks “Under what conditions can indigenous 
movements occupy the limited spaces opened by neoliberal multiculturalism, redirecting 
them toward their own radical, even utopian political alternatives?”62 Put differently, the 
reality of such movements as the LPP allowed for indigenous and multiethnic people in 
Latin America to participate in the political arena, yet what did this participation entail? 
Invested with a type of political freedom, indigenous people were given rights that 
protected their individual interests. They were denied political autonomy, however, the 
ability for indigenous communities to be self-governing or at least take part in the 
democratic creation of laws as collective units. Besides assisting in explaining what I see 
to be the difference between autonomy and freedom, Marx cautions of the traps of this 
kind of “political emancipation” in his essay “On the Jewish Question.”63  
A critique of the work of the young-Hegelian Bruno Bauer, “the Jewish Question” 
argues for the emancipation of humanity from the conditions leading to its alienation and 
exploitation, that is, for political emancipation. For Marx, since the state coincides with 
the rise of the consciousness of “civil society,” it arises with the growth of capitalism and 
private property.64 The exact relationship between civil society and capitalism is what 
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Marx explores, which renders this essay a direct commentary on the nature of the state. 
According to Marx, Bauer is concerned with a general political problem: Bauer asks if a 
Jewish person could ever really be a citizen of the German state, insofar as citizenship 
implies a civic identity grounded in the Christian faith. Would not one’s religious 
leanings as a Jewish person always trump that of the state?  Why should the state forgo 
its religious leanings when Jewish people choose not to? Only in what Bauer calls “a 
superficial sense” could a Jewish person remain “Jewish” or a “citizen” in political life. 
Essential to this person’s identity would be their faith, and their political identity would 
only be a momentary exception to their essential and normal identity. As a result, Bauer 
calls for the abolition of religion from the state through the political emancipation of the 
human. 
For Marx this leads to the division between the public and the private, the basis 
for bourgeois alienation and the “consummation” of political emancipation.65 Marx 
writes, “The decomposition of man into Jew and citizen, Protestant and citizen, is not a 
deception practised [sic] against the political system nor yet an evasion of political 
emancipation. It is political emancipation itself, the political mode of emancipation from 
religion.”66 The guarantors of political emancipation are “rights”; as political beings, the 
state guarantees our rights. Rights, in turn, help define who we are as individuals. Given 
that rights are said to protect that which allows us to define who we are (such as 
property), our identity turns out to be a divided and alienated self that depends upon a 
particular economic system—this is exactly the position of the indigenous after the LPP. 
Since capitalism coincides with the rise of nation-state, both of which result in alienation 
and objectification, no real freedom is possible through the political ideal of liberty. 
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Worse, “civil society” (the basis for the bourgeois state) suggests that one should only 
aspire towards political emancipation. Yet, for Marx, this is not human emancipation. It 
misses the point. 
Marx writes,  
[Egoistic] man in this aspect, the member of civil society, is now the foundation 
and presupposition of the political state. He is recognized as such in the rights of 
man.  
[…] 
But the liberty of egoistic man and the recognition of this liberty is rather the 
recognition of the frenzied movement of the cultural and material elements which 
form the content of his life. 
[…] 
Thus man was not liberated from religion; he receives religious liberty. He was 
not liberated from property; he received the liberty to own property. He was not 
liberated from the egoism of business; he received the liberty to engage in 
business.67  
 
Marx thinks that the state does not “restore” freedom (in a Rousseauian sense) but instead 
endows humanity with alien powers. Marx quotes Rousseau:  
Whoever dares undertake to establish a people’s institutions must fell himself 
capable of changing, as it were, human nature itself, of transforming each 
individual who, in isolation, is a complete but solitary whole, into a part of 
something greater than himself, from which, in a sense, he derives his life and his 
being; [of changing man’s nature in order to strengthen it;] of substituting a 
limited and moral existence for the physical and independent life [with which all 
of us are endowed by nature.] His task, in short, is to take from a man his own 
powers, and to give him in exchange alien powers which he can only employ with 
the help of other men.68  
 
All this is to say, in the context of Bolivian indigeneity the investment of rights and the 
recognition of indigenous people as citizens arise from within the confines of a particular 
political system. This political system does not represent a fundamental way of being 
human, but a specific political ordering that is based on histories of oppression and 
systems of power that grant or permit citizenship for indigenous people. And in doing 
that, neoliberal political systems reinforce their own structure and deny the chance for 
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novel forms of political organization or citizenship. In this specious setting, formal 
equality comes as the cost of true autonomy. This is why Marx says that “Political 
emancipation certainly represents a great progress. It is not indeed, the final form of 
human emancipation, but it is the final form of human emancipation within the 
framework of the prevailing social order.”69  
 My point is not to simply critique multicultural political platforms—again, I think 
that these are positive steps in the right direction to formal equality in terms of 
establishing a necessary atmosphere conducive to immigrant rights. But, multiculturalism 
needs to be accompanied by changes in the distribution of political power in ways that 
are transformative, and do not reify unfair status quos. Chapter 2 focused on Dussel’s 
recent political philosophy. In doing so, I explored the nature of the state in novel ways 
that continually check the balance of power. Similarly, chapter 6 of this dissertation 
suggests some ways in which exclusive forms of assimilation and group interaction can 
be curbed. 
3. Notes
                                                
1 Bosniak, “Citizenship,” p.188. 
 
2 For an updated and expanded version printed two years later see Charles Taylor, “The 
Politics of Recognition,” Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Amy 
Gutmann (Ed.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).  
 
3 Kymlicka and Norman, p. 352.  
 
4 The following texts were released during 1992 or shortly after: The original Spanish 
version of what became Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas: The Eclipse of 
the Other and the Myth of Modernity (New York: Continuum, 1995); Leopoldo Zea, The 
Role of the Americas in History, Amy A. Oliver (Ed.) and Sonja Karsen (Trans.) (Savage: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992); Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father's 
House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. (New York: Oxford UP, 1992); Paul Gilroy, 
The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge: Harvard 
  129 
                                                                                                                                            
University Press, 1992); Ofelia Schutte, Cultural Identity and Social Liberation in Latin 
American Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993); John Rawls, 
“The Law of Peoples,” Collected Papers, Samuel Freeman (Ed.) (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: University 
Press, 1995); James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity 
(Cambridge: University Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
 
5 Ronald Reagan, Proclamation of National Family Week (Proclamation 4882) (As of 2-
2-2009: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=43204). For Aristotle’s 
origins of the polis see Aristotle, The Politics and Constitution of Athens, Stephen 
Everson (Ed.) (Cambridge: University Press, 1996), p. 12.  
 
6 Domestic Policy Council, The Family: Preserving America’s Future (Washington, D.C: 
United States Executive Office of the President, 1986), p.42. Accessed 8-25-2009: 
http://www.eric.ed.gov:80/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/8
0/20/03/b8.pdf 
 
7 Carter A. Wilson, Racism: From Slavery to Advanced Capitalism (Thousand Oaks: 
Sage Publications, 1996), p. 218. 
 
8 Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics 
of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
 
9 Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” p. 25. 
 
10 Ibid., p. 25. 
 
11 Ibid., p. 34 
 
12 G.W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, A.V. Miller (Trans.) (Oxford: University 
Press, 1977), p. 297. Some have argued that the main problem of the Phenomenology is 
Bildung, i.e. the progression and development of Spirit. See G.A. Kelly, Idealism, 
Politics, and History: Sources of Hegelian Thought (Cambridge: University of 
Cambridge Press, 1969). 
 
13 Hegel, p. 297. 
 
14 Iris Marion Young, “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal 
Citizenship,” in The Citizenship Debates: A Reader, ed Gershon Shafir (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 263-290.  
 
15 Young, pp. 274-275. 
 
16 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 468. 
 
  130 
                                                                                                                                            
17 Young, p. 275. 
 
18 Taylor, p. 32. 
 
19 For a reconsideration of identity politics see Linda Martín Alcoff, Michael Hames-
Garcia, Satya P. Mohanty, and Paula M. L. Moya (Eds.), Identity Politics Reconsidered 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
 
20 Fukuyama, “Identity, Immigration and Liberal Democracy,” p. 6.  
 
21 See Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-
First Century,” Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2007; Francis Fukuyama, 
“Identity, Immigration and Liberal Democracy”; Arthur Schlesinger, The Disuniting of 
America (New York: W.W. & Norton & Company Inc., 1991); Samuel Huntington, Who 
Are We? The Challenges to American National Identity (New York: Simon and Shuster, 
2004); David Miller, “Nationality in divided societies,” Multinational Democracies, 
Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully (Eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001). 
 
22 See Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), p. 287.  
 
23 James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity 
(Cambridge: University Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 30-39. 
 
24 Rogers Brubaker, “Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State,” The Citizenship 
Debates, p. 132. 
 
25 See Charles Taylor, “Democratic Exclusion (and Its Remedies?),” Diversity and 
Pluralism: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives, Alan C. Cairns, et al, (eds.) 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), p. 286.  
 
26 Ibid., p. 265 
 
27 Ibid. 
 
28 Jorge Valadez, “Immigration and the Territorial Powers of Nation-States,” APA 
Newsletter for Hispanics in Philosophy No.7, Vol. 2 (2008), p. 9. 
 
29 Hans Lindahl, “The anomos of the earth: political indexicality, immigration and 
distributive justice,” Ethics & Global Policy Vol. 1, No. 4 (2008), pp. 193-212.  
 
30 Will Kymlicka, “Immigration, Citizenship and Multiculturalism: Exploring the Links,” 
The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. LTD. 2003 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 199 & 
202. 
  131 
                                                                                                                                            
 
31 Ibid., p. 202. 
 
32 Ibid., p. 204. 
 
33 Ibid, p. 200. 
 
34 Nick Stevenson, “Cosmopolitanism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship,” Sociological 
Research Online (Vol. 7, No. 1.)  
 
35 Jean Hampton, “Immigration, identity, and justice,” Justice in Immigration, Warren F. 
Schwartz (Ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 67.  
 
36 For an overview of contemporary Latin American political thought, with 
accompanying texts from an interdisciplinary background, see Iván Márquez, 
Contemporary Latin American Social and Political Thought (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2008). In the preface of this work, Márquez ventures so far as to suggest that 
the political tendency of Latin American thought might even be considered a “principle.” 
For more on the political nature of Latin American philosophy see Grant Silva, “The 
Political Nature of Latin American Philosophy: Nation-Building, Nation-Fixing, Nation-
Transcending” (unpublished manuscript). 
 
37 I will be drawing from Courtney Jung, The Moral Force of Indigenous Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) and Nancy Grey Postero, Now We Are 
Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2007).  
 
38 See Bill E. Lawson (Ed.), “Race, Racism, and Liberalism in the Twenty-First 
Century,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume XLVII (Supplement, 2009).  
 
39 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” Identities: Race, Class, Gender, and 
Nationality, Eds. Linda Martín Alcoff & Eduardo Mendieta (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2003). 
 
40 Jung, pp. 18-19. 
 
41 Jung, p. 18. 
 
42 For more on coloniality see Aníbal Quijano, “Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality,” 
Cultural Studies (Vol. 21,No. 2, 2007). 
43 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 
chapter xiii, ¶11. 
 
44 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Hackett: Indiana, 1980), ¶49. 
 
  132 
                                                                                                                                            
45 Erika Cudworth, Tim Hall and John McGovern, The Modern State: Theories and 
Ideologies (Edinburgh: University Press, 2008), p. 1. 
 
46John McGovern, “The Emergence of the Modern State,” The Modern State: Theories 
and Ideologies, (Edinburgh: University Press, 2008), p. 21. 
 
47 Gustavo Esteva, “The ‘Other Campaign’ and the Left: Reclaiming an Alternative,” 
Trans. Holly Yasui (2006), p. 13. 
 
48 Cudworth and McGovern, p. 2. 
 
49 Ibid. 
 
50 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 43. 
 
51 Ibid., p. 79. 
 
52 Ibid., p. 80. 
 
53 Aníbal Quijano, “Coloniality/Modernity and Rationality,” Cultural Studies 21:2 (New 
York: Routledge, 2007) 
 
54 Dussel, The Invention of the Americas, p. 131. 
 
55 Vine Deloria Jr., Philosophy and Tribal Peoples, American Indian Thought, Ed. Anne 
Waters (Malden: Blackwell, 2004), p. 3 
 
56 Postero, p. 18. 
 
57 Jung, p. 20. 
 
58 Postero, p. 5 
 
59 Postero, p. 6. 
 
60 Simón Bolívar, “Address to the Angostura Congress, February 15, 1819, the Day of Its 
Installation,” Nineteenth Century Nation-Building and the Latin American Intellectual 
Tradition, Janet Burke and Ted Humphrey (Eds.) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007), p. 5. 
 
61 Postero, p. 142. 
 
62 Charles Hale, “Neoliberal Multiculturalism: The Remaking of Cultural Rights and 
Racial Dominance in Central America,” PoLAR: Vol. 28, No. 1 (2005), p. 11. 
 
  133 
                                                                                                                                            
63 The rest of Postero’s book goes on to argue for what she calls a post-multicultural form 
of politics. She thinks that there is real change taking place in Bolivia. While I am willing 
to admit that this is indicative of a new phase in “neo-liberal thought,” I question why 
one should maintain the ideals of neo-liberal political formations. I want to follow Marx’s 
warning. Postero makes no reference to Marx’s essay, though the title of the first section 
of her book is “The Indian Question.”  
 
64 This is another way of including the myth of modernity into this conversation. The idea 
of civil society requires the uncivilized or savage in order to distinguish “progress.”  
 
65 Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” p. 18. 
 
66 Ibid., p. 22. 
 
67 Ibid., p. 27. 
 
68 Ibid., p. 28. 
 
69 Ibid., p. 21. 
  134 
CHAPTER V 
 
THE RE-RACIALIZATION OF UNITED STATES NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
The biggest threat to multiculturalism, and inadvertently a significant threat to 
legal-citizenship (given my comments in chapter 4), is the dynamic nature of race. This 
chapter will explore this claim by comparing the workings of race in Latin America to 
that in United States. While considering various interactions between these racial 
paradigms, especially those resulting from increases in human migration and 
globalization, this chapter explores the philosophical dimensions of the category “race” 
as it is connected to social and political communities in the 21st century.  
One of the main questions motivating this chapter is the following: In terms of 
racial identification, what happens when people from two different social ontologies with 
diverse understandings of how race is demarcated, meet? Take for instance a brown-
skinned Mexican immigrant answering the question “What is your race?” posed by an 
Anglo-American in the United States. Presume that the immigrant in question appears to 
be of an indigenous background, as a majority of the populations of Mexico and other 
countries like Guatemala or Peru, are. For reasons that this chapter explores, this person 
might designate their nationality, a mixed-racial identity, or the culture they associate 
with, before claiming (if they ever would) to be of the Amerindian, Native American, or 
even “Asiatic” race—classifications that the North American racial paradigm would 
suggest. By identifying as a mestizo/a or mixed-race person, or for that matter identifying 
with a national identity that is grounded in the process of mestizaje (the phenomena of 
racial and cultural fusion), this individual avoids being labeled an Indio or Indian.1 
Instead, this person aligns herself with a background of mixed ancestry, which to her and 
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many individuals inside of Latin America designates her race—regardless of whether or 
not any miscegenation or racial mixture ever took place in this person’s ancestral lineage. 
Explaining the reasoning behind this answer necessitates a comparative analysis 
of the history of race and racism in Latin America and the United States. Such an 
analysis, however, sheds light on the mechanics of racial exclusion and racial inclusion in 
the United States, especially in the context of current political debates regarding 
immigration. Take, for example, the contemporary demands for immigrant assimilation 
by so called neo-nativists and the recent celebrations of a post-racial United States of 
America.2 Both perspectives pose peculiar dilemmas to traditional theories of racial 
justice in North America: on the one hand, those who think that all immigrants must 
adhere to historically “American” ways of living contradict the central tenants of 
multiculturalism, even though these individuals often make room for a racially plural 
environment; on the other hand, celebrants of the social and racial progress of the United 
States must be made aware of the long history of manipulative efforts in using biracial 
and poly-racial identities for political gain in Latin American history.3 Those proud of an 
increasingly multicolored United States must realize that there is more to race than just 
skin color, yet this only becomes apparent when studying the ways that “race” differs in 
other parts of the world, which helps to explain why our Latina immigrant above might 
answer the way I suggest. 
Throughout most of Latin America, race functions within a broad phenotypical 
hierarchy that places white or pale-skinned people on top and black or dark-skinned 
individuals on bottom. In addition to this color-based ordering, culture, language, 
education, and socioeconomic-class status are major factors of racial determination in this 
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region.4 Alternatively, because of the historical importance of the one-drop rule, where 
the slightest intermixture with “African-” or “black-” ancestry designates racial impurity, 
supposed biological inheritance or genotype is held to determine race in the United 
States. From this second perspective, folk notions about race assume a genetic origin 
because it is an idea that is mostly associated with physical appearance—the (incorrect) 
presumption being that genetic or blood-based essences cause phenotypical racial traits.5 
Whereas racial identities are more fluid in Latin America, such that differences in custom 
or social positioning can cause racial fluctuations (even within a single family), race is 
said to be permanent in the United States. This permanence is due to the fact that 
questions of race remain connected to the black/white binary, which taken into 
consideration with the one-drop rule, provides the historical basis for racial purity or 
impurity. 
By living in-between two racial paradigms, Latino/as and Latin American 
immigrants in the United States help create new ways of thinking about race and also 
reveal the mechanics of racial-political exclusion. Traditional forms of racialization 
reliant upon generalizations like “black” or “white” prove inadequate for people of Latin 
American descent, given that the social categories of “Hispanic” or “Latino/a” comprise a 
spectrum of races, cultures, and colors. Although some can be categorized as “brown,” 
“white,” or “black,” many Latino/as are grouped in terms of culture, language, or some 
combination thereof, such as “ethnicity.” Ethnicity, though, often serves as a substitute 
for race when dealing with darker-skinned individuals and also becomes a means of 
exclusion for people who are white but of Hispanic background.6 Because of this 
collective racial ambiguity, not to mention the fact that power structures and social 
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hierarchies in the United States tend to replicate themselves on new fronts, I argue that 
whiteness has morphed into something that not only pertains to phenotypical appearance 
and supposed genetic inheritance, but also culture, custom, language, education, and 
socio-economic class level. This refinement or dispersal of whiteness signals the creation 
of a “white socio-race,” something akin to how whiteness is understood in much of Latin 
America, as alluded to above. As put by Eduardo Mendieta, in the United States there 
exist a “racializing of Hispanics” and a “Hispanizing of race.”7  
With this understanding of whiteness in mind, neo-nativists and advocates of 
assimilation re-racialize United States national identity and national-citizenship when 
demanding that all immigrants adhere to traditionally “American” culture and ways of 
living.8 When United States national identity is racialized along these lines any 
meaningful discussion of national-citizenship becomes problematic given that race and 
nationality begin to intersect once again, albeit in a rather nuanced way that implies a 
culturally “unified” or homogenous people for every nation. 
Section 1 of this chapter provides some general comments on the nature of race as 
connected to social ontologies. These comments are central to my overall thesis about the 
dispersal and solidification of whiteness. While I am hesitant to supply a formal 
definition for “race,” in part because I think this concept is one that cannot be 
encapsulated by a single set of characteristics, race is a highly philosophical ideal, 
grounded in human artifice. This in no way undermines the felt experience of racism or 
the ways that race assumes physical or cultural characteristics. Section 2 provides a 
historical framework for the two racial systems mentioned above, the Anglo and Latin. 
Arising from within the contexts of European history and the colonization of America, 
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the social relations apparent in what became Latin America relied upon alternative 
understandings of human difference than those operating in the North. Although the 
nature of the colonizer and the kinds of indigenous communities encountered are factors 
that can explain the various methodologies underlying imperial practices, the Iberian 
willingness (and need) to interact with the indigenous (at least more so than the Protestant 
settler-societies of New England) generated a different approach to mixed-race, multi-
ethnicity, and race in general. Section 3 presents the current status of Latino/a identity in 
the United States by highlighting the problems that arise from attempts at racializing 
these people according to black/white conceptions of race. 
 If race is an ideological construct that depends upon culture and history for 
meaning, then this idea is subject to change when that culture undergoes a transformation 
or reorganization. Here, I am concerned with the ways in which racial identities in the 
United States respond to the growth of the Latino/a population. The Hispanic presence in 
the United States has changed what is meant by whiteness—I give reasons for this as an 
empirical claim. Unless aware of these changes, social theorists lose track of the ways in 
which “whiteness” remains the basis for national unity in the United States. When made 
explicit, the social force that immigrants have generates questions about current forms of 
political organization that focus on the nation, which begs the question of whether or not 
novel forms of political organization are needed (which is a claim I will explore in 
chapter 6). 
1. Racial Dynamism and Social Ontology 
Race is perhaps one of the most contrived ideas ever realized—as such it is one of 
the most philosophical concepts ever. As the anthropologist and expert on Latin 
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American race, Peter Wade, writes, “Since the Second World War, most biologists have 
agreed that race is not an analytic category to understand human biological diversity.” He 
continues, “Race is a set of ideas about human similarity and difference.”9 Invested with 
great social force and a supposed material existence, the idea of race is one of the most 
pressing issues that philosophers continue to think about. This is especially true when it 
serves as the basis for national citizenship or when major changes in political and civil 
society occur.  
Race can be viewed as an ideological construct that is wedded to the social 
ontology of a particular region. A social ontology is an account of the various ways that 
human social relations are ordered and organized. Social ontologies reflect the various 
aspects of group life and designate the importance of human difference, which includes 
the ways in which these differences are demarcated in the first place. Within particular 
social ontologies, the idea of race graphs onto human biology and culture, which grants 
this concept a material or physical existence—the reality of which is debatable and varies 
depending on the paradigm in question. As Michael Omi and Howard Winant argue, 
social theorists and philosophers need to think about race as a historical force. It is a 
concept that has an origin and history of structuring human social relations, often for 
manipulative and oppressive reasons. In other words, race is not a mere “social 
illusion”—it is an idea that may begin in the mind but it does not stay there—nor is it an 
essentialized biological ideal.10   
Although ‘race’ can be found in use in European languages as of the 14th century, 
not until the mid-17 century did this term assume the connotations associated with being 
a pseudo-anthropological means of human sub-speciation.11 This latter meaning owes 
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much to modern European colonialism. The encounters that took place in the modern 
period between people of various backgrounds and the subsequent attempt to justify the 
mass appropriation of people, land, and resources, brought the fact of human differences 
to the fore like nothing before. Nowadays, race is a fundamental way in which the human 
social world is structured and modern human relations are maintained and furthered. 
Even in “post-modern” times, race is a basic starting point for figuring human identity as 
it descends from past legacies of human identification. Put differently, race is a central 
way through which a vast majority of humans identify or figure their identities. In several 
respects, this reveals how distinctively “modern” human identity remains.12  
Insofar as race was created during times of colonial expansion and imperial 
hegemony, differences in the method and form of colonization should imply differences 
in racial formation. Such is the case in the Americas, as I show in the next section. 
However, let me close this section with one final comment about “race” that is central to 
my thesis. 
As Falguni Sheth pointed out,13 race can be thought of in a similar manner to how 
Martin Heidegger views the phenomena of enframing in regards to technology: every 
technological advancement, every new piece of technology, is neither inherently good 
nor bad, but changes the ontological horizon of human possibilities. By revealing new 
potentialities and obscuring others, technology changes the ways in which human life is 
ordered and arranged.14  
While I refrain from commenting on the inherent moral status of race (i.e. 
whether it is inherently good or bad)—because of 20th century attempts to construct a 
positive idea of race or racial identity out of a concept invented for subjugation15—once 
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the idea of race is introduced into human social relations, it alters the range of 
possibilities of human identity and the ontological horizon of social life. All human 
identities and social groups are thus impacted by the existence of “race.” This remains the 
case even for whites in the United States, who might not overtly identify in racial terms 
but nonetheless benefit (by default) from social and political institutions that historically 
privileged their particular ancestry and continue to do so. While my point here is to 
highlight white privilege, I would also like to highlight the ways in which racial identities 
(as we typically think of them in the United States) are unnecessary in order to be 
affected by the legacy of racial oppression. Once race and all the ideological and 
hegemonic baggage historically connected to it is introduced into the matrix of human 
social relations, there is no going back to a pre-racial age of human social relations. 
Social interactions, socio-economic differences, and the attachment to phenotypic 
difference, all of which race touches upon, alters human relations in ways that might 
lesson but not disappear. Philosophers of race must now find the means of identifying 
how the axes of political and social exclusion continue to rotate, without any overt talk of 
hypodescent theories of racial inheritance or only color-based mechanisms. The workings 
of race in Latin America provide such a vantage point. 
2. Two Dogmas of Racialization  
 
In the Americas, the particularities of various colonial endeavors differ on account 
of the Europeans involved and the indigenous people in question. The resulting colonial 
environments allowed for the development of two general patterns of racial formation.16 
Along these lines, Carlos A. Fernández argues that there are two different responses to 
race, racial-mixing and cultural assimilation in America, expressed through the ideas of 
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“mestizaje” (a concept pertaining to the metaphysics of race/culture mixing) and what he 
calls “melting-pot” (the ongoing exclusivist assimilative ideal of the United States nation-
building project). These responses were shaped by the history of the Iberian Peninsula 
and the formation of Anglo-Protestant Europe.17  
Iberia was an important site for the Roman Empire. Given its location and 
subsequent history of diversity, the people of the Iberian Peninsula developed something 
of a tolerance for what can be considered (by today’s standards) racial differences. The 
main distinctions amongst the many people in Iberia were based on religion and culture.18 
This “tolerance” was inherited from Roman cosmopolitanism, something that emphasized 
tribute to Cesar over complete cultural assimilation—an example of which is the relative 
autonomy that the Jews are said to have experienced, as detailed in the Bible.19 In 
northwestern Europe, on the other hand, the Germanic and Saxon tribes (the ancestors of 
White Anglo-Saxon Protestant people) never appreciated Roman cosmopolitanism, or so 
argues Fernández. For the Roman Empire, the northwestern European lands formed the 
border with the barbarian world. Remember, the Roman legions consisted of people from 
African, Mediterranean, Southern European and Asian backgrounds. Fernández argues 
that this posed a multi-ethnic threat to the Germanic and Saxon people. Never fully 
submitting to Roman rule, this threat created a strong desire for the preservation of 
cultural and ancestral lineages and a general uneasiness towards miscegenation in 
general. Fernández writes, “The persistence of the German peoples, born of their 
struggles against the Romans, can also be seen later in history as an important element in 
the Protestant schism with Rome accomplished by the German Martin Luther. It is no 
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coincidence that Protestantism is primarily a phenomenon of Northwestern Europe, while 
Catholicism is mainly associated with Southern Europe.” 20  
I do not mean to suggest that Fernández’s historical interpretation is indisputable 
or completely correct. First of all, the Germanic and Saxon people never were one 
homogenous group. Nordics, Celts, Francs, Gauls and others of Teutonic origin made up 
this region.21 Second, though the Spaniards were in contact with many types of people 
and there is much mixing that went into the cultures of the Iberian Peninsula, there was 
no doubt a strong desire for ancestral purity in the Spanish homeland, a desire so strong 
that the beginning of 1492 saw the expulsion of all Jews and Moors from Spain. At that 
time, after 800 years of a relatively peaceful coexistence, the idea of limpieza de sangre 
(cleanliness or “purity” of blood) was a notion used to designate recent converts of 
Moorish or Jewish backgrounds from older Christians.22 Nevertheless, as Fernández 
points out, the Iberian Conquistador, fresh from the Re-conquest of Spain, relied on 
culture, religion, and custom, rather than any sort of biological essentialism or ancestral 
lineage (outside of religious decent), as means of human differentiation. 
Fernández’s historical analysis of racial formation in the Americas gains more 
credibility with his examination of the nature of the colonizer and colonial communities. 
Whereas large groups of families were the main source for European expansion into the 
North, mostly male soldiers, missionaries, and slaves traveled into what became Latin 
America. There is little doubt that this had a profound effect on the idea of racial mixing 
in the Americas. In what became the Northeast United States, large communities of 
families with similar ethnic backgrounds started “self-sufficient” colonies. To these 
people, the Native Americans were savages who resided in the forest and had none of the 
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forms of political formation known in Europe.23 The Anglo-Protestant colonizer had no 
need or desire to mix with these strangers, because, as Fernández argues, these people 
had an identity historically grounded in the avoidance of cultural and racial mixing (recall 
the Germanic front and the Roman legions) and they brought their own families.24 
A different colonial relationship was established in what became Latin America. 
Based on their technology and imperialistic mindset, the Aztec and Inca had ways of life 
rivaling those in Europe. As a result of their somewhat cosmopolitan attitude and need 
for Indigenous assistance, as well as human relations, the Spaniards were more willing to 
intermix with the natives. This type of social intermixture is exemplified by the 
encomienda system.  
Encomiendas (or Haciendas) were large plantation-like communities powered by 
mostly Indian workers with Iberian masters. Often, indigenous nobility, or caciques, were 
given positions of power in between the Spaniards and the rest of the Indians. The mixed-
race children of Spanish and Indian parents, who had better social standing than full-
blood Indians, subsequently filled these roles. Alliances between Spanish and Indians 
were thus formed through bloodlines. While light skin mestizo/as had the advantage of 
being noticeably different from Indians of dark complexions, dark complexioned 
mestizo/as also had higher social status on account of their custom, language, and culture.  
It became possible to differentiate skin shades along a continuum between light and dark 
mestizo/as, to the point of creating a vast array of racial possibilities.25 Nonetheless, 
seeing the advantageous positioning that the first mestizo/a children of Iberian and Indian 
background received, even when they looked indigenous, abandoning the indigenous 
mindset and practicing Spanish cultural traits became a life or death decision in South 
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and Central America. This colonization of both mind and body established the 
degradation of indigenous culture, an idea culminating in Juan Ines de Sepúlveda’s 
argument for the treatment of the Indians as barbarians because of their inferior “customs 
and morality.”26 We should note that customs and morality are typically viewed as 
cultural traits and but that they are the defining aspects of identity in Iberia just prior to 
the encounter with America, which anticipates the importance of culture in the figuring of 
racial identities, later on.27  
In Latin America, culture, socioeconomic-class status, and language are major 
factors in how race is determined. Demonstrating how this works with indigeneity, 
Fernández writes, “Indian has come to mean ‘someone who speaks an Indian language’ 
or who ‘lives like an Indian,’ that is, who is poor. The fact is, many biological Indians 
have become cultural mestizos who speak Spanish, and hence are regarded as 
mestizos.”28 Put differently, in Latin America, one can change their culture by speaking a 
new language or dressing in a different manner. This in turn changes one’s race, e.g., one 
can go from being considered a “full-blood” Indian to a mestizo or mixed-race person, by 
learning Spanish and becoming Catholic. However, one cannot (usually) change their 
skin tone, bone structure, or hair type. So though there are limits, race can fluctuate 
depending on cultural habits and class status. A dark-skinned person from indigenous 
parents may be mestizo/a or mixed-race by speaking Spanish and not practicing any 
indigenous cultural traits, but this person can never claim to be a full-blood European-
born Spaniard. Fernández emphasizes the socioeconomic aspects of this when he recants 
the Brazilian saying “a rich Negro is a White and a poor White is a Negro.”29 Although 
this saying is rhetorical or even metaphoric, it has a core of social truth. In this respect, 
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the idea of mestizaje is not only about the blending of phenotypical or “genetic” traits, but 
also the fusion of culture, custom and class on somewhat equal grounds.30 
A consequence of this alternative understanding of race and racial composition is 
that it challenges claims that a majority of Latin American populations consist of mixed-
race people. Wade writes,  
Sexual relations between Europeans, Africans and indigenous people led to 
“mixed” people, mestizos, who were recognized as socially distinct from their 
parents and enumerated using specific categories by colonial censuses. This 
mixed population became numerically dominant in some areas by the late 18th 
century. A broad contrast existed here with the US where, although such mixtures 
occurred, they were less recognized socially – especially during the 19th century – 
and the mixed children were placed socially, and often in censuses, into the racial 
category of the subordinate parent.31  
 
While the latter part of this quote is consistent with Fernández’s point about the different 
attitudes towards mixed-race children between the United States and Latin America, the 
ways in which a majority of Latin American colonial populations are considered “mixed” 
changes greatly by reflecting upon the meaning of ‘mixture.’ In the United States, race 
mixing arises from acts of miscegenation, the offspring of which were categorized in 
terms of the subordinate race—this makes the history of mixed-race people almost 
nonexistent.32 In the United States, as the legacy of settler societies that maintained 
homogenous ethnic identities based on what were initially familial-based communities, 
the mixing of races leads to social exclusion. Conversely, in colonial settings where 
access to goods, rights, and social dignity accompany “higher” races, being of mixed 
ancestry is a much sought- after characteristic, a means of colonial inclusion. The same 
goes for post-colonial societies that attempt to bring together heterogeneous communities 
under the same national banner. 
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 However, when questioning the reality of how “mixed” the populations of Latin 
American communities are, I do not imply that biological miscegenation did not take 
place in much of Latin America (although they are not alone, the Caribbean and Brazil 
standout as paradigmatic examples of “traditionally” mixed regions). “Mixed” meant in 
some cases, not biological mixture in parentage, but the acquisition by someone with all 
Indian ancestry of new cultural traits. Nonetheless, the process of mestizaje becomes a 
means of improving social status for people of Indigenous and even African ancestry, 
assuming that the mixture is heading towards European ideals of whiteness. For the elite 
classes, on the other hand, racial purity was much sought after, although the consequence 
of “taking a step back” (a Latin American racial term to explain a downward mixture) 
was not as great as in the United States. The main point here is that in the United States, 
mixed race is considered a biological phenomenon. In Latin America, it is partly cultural 
and race mixing can take place without any interracial sexual relations, which presents 
anthropologists and social theorists with some room to rethink historical census reports.  
The significance of culture in the Latin American racial calculus is not about the 
way in which cultures become naturalized. Throughout the history of race theory 
sometimes it is the case that, as Wade writes, “racial thinking is not just about dividing 
people into physical categories, but also about explaining their behavior.”33 Apparent in 
the naturalization of culture is the idea that human behavior can be explained through 
biology. The belief in the racial inheritance of culture was a popular train of thought 
within many 19th century European racial theories, especially those put forth by so called 
social evolutionists such as Tylor, Morgan and Spencer. They assumed the biological or 
genetic transmission of cultural traits along with race. As early as 1924, drawing from 
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Franz Boas and R. H. Lowie, Alain Locke argued that although there maybe some 
correlation between race and culture, they are not causally related such that one can 
predict a person’s cultural traits based on their supposed race (biological).34 In Latin 
America, culture becomes part of a racial identity but it need not be inherited nor does it 
have to be casually connected to a particular race. From a North American racialist point 
of view, people with similar phenotypic traits (say dark brown skin and straight hair) 
might be categorized as members of the same race. Any cultural differences between 
these people, say one speaks Spanish the other Mixtec, would signify mixed-race status in 
at least one of these individuals in Latin America.35 With this example, being mixed-race 
does correspond to having a particular type of culture, namely that of a European, but 
there is no need to view genetic transmission as the cause of this cultural inheritance. In 
addition, this culture is not only connected to mixed-race people, since European- born 
Americans share in this culture as well. The difference is that the latter, the Crillos, are 
not reliant upon culture to prove their “higher” social status.  
In short, culture is not necessarily determined by any set of physical 
characteristics though it may be associated with a particular people. While it is one thing 
to say that culture is determined by race, it is another to argue that race is determined by 
culture. Anthony Appiah, in his critique of the work of W. E. B. Du Bois, explains that 
culture cannot be linked to race in any way that assumes a biological or historical 
connection. Appiah furthers this analysis by eliminating the idea of “common impulses,” 
“historical strivings,” or even familial relations, as foundations for a general socio-
historical account of race, which Du Bois aspires towards.36 Appiah writes, “sharing a 
common group history cannot be a criterion for being members of the same group, for we 
  149 
would have to be able to identify the group in order to identify its history.”37 Identifying 
that group for historical purposes begs the question of what unites them if the goal to 
arrive at a common history. Thus, Appiah thinks that at the heart of any cultural 
discussion of race is the idea of skin color or some other ascriptive, physical identifying 
factor. Race is about the visual, the physical. 
My point is to argue that a bicultural social identity may signify mixed-ancestry in 
Latin America. This in turn allows others to assume that miscegenation took place in this 
particular individual’s past, which may or may not be the case. The history of 
colonization and the use of culture as a means of domination create doubt that European 
cultural traits were not assumed at some point by many slaves and natives in order to 
improve their lot. Latin American individuals may assume that a bicultural person is a 
product of miscegenation, but this does not have to be the case since cultural traits 
becomes an intermediary between various races. This intermediary status designates a 
mestizo/a person. Thus, in Latin America people can tap into whiteness or claim aspects 
of a white identity by participating in what are historically designated as white (read 
European) ways of living.  
A response to the characterization of Latin America race presented here might be 
that culture is not a factor in racial formation as much as there is an apparent appreciation 
for whiteness and a tendency towards “passing.” William Darity Jr., Jason Dietrich, and 
Darrick Hamilton argue this point.38 They hold that throughout Latin America there tends 
to be an aversion towards identifying as black or “Negro” and a strong preference for 
whiteness. This remains the case even though countries like Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto 
Rico are estimated to be upwards of 75 percent “modern African descent” (as presented 
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in their paper these estimates are misleading for Mexico since they imply that 75% of the 
Mexican population retains African ancestry). Darity, et al, argue that “collective 
passing” is taking place, especially when it comes to self-identification. Their evidential 
support is the fact that 33% of “very dark” respondents, 31% of “dark” respondents, and 
55% of “medium” or “brown” respondents (“very dark,” “dark” and “medium or brown” 
being ascriptive skin hue designations assigned by an external interviewer using an “eye 
balling” method) all self classify as “white” when asked about their race.39 While Darity, 
et al, may be correct in thinking that there is an aversion towards negritude in Latin 
America, they nonetheless misunderstand the nature of race formation in the region by 
missing the importance of culture in Latin American societies. The whiteness that 
Darity’s subjects claim is a result of the dispersal of whiteness throughout Latin 
American culture. The respondents are not using “white” in the same manner as that 
found in the binary racial ontology of North America. This should be quite obvious 
seeing how “nonwhite” these individuals appear by United States standards, yet they still 
self-identify as white for some reason.40 
It is in the manner presented above that Latin American racial identities can 
diverge from the way race is formulated in Anglo-America. Since racial mixing was not 
frowned upon in Latin America as it was in the North by whites, culture and class 
became a means by which racial identities could change, regardless of whether or not any 
sort of miscegenation took place. As far as racial mixing in the United States is 
considered, because of such things as the “one-drop rule” many were not able to benefit 
from racial mixing. Mendieta summarizes this point when he writes, “In the 
Americas…racial formations have coalesced around two different axes: in the United 
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States around the axis of domination and exclusion, in Latin America around the axis of 
hegemony and inclusion.”41 In other words, while racial mixing in Latin America became 
a means of acquiring or losing social status, racial mixing became taboo and in some 
places outlawed in the United States—the far extreme of this being the black/white 
dichotomy of American racial difference, the standard for designating purity/impurity. It 
was not until 1967 that anti-miscegenation laws were struck down by the Supreme 
Court.42 In Latin America, “race” evolved not only as a method of exclusion, but also as a 
means of colonial subjugation, a type of inclusion.  
The notion of race understood by most people today cannot be separated from its 
colonial origins. These racial formations dictate the social order and interactions of entire 
communities; they provide social benefits or positions of privilege for some, while 
simultaneously impinging upon the rights of others, subjecting them to both 
institutionalized and overt forms of prejudice. Race operates according to the same logic 
of domination regardless of the context. This logic is the coloniality of power, the 
underlying structure of exclusion and social hierarchy that originates in colonial 
atmospheres and becomes ingrained into everyday life to such an extent that it remains 
even after “post-colonial” or nation-building movements have taken place.43 This logic of 
domination is also apparent when racial identities evolve to continue exclusive social 
practices, as I identify below.  
3. Latino/as and the Mechanics of Post-racial Ideology 
It often is the case that when philosophers and social theorists think about race in 
Latin America (or for that matter in other parts of the world), they do so from 
perspectives grounded in United States understandings about race. The anthropologist, 
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Woodrow Borah, recounts this tendency in regards to his first attempt at surveying Native 
Americans in Mexico. In his effort to find native Mexicans he realized that he could not 
encounter a single person claiming to be an Indio (again this is a derogatory term). 
Instead, he quickly realized that “the Indians” were all around him, they just did not think 
of themselves in that way, because they maintained practices that were of a mixed 
heritage (in addition they were not wearing headdresses or making sacrifices atop of 
some temple).44 In the United States, race is intricately connected to and emerges from 
the black/white binary, which places much emphasis on physical appearance, ancestry 
and sometimes “blood” or genes. This is perhaps why ethnicity is so important as of 
recent. Ethnicity speaks towards the ways in which culture, custom, religion and 
language become locations for discrimination or representation.45  
A more global idea of race can help resolve some of the issues that begin with the 
intersection of culture, race, and nationalism. This section flushes out the problems with 
racial identities generated by the existence of people of Latin American descent in the 
United States. It also helps to resolve some of the following questions: What does the 
characterization of race in Latin American presented above teach the United States? What 
does it reveal about “race” in general and racism in particular? How can it help us in the 
United States identify novel forms of racism? Is it possible to respond to the challenge set 
out by Linda Martín Alcoff in the following quote? 
The emerging Latino population in the United States is testing existing categories 
and modes of conceptualizing identity, status, and political effect. We need 
expanded categories of identity, as well as expanded notions of racism, to provide 
meaningful representations and analyses, and we need to be willing to devise new 
creative concepts like ethnorace to be able to avoid unproductive debates about 
whether Latinos are an ethnicity or a race, whether they are closer to black or 
white, or whether they represent a threat or a promise.46 
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The rise of immigration populations, various libratory movements, international 
happenings (such as war or climate change), and economic challenges create a national 
identity crisis for the United States. A crisis is an indecisive and critical moment often 
accompanied by feelings of uncertainty, anxiety, and the need for action. As new faces 
take on political positions historically linked to white males, it is quite natural that the 
country begins to question whether or not these events symbolize a change in the 
composition of the nation. Questions like “Does the election of President Barack Obama 
connote the end of racial barriers?” get to the heart of contemporary debates over the 
importance of affirmative action and racial discrimination. Other phenomena, like the rise 
of Korean, Vietnamese, or Spanish-language television programming, generate inquires 
into what language or way of life (if any) best expresses the United States. These 
questions are a product of the self-inquisitive nature of the “American” imaginary, 
insofar as the political institutions of this country remain tied to the nation-state. With 
nation-states, national identity and nationalism imply the idea of a single “people,” i.e. a 
nation, as the core of the state. The potential dangers of this crisis lie in the fact that 
examining the relationship between race and society with antiquated models for what 
constitutes race or racism allows for new forms of prejudice to go unnoticed. One 
example of this is the recent resurgence of nationalism based on neo-nativist ideals of 
maintaining “American culture.” Another example is the attitude that holds racism (post 
Obamian “change”) to be a nonissue in today’s society. Reviewing the Latino/a and Latin 
American relationship to race, especially as it exists in the United States, can afford the 
epistemological tools that direct these concerns.  
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People of Latin American descent in the United States are “mixed” given that 
their identity brings together two conceptualizations of identity, one Latin the other 
Anglo.47 This understanding of mixture extends beyond mixed-race. Latino/as have a 
mixed-identity, their personal identities transverses the boundaries of a particular set of 
social relations, a single social ontology. Such is the case for Latin Americans who must 
engage the forms of racialization currently found it in the United States while 
maintaining the racial formations and dynamics of their home communities/countries. A 
system of identification that supports no real notion of mixed-identity makes the identity 
status of Latin Americans and Hispanics questionable; “are Latinos a race?” or “are 
Latinos a single culture?”—asked from both Latino and non-Latino perspectives—
reiterate this point.  
Contrary to popular misconceptions, which are due in part to specific experiences 
and individual relations to Hispanics, there is no single racial, ethnic, linguistic or cultural 
requirement necessary for categorization into the generic Latino/a population. Not all 
Latino/as need to be Mexican, Puerto Rican or Cuban, speak Spanish, eat beans and rice, 
or dance the tango. Moreover, current literature draws no conclusions regarding whether 
or not Latin Americans are even a single group or many. Nor is there consensus regarding 
whether labels like “Latino/a” or “Hispanic” are more useful than nationalistic terms like 
Argentine or Ecuadorian. Put differently, in the United States, those who are 
systematically categorized as Latin American, Latino/a, Hispanic or even “Spanish” can 
thus be thought of as racially, culturally, or ethnically different from others in this 
country.48  
  155 
This is not to say that for Hispanics of darker skin, “race” is not a significant 
issue. For many, color-based theories of race and (more important) racism play a major 
role in their identity. As put by Linda Martín Alcoff, “In terms of pan-Latino 
identity…when Mexican Americans or Puerto Ricans are called Latino, the latter term 
will connote racial meanings; whereas Argentineans who are called Latino in the North 
may escape these connotations.”49 Take for example those Hispanics who come from 
families originating in southwestern states but no longer speak Spanish or maintain the 
cultural practices of their country of origin. Part of the American populous, the United 
States, is (and has been) their country of origin. Still, there is something that makes them 
Hispanic, i.e., the color of their skin. While it can be argued that their “Hispanicity” or 
“Latinidad” is due to their ethnicity or heritage, there is no doubt that these people are 
being treated in ways that correspond to their appearance. In short, while some Latino/as 
can be racialized, others, who look white, require alternative forms of identification since 
visual perceptive practices are misleading.  
For those Latino/as who escape “traditional” racial connotations, language, 
custom and culture bear a majority of the mark of difference for them. Many public 
institutions now consider Latino/a or Hispanic identity a supplementary aspect to racial 
identity. One can now be “white” but be of “non-Hispanic origin” or “white” and be “of a 
Hispanic origin.” This is the idea of ethnicity, which in the United States functions closer 
to culture rather than race, according to Zack.50 However, ethnicity does not replace race 
as a proper means of identification when visual appearance remains a primary way that 
people are categorized. Alcoff writes, “When ethnic identities are used instead of racial 
ones, the perceptual practices of visual demarcation, by which we slot people into racial 
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categories, continue to operate because ethic categories offer no substituting perceptual 
practice. In other words, the fact that race and ethnicity do not map onto the same kinds 
of identifying practices will make race harder to dislodge.”51 By focusing on the ways in 
which human beings are always already involved in visceral racial discourses without 
consciously realizing it (the phenomenology of race), Alcoff cautions of the tendency for 
color-based racism to persist even during instances where a person does not identify with 
the race that they are ascribed.52 
For Latin Americans who would normally be identified as “white,” ethnicity 
comes to serve as a second form of race. In this respect, the category “white but of 
Hispanic origin” designates different kinds of whiteness: there is that which can be 
applied to Latino/as of fair skin complexion, then there is that which pertains to the 
tradition and legacy of whiteness in the United States (which now has linguistic, cultural, 
and ethnic dimensions to it). For Suzanne Oboler, this creation of an “ethno-race” 
signifies a step towards changing the concept of race from a false biological determinism 
to a “rigid socioracial hierarchy of ‘ethnic groups.’” Oboler writes, “Contrary to the 
biological determinism that historically has pervaded U.S. race relations, Latin American 
intellectuals and scientists alike understood ‘race’ in social terms—specifically in terms 
of the belief in the existence of higher and lower cultures, which could clearly be 
assimilated into a national socioracial hierarchy organized and (in)visibly marked by skin 
color and phenotype.”53 By designating nonwhite status in the same way being black or 
brown designate colored status, ethnicity serves the same function of racial exclusion. 
This signifies the creation or solidification of a white cultural-racial identity or a “white 
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ethnicity,” something that now serves as the basis for a pernicious form of cultural 
racism.  
Zack calls this “postracial race.” She holds that the existence of a “white—non-
Hispanic” form of identification signals the creation of type of whiteness that is different 
from the whiteness that pertains to Latino/as of fair skin complexion. The “postracial” 
aspect of this identity pertains to the ways in which this racial category does not rest on 
ideas about biology, but instead comes into being by default in the wake of a white 
supremacist culture.54 Ramón Grosfoguel, Nelson Maldonado-Torres and José David 
Saldívar argue that implicit to the idea of race is the idea that “white European/Euro-
American groups are always at the top of the racial/ethnic hierarchy.”55 What Grosfugel 
(et al.) call “cultural racism,” is “a pervasive form of racist discourse in which the word 
‘race’ is not even used. Cultural racist discourse uses ‘culture’ as a marker of inferiority 
and superiority, reinstalling again the same colonial/racial hierarchy of the 
European/Euro-American colonial expansion.”56  
The now infamous example of cultural-racism is found in the most recent work of 
the late Samuel Huntington, critic of domestic multiculturalism and Hispanic 
immigration. Huntington’s last book concerns the influx of Hispanic immigration and the 
potential national fragmentation caused by these people maintaining “non-American” 
traditions and cultures. He argues that American national identity is connected to the 
cultural practices that the United States was founded on, making racial differences (in a 
supposed biological sense) and ethnic differences unnecessary.57 In Huntington’s United 
States, citizens can be of any color as long as they adhere to “the American core culture,” 
which unites the country and consists of Anglo-Protestant values, traditions and beliefs.58 
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Huntington’s argument demonstrates how “whiteness” is something that has made the 
jump from biology to culture given that his view of United States national identity implies 
a particular core culture, one that was historically associated with a certain race. An 
argument can be made that this is but an older view of race in the US, when Poles, Irish 
and Jews were considered nonwhite races because of their cultural differences. 
Nonetheless, demanding that all “Americans” (or citizens of the United States) adhere to 
Anglo-Protestant culture in light of recent immigration is a form of re-racializing the 
nation, albeit in terms similar to how race operates in Latin America.59 With 
Huntington’s call for American nationalism, then, the national identity of this country can 
account for the influx of Latino/as (among others) living in the boundaries of this nation. 
Here, non-white race still designates impurity and exclusion, just in new terms.  
Drawing from Alain Locke, Huntington’s neo-nationalism can be considered a 
case of “imperial politics.” For Locke, when people of different ways of life meet, when a 
“race contact” (as he calls it) takes place, the practices of the dominant or ruling group 
dictates the political atmosphere of these interactions. Dominant groups impose their 
social orders through violence or coercion and mold political encounters their way.60 For 
Locke, it is characteristic of modern imperialism to demand that the weaker civilization 
assume the culture of the dominant. Ancient imperialism, of the sort one finds with the 
Roman imperial project, was not a policy of total subjugation, but one where they made 
people dependent upon the Roman government (and therefore Roman taxation).61 
Conversely, modern imperialism, the type of which is visible in the European colonial 
projects of America, required total dominance; not only did modern colonialism require 
the appropriation of land, people, and resources, it required that the people adopt 
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“modern culture.” Locke posits an economic basis for this: the forced adoption of 
European civilization required the implementation of European goods under the control 
of the colonial regimes. This made the European colonial elite socially and economically 
necessary.62 This is important in returning to the neo-nativist thought of figures like 
Huntington, when we remember that the nationalism they purport requires a single people 
(read “culture”) for each country. Not only does this necessitate cultural assimilation for 
immigrants, which places this instance of imperial politics into Locke’s characterization 
of the modern tradition, but it also keeps alive the socio-economic power structures of 
white Protestant America on new levels. Huntington is thus an advocate for domestic 
imperial practices.63 
Huntington is not alone in his call for an assimilative nationalism. Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr. also argues for such a position in light of fears that without a unifying 
culture multiculturalism and ethnic enclaves will balkanize the United States.64 In fact, 
Schlesinger’s chapter “A New Race,” explores the historic need for a politicized identity 
founded upon civic responsibility and participation in the United States, the American 
creed being the basis for this identity.65 As identified by Gunnar Myrdal of Sweden, the 
American creed consists in the ideals of “the essential dignity and equality of all human 
beings, of inalienable rights to freedom, justice, and opportunity.”66 Originally, the new 
race was one of people from common stock, founded in the Anglo-Protestant ability to be 
“new,” to start over in the Americas. Later immigrants from western and northern 
Europe, such as the Scandinavian, Irish and German, pointed out the troubles associated 
with the distinctive Anglo bent in the American national character. Similarly, newer 
immigrants of southern and eastern Europe were at first subject to much hatred and 
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oppression. All, however, were sold an ideology that implied that they had a duty to mix, 
argues Schlesinger. However, the “incompleteness” of the melting pot became apparent 
early on in the 20th century as enclaves of ethnic based communities quickly began to 
form. This created an either/or logic expressed by Woodrow Wilson and Theodore 
Roosevelt: either one is American or not, there is no middle ground.67 Interesting enough, 
this logic parallels hierarchical theories of race that emerge out of settler societies, i.e. 
black/white, pure/impure. Schlesinger writes, “The Ethnic upsurge…began as a gesture 
of protest against the Anglocentric culture. It became a cult, and today it threatens to 
become a counter-revolution against the original theory of America as ‘one people,’ a 
common culture, a single nation.”68 
More recently, Francis Fukuyama argued that the more serious long-term 
challenge to liberal democracies today concerns the integration of immigrant group as 
citizens of pluralistic democracies. In particular Fukuyama has in mind Muslim 
immigrants in the first world counties of Europe and the United States. Fukuyama’s 
beliefs that radical Islamic Jihadism arises out of modern identity politics and that 
Muslim people request specific cultural allowances that liberal societies cannot permit 
are the basis for this claim.69 Fukuyama argues that there is not such a great divide 
between church and state in modern liberal societies. Supporting Huntington, Fukuyama 
holds that American national identity is distinctively flavored by Anglo-Protestantism to 
such an extent that it influences everything from the work ethic to politics. This cultural 
foundation for national values is open to all newcomers, argues Fukuyama.70 One can add 
that these values are not just open to newcomers but required, this being the distinctive 
ability of the American melting pot.71 Conversely, European national identities have not 
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been so demanding upon immigrants, and as a result second and third generation Muslim 
immigrants attempt to discover their sense of identity through radical Jihadism, a de-
territorialized Muslim ideology that thrives on alienated Muslim immigrants in European 
societies.72  
Fukuyama’s suggestion to European nation-states is to formulate nationalisms 
that are inclusive, but expect conformity to dominant cultural traditions. Put differently, 
national culture should be universal and open to public discussion, the inclusive aspect of 
this being that all people are allowed to participate in the discussion. The exclusive side 
comes out of Fukuyama belief in the need for “guiding cultures,” social atmospheres that 
are respecting of differences and create the necessary and sufficient conditions for public 
debate over nationalism in the first place. As example he gives the United States melting 
pot ideal inspired by Anglo-Protestant inclusivity.73  
I take issue with Fukuyama’s depiction of the United States assimilative paradigm 
because it ends with the types of claims Huntington puts forward. While Fukuyama does 
a better job of allowing for dialogue, his model for what this dialogue looks like is the 
American melting pot, with its distinctively Anglo-Protestant cultural flavor. To some 
extent, insofar as immigrants seek inclusion, and assuming that their phenotypical 
differences do not get in the way (a large assumption), assimilation is possible. Yet this is 
a one-way cultural exchange that forces minorities and immigrants to conform, not the 
dominant group. In this sense, immigrants and racial minorities are not really authentic 
agents who can contribute to American national identity or European national identities. 
And, as Mendieta and others argue, the historical and legal dimensions of racism, the 
ways in which the Constitution, the Supreme Court and United States law have been used 
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to justify and uphold such things as Jim Crow, the Chinese exclusion act, the annexation 
of Mexican land, and the removal of Native Americans, raises doubts that racial 
minorities can buy into American ways of living as citizens, like Huntington, Schlesinger 
and Fukuyama suggest.74  
Focusing on the social and legal construction of race, and showing how the ideal 
United States citizen has been racialized by the legacies and legalities of exclusion, 
Mendieta writes, “Law constructs race by regulating the ways in which social agents can 
enter and transverse the geography of society and by determining the kinds of affects they 
can and must feel, whether covertly or overtly.”75 The last part of Mendieta’s quote, that 
pertaining to affect, is important because it connects to the workings of the American 
imaginary and also leads to a phenomenological critique of the nation-state. Mendieta 
claims that the Supreme Court has taught a majority of United States citizens how to 
respond to and value (or de-value) minorities and immigrant groups. Not only does this 
suggest that American sensibilities are cultured through prejudice—i.e. their feelings and 
attitudes towards others are developed by laws that tell them whom to respect and honor 
as full citizens and whom not to—but it also shows how a particular culture, or way of 
living, valuing and feeling, exists at the core of the United States national identity. This 
culture exists in both a descriptive and normative sense, which reflects the 
institutionalization of prejudice and how deeply ingrained into the American imaginary it 
remains. Mendieta performs a phenomenological critique of the nation-state when he 
points out how prior to entertaining the question of “Who is a citizen?” people inside of 
the United States have already been claimed by a legal discourse that pre-selects the 
answer that will be given. The phenomenology becomes obvious when Mendieta brackets 
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the question of who or what is a citizen, only to find that the history of American law 
always already shapes our thinking about this ideal person.  
Mendieta’s phenomenological critique of the nation-state reveals something 
similar to what Étienne Balibar points out in his work on nationalism.76 Balibar argues 
that the fundamental problem for nation-states is how to produce people, since it is a 
historical fact that no current nation-state in reality has ever maintained a homogenous 
ethnic base. More precisely, argues Balibar, the real issue for nations is to bring about 
“the effect of unity by virtue of which the people will appear, in everyone’s eyes, ‘as a 
people,’ that is, as the basis and origin of political power.”77 For Balibar, social 
communities are products of the functioning of institutions that serve them (here we can 
enter Mendieta’s thoughts on the intersection of law and political power). National 
communities, however, attempt to monopolize the workings of state institutions such that 
one can say that the state belongs to a particular group of people. Similar to how race 
functions in idealist ways, such that it ventures from the mind of racialists to the reality of 
particular social ontologies, nationalism springs forth from the workings of national 
imaginaries and blankets states. These imaginative acts begin as a result of ideology that, 
as Mendieta highlights, discriminates and influences our understandings about who real 
citizens are, and, as Balibar notes, assumes in advance that the state exist for this type of 
people alone.  
With the racialization of national identity, it becomes obvious that political power 
is said to arise from a particular group of people or a particular cultural heritage, either an 
imaginary collective or an ideal way of being, i.e., an ideal culture. We can identify 
ethno-racial formulations of this culture using conceptual tools that are made available to 
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philosophers of race as it functions in Latin America—at least this is my main contention. 
When people argue for immigrant assimilation they are placing demands upon 
newcomers and racial minorities that resemble the seeming inclusive practices found 
within Latin American formations of whiteness. “Americaness” or “Americanity” 
remains the ideal from this perspective, just like Europeaness or European culture was 
dispersed throughout colonial Latin America, the effects of which persist until today. 
 Ultimately, I do not mean to suggest that with the rise of the Latino/a population 
phenotypical or color-based racism will end. As pointed out by Ronald Sundstrom, with 
the influx of racial minorities there is the belief that this coming social environment 
“will…‘overwhelm’ our history and render pointless ‘old’ black and Native American 
claims for social justice.”78 In other words, it is a mistake to view “the browning of 
America” as a solution to the problem of racism, because it is thought that all people at 
some point will be mixed. One can identify this mistake in the work of José Vasconcelos, 
one of the great thinkers of Latin American mestizaje. In Vasconcelos’s view, the coming 
racial synthesis is expected to physically and spiritually unite the people of the world. It 
is the expected social condition for future humanity. This is rather convenient in terms of 
hegemony, since it allows the status quo to remain in place, colonial hierarchies and all. 
Thus, the idea of a mestizo Mexico (Vasconcelos’s ideal) honors the dead Indian but pays 
lip service to those on the streets. One specific lesson philosophers of race in the United 
States can learns from Latin American political history is the ways in which mestizaje 
does not solve racial tension. Take for instance Benito Juarez, the former President of 
Mexico, elected to office in 1858. Juarez, Mexico’s first President, was a full-blood 
Mixtec Indian, who spoke Spanish as a second language. Although he served for five 
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terms, the plight of the indigenous did not change. It would be great if Barak Obama’s 
presidency signaled the end of racial oppression. However, as Sundstrom points out, with 
changes in the national demographic and politics of representation come changes in 
social justice.79 While Obama’s election is a great moment and step in the right direction 
for racial justice, we must remember that with every step forward we take in the direction 
of social and racial justice, prejudice moves with us, as if they are caught in some type of 
waltz or salsa. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
FROM IMMIGRANT ENCOUNTERS TO ESTADOUNIDENSE 
 
I began this work by differentiating national-citizenship from legal-citizenship. 
National-citizenship is the activity of being a citizen. It is heavily normative, and as a 
result, at times it can be subject to racist and culturally exclusive ideologies—even in 
ways that reflect novel racist practices. Critical multicultural discourse is needed so as to 
ensure that nations remain sites of cultural exchange and inclusion. As sites of inclusion, 
pluralistic nations are more likely to not turn away strangers or associate newcomers with 
“enemies.” Thus, immigration reform aimed at the category of legal-citizenship depends 
in part on culturally plural atmospheres. Yet, multiculturalism is a difficult ideal to 
achieve, and it must be accompanied by understandings of the state that do not just 
include marginalized perspective into oppressive power dynamics, but actual changes to 
the balance of power. On account of the impetus for change being the material needs of 
the marginalized and oppressed, Dussel’s “analectical politics” aim for political 
transformations while also laying the foundations for an appropriate understanding of the 
state needed to combat power imbalances associated with the idea of citizenship.  
Legal-citizenship is the site where the battle over immigrant rights takes place. I 
argue that the exclusive nature of legal-citizenship rights cannot be maintained in light of 
the arbitrary nature of borders. And yet, legal-citizenship is necessary for national-
citizenship and the existence of political communities in general, and so we need to 
rethink our understanding of borders so as to allow for more robust and fair constructions 
of state membership. The liberal assumption that political theory can begin from 
conceptions of the state that are self-enclosed is untenable. John Rawls’ work served as 
  174 
my main example of this, based on his own standards for what constitutes a reasonable 
argument. The problem with this self-enclosed origin is that it determines the trajectory 
for subsequent political thought on the topics of political institutions, state membership, 
and citizenship rights in ways that are heavily dependent upon the boundaries between 
countries. These boundaries are morally indefensible, outside of utilitarian appeals to the 
need for political order, and not so clear-cut or well defined in actuality. State boundaries 
are products of historically contingency but also the primary means by which legal-
citizenship is determined. Rethinking the reality of borders reveals that they are in 
constant movement and constantly moved through. The historical and ongoing relations 
between states, based on treaty, trade and the global market, defy the self-enclosed nature 
purported by mainstream political theorists. Our views on state membership should 
follow suit. 
In this concluding chapter, I argue that two axioms exist at the core of all political 
philosophy in the Americas: the discovery of America and the encounter of America. I 
use the term “axiom,” since the resulting political atmospheres stemming from these 
concepts have a determining effect on the resulting political arrangements (such that it 
could almost be deduced from the concept itself). These understanding of the events of 
1492 contribute to the theories of the state, understandings of multiculturalism and views 
on national-citizenship found throughout the region. The discovery of America connects 
to the settler societies of New England, the legacy of which attempt to maintain 
exclusive, bordered and fixed understandings of group identity. The encounter of 
America presents an ethical and political opportunity to interact with another human 
being regardless of their national affiliation or geopolitical situation. Aware of the history 
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of “encounter,” the first section of this chapter argues for political practices that respond 
better to questions of unauthorized citizenship, multiculturalism and social justice. 
In the 21st century, due to the flow between borders and the rise of a minority- 
majority population, the basic axioms of “American” political thought (especially those 
associated with the justification of the settler society) stand in need of reconfiguration. 
Latin American political formations, and the social hierarchies that undergird those 
societies, provide the United States with the possibility of rethinking the relationship 
between race, national identity, and citizenship. In the second section of this conclusion, I 
will present one such re-conceptualization of U.S. citizenship and national identity, 
namely that of Estadounidense. This idea breaks with the assimilative paradigm of 
“American” domestic imperialism, while also providing the opportunity for novel forms 
of political existence to manifest. 
1. Core Political Axioms: Settlerism vs. Discovery  
Certain political axioms emerge from, and also support, interpretations of the 
initial meeting between the indigenous inhabitants of America and the European 
colonizers. I will focus on two paradigmatic understandings of this event: for some 
America was discovered while for others it was encountered. Though equally complex 
and debatable, these ways of viewing the historical events of 1492 help to shape the 
theoretical landscape of political thought in all of the Americas.  
The difference between “encounter” and “discovery” has been explored at great 
length.1 Most literature on this debate concerns the perspective(s) represented by each 
term, i.e. European, “Latin American,” “mestizo/a” and indigenous. However, encounter 
and discovery serve as political poles that can lead towards different responses to 
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multiculturalism, possible paths towards alternative conceptions of citizenship, and 
different notions of the state (one modeled on the modern subject, the other more inter-
subjective).  
“Discovery” is the dominant interpretation of the events of 1492 in the Anglo-
American world. In a settler society like the United States, the discovery of America 
signifies a barren land, empty of real human inhabitants. The most apparent 
manifestation of this thought is the appropriation of the term “American” to describe the 
citizens of the United States. The paradigm of discovery lends itself to the exclusivist 
project of assimilative nationalism. The link between discovery and assimilative 
expectations is the settler society, a self-sustaining, enclosed community of transplanted 
individuals (Europeans) living in a new region. Nationalisms incorporating assimilative 
ideals require that immigrants integrate into the dominant social group when seeking 
admission into the body politic of a country such as the United States (assuming that full 
admission is possible in the first place). The concern is that a politics of multinationalism 
and the existence of immigrant cultural enclaves may result in the balkanization of the 
country. Here, the price for membership is cultural alterity; with assimilative 
nationalisms cultural influence is one-directional: immigrants must conform and not the 
dominant cultural/national group.  
Complete cultural assimilation is a strange request, however, since the migratory 
experience, the fact of being part of an immigrant group, tends to “create” or solidify 
ethnic identities in the first place. In their home countries, those who immigrate are not 
fully aware of their “ethnic status,” in the sense that they tend to be part of the dominant 
social grouping (this is not the case with ethnic refugees, obviously). For those who were 
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part of the majority, their national identity, race or ethnicity acquires new meaning in the 
context of emigrating and subsequently immigrating. Once upon the shores of the United 
States, the Irish became an “ethnic group.” And yet, the assimilation process, which aims 
at eliminating ethnic differences, attempts to undo what immigration does. 
On the other hand, for those employing “encounter” (encuentro), this idea 
signifies that people were in the Americas before Europeans arrived. A “discovery” took 
place only from a Eurocentric perspective. For Enrique Dussel the term “discovery” not 
only begins from a European perspective but also requires at least two different moments 
of European understanding. The first “covers over” America by mistaking it for Asia; the 
second “dis-covers” the mistaken identity.2 For many, this is the only significance of 
encounter. However, extending this idea, I will argue that encounter is a better framework 
than discovery for dealing with questions of multiculturalism and perhaps even national-
citizenship Based on the history of “political meetings” or encounters in Latin America, I 
will suggest that this paradigm can lend itself to a political philosophy that responds 
better to Latino/as and other people whose existence in the United States is predicated 
upon internationality, i.e., people who, regardless of their citizenship status, have 
historically represented a “non-American” identity. The paradigm of encounter could put 
political thinkers on the path towards alternative bases for state membership. When based 
in a framework that acknowledges the coming together of people, encounters provide 
ethical opportunities or ways of being that necessitate a blurring of the line between 
praxis and contemplation. 
For the United States, the fundamental politico-philosophical question is the 
justification of the “settler society.” In her book coauthored with Charles Mills, Contract 
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and Domination, Carole Pateman supports this point when she writes that the question of 
legitimacy is unavoidable for the settler societies of North America, Great Britain and 
Australia.3 Historical justifications, which have drawn heavily from John Locke, bypass 
any debate about whether the initial colonies of Great Britain were predicated on 
conquest or colonialism, the former being the outright declaration of war against natives, 
while the latter is the establishment of a settlement. For Pateman, the idea of terra nullius 
(empty land or land devoid of life) in addition to the rights of husbandry help justify 
British colonial enterprises by referring to unused land and absence of formal government 
(sovereignty) amongst native people.4 In this sense, “conquest” is said to be a nonissue at 
the beginning of the United States, although one can argue that after Manifest Destiny, 
the appropriation of Mexican land, and other American imperial projects conquest 
emerged as a central concern.  
The “settler question” serves two main purposes: First, it explains how and why 
countries like the United States can lay claim to the land that they exist on. In an area 
lacking sovereign inhabitants or in an area where indigenous people fail to recognize the 
full potential of the land they live on, early colonial political thinkers saw the potential 
for justifying appropriation. By positing the idea of terra nullius, apologists of European 
imperialism create a clean slate (using the language of “state of nature”) from where 
states and subsequently nation-states can be created. As typical of states, these states are 
supported by social contracts with settler contracts as their ultimate base.5 Having a 
settler contract is characteristic of modern colonial polities. The idea of “discovery” thus 
furthers the settler justification by establishing a rhetoric of prior emptiness that allows 
for the initial land holdings of a community.   
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Second, the settler paradigm provides a means through which hegemonic power 
can be situated and maintained. Settler societies do not live amongst natives and form 
mixed communities like the Iberian Conquistadors did in what became Latin America. 
Settler societies rely upon the idea of self-enclosed, self-sustaining groupings. At their 
extreme, the types of nationalisms that settler societies exhibit generate an understanding 
of racial purity and a logic of exclusion that culminate in hypodescent theories of race. In 
this manner, the United States, supposedly based on the initial Anglo-Protestant settler 
community, is the continuation and legacy of European imperial projects. Eduardo H. 
Galeano makes a similar point when he writes,  
The Mayflower pilgrims did not cross the sea to obtain legendary treasures; they  
came mainly to establish themselves with their families and to reproduce in the 
New World the system of life and work they had practiced in Europe. They were 
not soldiers of fortune but pioneers; they came not to conquer but to colonize, and 
their colonies were settlements.6  
 
By maintaining Old-World systems of order and exclusive communities of ethnically 
European people, the United States is a full partner in the racist, masculine and 
imperialist/colonial projects of the North Atlantic. The fight to maintain the direction of 
the nation-state, amidst the growing minority-majority population, thus challenges the 
legacy of imperial hegemony.7 
As Pateman notes, the settler contract is bankrupt insofar as it rests upon the idea 
of terra nullius. Even though the Australian legal system has ruled terra nullius to be 
fiction, not to mention that it is politically insensitive to discount the pre-existence of 
native people in a colonized region, the expected legal challenges to national sovereignty 
are still missing in the United States.8 The persistence of terra nullius is perhaps due to 
the fact that the rhetoric of emptiness remains ingrained in ordinary life, which is a sign 
of the great extent to which the modern imperial projects have been successful. However, 
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I argue that the political axiom of discovery is becoming less important given the 
growing number of people of Latin American descent in the United States. Besides 
changing the demographics of the country, Latino/as are also challenging the bedrocks of 
political theory by creating new angles from which questions of multiculturalism, multi-
nationalism, national-citizenship are starting to arise. 
Political philosophical thought about the political existence of Latino/as and Latin 
American immigrants in the United States is predicated on different axioms than the 
legacy of much Western political thought. Political issues regarding Latino/as do not 
presuppose land to be open and ripe for the taking. Through the lens of migration, Latin 
American immigrants arrive into populated or occupied territories. For migrants, the 
political question is one where dealing with differences and being “extra-national” cannot 
be ignored. As Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Ramon Grosfugel, and Jose Saldívar write, 
“Migrants do not arrive to an empty or neutral space.”9 Histories of colonialism and 
hierarchies of power pollute the political spaces where immigrants seek to go. Thus, for 
Latin American immigrants, and by association Latino/as who are already in the United 
States, a different political question needs asking: rather than assuming a political 
philosophy that begins with the idea of emptiness, which can be construed as a type of 
“original position” or “the original state of nature” from where abstract principles of 
ownership can be formulated (i.e. settler contract), Latino/as start from international or 
“trans-national” (in my Dusselian sense) predicaments. 
Based on the types of indigenous people in the region, the method (and history) of 
the Iberian conquistadors and their subsequent interaction, the fundamental politico-
philosophical paradigm for Latin America is that of encounter. Immigrants (authorized or 
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not), indigenous politicians representing subaltern perspectives and people of Latin 
American descent in the United States further this paradigm. The politics of encounter 
begin with the coming together of two people(s) or groups. Encounters start from where 
people are in the United States and in Latin America: post-colonial America.10 However, 
this alternative basis for political thought harbors decolonial commitments, it combats the 
exclusivist and hegemonic orientations of nation-states rather than merely solving the 
problem of colonial rule itself. Thus, the politics of encuentro arise from “the outside” of 
nationality, a positioning other than that typically called to mind by the normative 
meaning of “American” or other nation-building projects.  
The paradigm of encounter has been viewed with much suspicion. Dussel’s 
warning and implicit criticism is found in the following: “If the meeting (encuentro) of 
two worlds were to signify the new hybrid, syncretistic culture that the mestizo race is 
articulating, its content would be acceptable. Popular culture in its own creative 
consciousness would then be producing this meeting, and not the brutal event of 
conquest.”11 I take Dussel’s concerns further since I am weary of the traps of “mestizaje” 
and other unifying narratives in Latin America (see chapter 5).  
I interpret the idea of encuentro only as the con-frontation of different people, the 
historical fact of a coming together and the attempt to workout some form of peaceful yet 
productive coexistence. Notice how the Spanish frontera (border) and the English 
frontier share the Latin frons as their root. The original meaning of frons refers to the 
“front brow” on a human face. Broken down further, this word also referrers to that 
foremost part of an object, that which would come into contact with other things (the 
boundaries of a nation). Hence the idea of exchange or encounter between borders is 
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derivative of this root. Add the prefix con to this, or “with,” and one has “confrontation,” 
not in a negative sense but one inclined towards meetings.  
My interests are in the political significance of what happens when different 
cultures meet. Often time these meetings end violently. When this occurs war and 
eventually conquest begin. War develops when the appropriation and control of 
land/resources are in the background. From historical positions of social and political 
clout, this is seemingly the case when indigenous politicians win a majority of votes or 
when it appears as though Mexicans are taking over southwestern United States. Yet, 
encounter does not have to end in violence. This framework highlights the shared ethical 
responsibilities that people have for maintaining their places of residence or dwelling. 
Sometimes these responsibilities imply allowing dominated peoples to take part in the 
governance of a region. Other times recognizing the social and economic contributions 
provided by alienated portions of society is required.  
When assuming bordered, self-enclosed and nationalistic polities, the basic 
assumptions of Anglo-American political philosophy run counter to that of encounter. At 
times, this renders North American political thinkers somewhat incapable of critical 
thought regarding such issues as undocumented immigration and national-citizenship. 
One possible reason for this inability stems from the specified and thus limited 
conceptions of justice found in this tradition—most are fixated with private property, the 
welfare state, nationalism, war, and establishing borders. The theory of the state that 
arises from this perspective can be understood as the inheritor of modern colonial forms 
of social arrangement, namely, the settler society.  
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Rather than starting as pure subject or national, Latino/as begin from inter-
subjective or inter-national predicaments, with foreign nationality, race, ethnicity and 
even culture serving as the signifiers of this status. Thus, a Latino/a political philosophy 
begins from the outside of nationality, a positioning that can respond better to the 
dynamic social climate of the United States and other first world countries. With a state 
that begins inter-subjectively, the model for social interaction is not assimilation but 
asimilao, an idea that fosters reciprocal cultural exchanges between immigrants and other 
“extra-national” individuals.12 In advocating for this ideal, my project falls in line with 
Dussel’s Invention of America. There, he argues for the realization of a true dialogue 
between the European and the colonized victim amidst the epistemic monologue of 
European modernity. The “monologism” results from the unwillingness to listen to an-
Other. This unwillingness stems from the universalization and imposition of strict 
standards for knowledge, and the subsequent naturalization of indigenous bodies and 
ways of thinking. In contrast the transmodern attempts to articulate a de-historicized, 
unbounded human being that “progresses” through interacting with Others on equal 
terms. This is perhaps a better model for the state in the age of human migration. Human 
interests are better served by taking encounters for what they are, meetings, and trying to 
foster a sense of dialogue and mutual respect that does not alienate significant portions of 
society nor ignore the legal demands of civil participants who lack proper identification.  
2. Re-Thinking the Meaning of ‘American’: Estadounidense 
Attempting to introduce the question of internationalism or multi-nationalism to 
domestic/national politics, this section will explore the possibility of one such re-
conceptualization of “American” national identity, the idea of Estadounidense, or 
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Spanish for “citizen of the United States” and something akin to “Unitedstatesian”. 
People of Latin American decent are changing the mechanics of racial exclusion in the 
United States, which brings to the fore novel types of participatory government that 
acknowledge the various ways that individuals can be “political” and not have legal 
status. 
It is perhaps because all the nations of this region stem from the same era of 
modern colonization, that the search for freedom (as a social and political category) is 
bound to freedom of consciousness in all the Americas. This remains the case in literature 
generated by Black Americans seeking incorporation into mainstream United States 
society as well as Latin Americans seeking to break old colonial regimes.  
For instance, in the philosophy of race in the United States, friction exists 
between what can be called race-conservation and race-repudiation. Best espoused by 
thinkers like W.E.B. Du Bois and the first Harvard educated Black philosopher Alain 
Locke, the conservationist view seeks an authentic culture that can stand alone as an 
original contributor to the goals of humanity. This is evident in Du Bois’s call for the 
embracement and cultivation of Black identity as a means of achieving a level of group 
awareness that demonstrates a readiness for full citizenship.13 Locke called this “the 
stimulation of a secondary race consciousness.”14 In addition Locke writes, “one must 
conform to the civilization type, but mere social imitation is, unfortunately, useless, for 
the reason that it involves antagonisms and reactions on the part of the dominant group 
that actually engender what we know as social friction.”15 On the other hand, the 
repudiation view asks for an authentic understanding of the self that depends upon ideas 
generated by an existential awareness of choice and a rejection of false biological notions 
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of race. Naomi Zack express this latter view when arguing that a first-person existential 
identification with a biological race is “tragic,” because it is based on false scientific 
ideals; to identify (on a first-person individual level) with ideas generated for domination 
and servitude provide no possibility of understanding one’s own life as free. 
The tension I am concerned with arises when both currents of thought (i.e. race-
conservation and race-repudiation) appeal to notions of authenticity, originality and 
freedom. There is no doubt that a link exists between freedom of mind or consciousness 
and a turn away from imperial impositions that colonize the mind. This is obvious in 
much Latin American political thought. For Latin Americans, projects of de-colonization 
often begin from a desire to avoid imitation. From Simón Bolívar to José Martí, Andrés 
Bello to Zea, the work of many Latin American intellectuals has concerned the 
intersection of cultural, racial, and political authenticity.16 The idea of cultural identity as 
connected to the fear of being heteronymous or imitative plagues much Latin American 
thought. As such there is a constant desire in much Latin American literature to articulate 
understandings of the Latin American predicament that begins from one’s own 
perspective, i.e., a colonized “mestizo/a” perspective.  
In one word these various libratory movements can be summarized in the nuestra 
(or “our”) of Martí’s essay “Nuestra Ameríca” (“Our America”). For the Cuban thinker 
and journalist, “Nuestra Ameríca” is the articulation of an understanding of the geo-
political positioning of Afro-Caribbean, Mulato, Mestizo/a, and other Latin Americans 
that differs from understandings of the region that are espoused by “Americans” in the 
north and conservative elites seeking to maintain oligarchies of power in the south. For 
Martí, Nuestra Ameríca, or “Our America,” is an understanding of America for Latin 
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Americans grounded in the histories of the indigenous people and the non-erudite social 
repressed/oppressed groups of the region.  
Evaluating comments like Martí’s, the Mexican philosopher, Leopoldo Zea, 
writes, “Originality is one of the major preoccupations of Latin American culture. 
Questions about the possibility of a Latin American literature, philosophy or culture are a 
clear indication of this concern with Latin American originality.” Zea then asks the 
following question: “Originality as against what?” He continues, “Originality with 
respect to Europe, or Western culture. However, the expression ‘with respect to’ (frente) 
should rather be interpreted to mean ‘in the presence of’ (ante).”17 Originality in this 
sense is not the creation of something ex-nihilo (from nothing) or from abstraction, for 
this tends to be a European understanding of originality. Rather originality in the Latin 
American context is the act of recreating, i.e., using something in an untypical manner for 
one’s own purpose. To become authentic in a Latin American standpoint is to take part in 
the recreation of Western culture, argues Zea; for Latin Americans to be authentic in light 
of the centuries of colonialism means that they must become contributors to the cultural 
climate of the region rather than mere imitators or those seeking recognition from the 
dominant powers that be. 
This type of authenticity, which Zea argues occurs in the presence of others and 
not in nothingness or abstraction, is the type of political being that is required in today’s 
age of migration. One such idea, meant to be a microcosm of the Latin American political 
tradition, is that of Estadounidense, which is the Spanish word for citizen of the United 
States, akin to “unitedstatesian.” For an individual to claim that they are an 
Estadounidense and not an “American” consciously acknowledges the history of 
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colonization and imperialism associated with the latter term. Estadounidense is a break 
with the rhetoric of emptiness that continues “America” as a continent devoid of other 
inhabitants. Estadounidense is a view of citizenship based on the notion of cultural 
pluralism. It is a Hispanic racial, cultural and ethnic conservation and simultaneously a 
repudiation of racist and ethnocentric beliefs about what constitutes an “American”; it is 
a type of political authenticity. Estadounidense offers a way of thinking about U.S. 
national identity and citizenship that is not racialized (nor racialized) by what is called 
“hegemonic identity politics.” However, my point is not to get people to use a new word 
when they speak of themselves as a citizen of the United States (I do not care about that). 
I want people to think about the meanings associated with such a terms and also realize 
what legacies attach to the terminology they use.  
It is apparent that as a nation we live in a critical moment. This moment is 
perhaps part of a larger predicament that the world is currently in. Immanuel Wallerstein, 
the world-systems theorist, identifies this as the brink of a new historical system. From 
Wallerstein’s perspective, the planet is entering into a new phase of history. It is one 
where diverse historical possibilities are possible: the axes of power can remain the same 
and thus privilege a racial, gendered, capitalist and imperialist hegemony, or it can shift 
towards a more just and equitable system that combats the legacies of oppression around 
the world.18 Seeing how Latino/as are a growing populous inside of one of the most 
dominant super power in the current state of affairs, their role as potential agents of 
change on a global scale is great. Thus, there is crucial need for rethinking the 
relationship between legal-citizenship and national-citizenship if we wish to (a) take 
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advantage of the political climate associated with the opportunity for “change” and social 
justice, and (b) combat the hegemony of the current world order.  
In addition to the new axiomatic trajectory mentioned in the last section, it is 
important to add that ethnic minorities and other populations historically alienated from 
the national imaginary must take part in the construction of these new nationalisms. It is 
not enough to say that individuals of diverse backgrounds or national affiliations must be 
recognized as members of the body politic. The politics of recognition, in this sense, does 
empower some but it keeps real power in the hands of those who do the recognizing. As 
civic participants in the public domain, such people as immigrants and others like 
Latino/as must articulate political meanings that are partially their own doing. Put 
differently, in order for these new nationalities to be meaningful on a personal level they 
have to self-articulated and arise from the perspective of a consciousness searching for 
self-recognition (not recognition from others). 
3. Notes  
                                                
1 See Walter Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America (Malden: Blackwell, 2005).  
 
2 See Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of “the Other” and the 
Myth of Modernity, trans. by Michael D. Baber (New York: Continuum, 1995). As 
Dussel explains, the idea of “encounter” (encuentro) has a long and controversial history 
of debate in Latin America, especially Mexico. 
 
3 Carole Pateman & Charles Mills, Contract and Domination (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2008), p. 37.  
4 Ibid., p. 46 
5 Ibid., p. 46 
6 Eduardo Galeano, “Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a 
Continent,” Contemporary Latin American Social and Political Thought: An Anthology, 
ed. Ivan Marquez (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), p. 177. 
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7 Nelson Maldonado-Torres argues that rather than attempting to assert superiority, the 
resurgence of neo-nativist nationalism are simply attempting to survive given the rapid 
growth of Latino/as and others. See Maldonado-Torres, “Decolonization and the New 
Identitarian Logics After September 11,” Radical Philosophy Review 8, no. 1, p. 38. 
 
8 Pateman, Contract and Domination, pp. 72-78. 
9 Ramon Grosfoguel, Nelson Maldonado-Torres and Jose David Saldivar, Latin@s in the 
World System (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2006), p. 8. 
10 I use ‘post-colonial’ cautiously since, as Enrique Dussel notes, American-born 
Europeans (Criollos) relied upon “encounter” to justify their fights for independence and 
nation building projects. Dussel, The Invention of America, p. 55.  
 
11 Ibid., p. 57. 
12 See Paula Moya, “Cultural Particularity versus Universal Humanity,” 
Hispanics/Latinos in the United States: Ethnicity, Race and Rights, Eds. Jorge. J. E. 
Gracia & Pablo De Grieff (New York: Routledge, 2000) 
 
13 W. E. B. Du Bois, The Conservation of Races (Washington: American Negro 
Academy, 1987), p 17.  
 
14 See Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations (Washington, D.C.: Howard 
University Press, 1992). 
 
15 Ibid, 90. 
 
16 In the Latin American philosophical context, both cultural and philosophical originality 
have been important themes of debate given the history of colonization, the colonial 
emphasis of scholasticism and the legacy of positivism. 
17 Leopoldo Zea, The Role of the Americas in History (Savage: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1992), p. 3. 
18 Immanuel Wallerstein, “Latin@s: What’s in a Name?,” in Latin@s in the World 
System, Eds. Ramon Grosfoguel et al (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2006), p. 3-4.  
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